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Preface
Heart failure is a chronic and progressive condition in which the heart is unable to pump
enough blood to meet the body’s needs. It affects over 5.8 million people in the United States,
with increasing diagnosed cases each year. Heart transplantation is the only viable therapy for the
patients who suffer from end-stage heart failure to improve their quality of life and survival. The
only source of hearts for transplantation is from cadaveric donors, which is very limited compared
to the heart transplantation waiting-list patient population. Thus, efficient and fair allocation of
this limited source to the patients is of top priority. In this dissertation, we develop mathematical
models to study the problem of heart allocation and analyze it by using simulation and optimization
techniques.
Because of the challenges in heart allocation, policy makers in the United Network for Organ
Sharing (UNOS) have periodically revised the heart allocation policies over time. In order to assess
the performance of different allocation policies, researchers have developed simulation models. The
Thoracic Simulated Allocation Model (TSAM) is a model of heart allocation system developed by
UNOS to evaluate the performance of the proposed changes in policy. However, TSAM makes
certain restricting assumptions in the simulation model.
In Chapter 1, we developed a simulation model of the complex heart transplant system in
the United States, that relaxes those assumptions and can be used to evaluate the potential impacts
of allocation policy modifications on several outcomes such as patients’ pre- and post-transplant
survivals. Furthermore, we proposed three common-sense policies by slightly modifying the current
UNOS allocation policy and compared their performance in terms of efficiency and fairness.
Due to the shortage of donor organs compared to the patients demanding for transplant,
donated hearts should be allocated in an efficient way. Furthermore, the allocation must be fair
with respect to different patient groups. It is not clear for the transplant community that the
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current allocation policy is optimal and there are debates regarding the efficiency and fairness of
the policy. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, we developed a constrained finite horizon Markov
Decision Process model to find the optimal allocation policy. Since the state space of the original
model is unbounded and the model is intractable, we study its fluid approximation in the presence
of several fairness constraints. The performance of our proposed optimal policy is evaluated and
compared with several benchmark policies by using the simulation model developed in Chapter
1. We conducted an extensive numerical analysis and provided insights about the structure of
the proposed optimal policy. In addition, we conducted fairness analysis of the proposed policy
by comparing its outcomes in the presence of several fairness constraints. The proposed optimal
policy tends to emphasize on the post-transplant outcomes of the transplantation system by shifting
allocation priority from sicker and older patients to healthier and younger ones. Our results show
that such a policy will significantly improve the efficiency of the allocation even in the presence of
fairness constraints.
In Chapter 3, we introduced a new fairness measure in organ allocation and study its poten-
tial benefits. In particular, while existing measures of fairness in the literature of organ allocation
are inefficient and have high prices, policies based on proportional fairness yield a lower price of
fairness and decrease performance loss. We formulate organ allocation with the goal of imposing
proportional fairness as a queuing model and analyze its fluid approximation. By studying neces-
sary and sufficient optimality condition of a transformation of this problem, we analytically show
that the optimal allocation policy under proportional fairness measure is an assortative partition
policy, if certain assumptions hold. Such allocation policies are easy to implement in practice and
have interesting insights. Our numerical results show that in terms of total utility, policies based
on proportional fairness perform in the midway point between the policy based on max-min fairness
measure and the one based on utilitarian approach. Thus, they significantly reduce price of fairness
in organ allocation systems.
iii
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Chapter 1
A Simulation Model of Heart
Transplant Queueing System
Summary: The optimal allocation of limited donated hearts to patients on the waiting
list is one of the top priorities in heart transplantation management. We developed a simulation
model of the U.S. waiting list for heart transplantation to investigate the potential impacts of
allocation policies on several outcomes such as pre- and post-transplant mortality. We used data
from the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) and the Scientific Registry of Transplant
Recipient (SRTR) to simulate the heart allocation system. The model is validated by comparing the
outcomes of the simulation with historical data. We also adapted fairness schemes studied in welfare
economics to provide a framework to assess the fairness of allocation policies for transplantation. We
considered three allocation policies, each a modification to the current UNOS allocation policy, and
analyzed their performance via simulation. The first policy broadens the geographical allocation
zones, the second modifies the health status order for receiving hearts, and the third prioritizes
patients according to their waiting time. Our results showed that the allocation policy similar to
the current UNOS practice except that it aggregates the three immediate geographical allocation
zones, improves the health outcomes, and is “closer” to an optimal fair policy compared to all other
policies considered in this study. Specifically, this policy could have saved 319 total deaths (out of
3738 deaths) during 2006-2014 time horizon, in average. This policy slightly differs from the current
UNOS allocation policy, and allows for easy implementation. We developed a model to compare
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the outcomes of heart allocation policies. Combining the three immediate geographical zones in the
current allocation algorithm, could potentially reduce mortality rate and is closer to an optimal fair
policy.
1.1 Introduction
Heart failure (HF) is a progressive disease that affects 5.8 million people in the U.S., with
550,000 new cases diagnosed annually. Heart transplantation is a life-saving treatment and improves
the quality of life and survival of late-stage HF patients (Stevenson, 2015). The source of hearts for
transplantation is from cadaveric donors, with patients joining the waiting list to receive a cadaveric
donor heart.
Since 2004, the number of new active adults (18+) joining the waiting list has increased by 40%.
However, the donation rate remains flat with 3.5 donations per 1,000 deaths in 2012, which increased
the size of the waiting list by 25% (Colvin-Adams et al., 2014). According to the UNOS data, since
2006 to 2014 total of 27119 adult patients has joined the waiting list which is significantly larger than
18962 heart donations during the same period. As of December 1, 2016, 3773 adult patients are on
the UNOS heart transplantation waiting list. These numbers clearly indicate a major imbalance in
supply and demand resulting in a substantial mortality for the patients on the waiting list (Colvin-
Adams et al., 2014). This shortage of supply raises the allocation question: which patients should
receive priority when a donor heart becomes available? This allocation problem is one of the top
priorities in heart transplant management (Colvin-Adams et al., 2014).
To enhance the fairness of organ allocation, the National Organ Transplant Act enacted new
rules to ensure the fair and equitable distribution of available organs (Davis and Delmonico, 2005).
Moreover, the allocation should be based on a priority rule for patients on the waiting list; i.e.,
if an organ is procured, patients should be ranked and the organ is offered to the highest priority
patient until it is accepted (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 2015). Allocation
policies, which substantially affect the quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) of the population, should
provide fair access to organs to all patients, independent of their race, age, and other characteristics.
Faced with such challenges, policy makers in UNOS have periodically revised their policies over time
(Colvin-Adams et al., 2012). The original heart allocation system, approved in 1988, was a two-tiered
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policy using medical emergency status applied to both adults and pediatrics (Colvin-Adams et al.,
2012). In 1989 UNOS/OPTN (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network) implemented the
heart allocation policy to place the highest priority upon those patients who are most likely to die
while waiting (Mancini and Lietz, 2010). In 1998, this allocation method was restructured into
a three-tiered system (status 1A, 1B, and 2) in which higher priority was assigned to the sickest
patients with a short survival rate (Renlund et al., 1999). Details of the revisions to heart allocation
policy from 1988 to 2012 are provided by (Colvin-Adams et al., 2012). Current UNOS allocation
policy was issued in July 2006 allowing a broader regional sharing of donor hearts (Singh et al.,
2012). However, the optimality of the current UNOS practice in terms of efficiency and fairness
is not clear and the OPTN/UNOS Heart Subcommittee recently suggested a reassessment of the
current allocation policy (Stevenson, 2015). Meyer et al. (2015) studied the limitations of the current
three-tiered medical urgency system and depicted the future direction of heart transplantation in
the U.S.
As assessing the performance of allocation policies for the nation is not amenable to clinical
trials, researchers have developed simulation models to analyze allocation policies. For example,
the Thoracic Simulated Allocation Model (TSAM) is a model of heart allocation system from July
1, 2009 to June 30, 2011, which has been used to evaluate the proposed changes in policy. TSAM
makes the following assumptions: (1) Arrivals of candidates/donors are input to the model with a
data file, (2) The initial waiting list is input to the model with a data file, (3) An entire history
of waiting-list status changes must be input to the model for each patient. As a result, in each
simulation, the same actual donors and candidates are used, thus statistical tests of comparisons are
not possible (Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients, 2015b). We relaxed those assumptions
by developing models for arrivals of patients and hearts, as well as models for change of health
status in the waiting list. van den Hout et al. (2003) built a model for the Eurotransplant waiting
list for heart transplantation and showed that international organ exchange reduces waiting list
mortality in different countries by 1.9% to 12.4%. Shechter et al. (2005) created a simulation model
for the liver allocation system to compare the performance of different allocation policies in liver
transplantation. Su and Zenios (2006) built a mechanism design model to examine the effect of
post-transplant information asymmetry on the kidney allocation system in terms of efficiency and
equity. Bertsimas et al. (2013) developed a framework to derive optimal policies for kidney allocation
3
while considering fairness constraints.
In this study, we developed a simulation model of the U.S. heart allocation system and validated it
to evaluate the potential impacts of allocation policy modifications on several outcomes such as pre-
and post-transplant survivals. We used the current UNOS allocation policy as the baseline policy for
our simulation model. With a few exceptions, this policy ranks patients in three different levels, i.e.,
geographical (proximity to the donor hospital), health status, and waiting time level. Specifically,
when a donor heart becomes available for transplantation, the policy first categorizes patients on
the waiting list based on their distance from the procurement Organ Procurement Organization
(OPO) into six zones, where each zone includes all transplant centers within some distance of the
donor hospital. Note that these zones are not geographical districts but are defined by proximity
to the donor hospital. It first offers the procured heart to the patients who are in the Designated
Service Area (DSA) of the same OPO as the heart is (Zone DSA); if no one is matched, the heart
will be offered to the patients of Zone A; if still no match is found, it will be offered in hierarchy
to patients in Zones B, C, D, and E. At each zone it classifies patients by their health status and
then primary and secondary blood type match with the donor heart. Within each classification,
patients are ranked by the total waiting time accumulated at that health status (see Appendix A.8
for details).
In addition to the current UNOS practice in allocating donor hearts, we considered three addi-
tional heart allocation policies based on modifications of the current practice. Specifically, Policy I
preserved the current prioritization rule but combined Zones A, B, and C into one zone. Policy II
preserved the current prioritization rule but changed the priority of health status from 1A>1B>2
to 1B>1A>2. Policy III preserved the current allocation prioritization but prioritized waiting time
over health status. Furthermore, we provided a framework to analyze the fairness of allocating
donor hearts by adapting similar concepts in the context of general resource allocation with a single
decision maker and multiple self-interested players.
1.2 Methods
Because the heart allocation system is complex with several components such as queues and
allocation schemes, we designed a simulation model to represent its behavior. Data from several
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sources is used to calibrate and validate the model from 2006, the last year in which changes to the
heart allocation policy were made (Kobashigawa et al., 2015), to the end of 2014. Patient records for
30,394 adults who are reported in the UNOS database were used. Among these patients, 2623 died
while waiting on waiting list and 17,667 went under transplantation. Also the SRTR annual data
reports were used to obtain more detailed information about the patients on the waiting list, as well
as the organ donation process (Colvin-Adams et al., 2015). Patient survivals were estimated using
risk adjustment models provided in the SRTR database (Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients,
2015a).
1.2.1 Overview of the Model
In order to design a flexible model to test the performance of a broad class of allocation
policies, we developed a simulation model of the heart allocation process on a daily basis. The
simulation model consists of six main modules: patient arrival, heart arrival, patient’s health status
change, pre-transplant survival, heart allocation, and post-transplant survival. Each module consists
of several sub-modules interacting together to simulate the allocation system (1.1).
Patient Arrival Module
This module generates patient arrivals to the waiting list and assigns various clinical and
demographic attributes according to conditional distributions. We modeled patient arrivals as a
nonstationary Poisson process (commonly used for modeling arrivals (Gallager, 2013)) with the
arrival rate depending on year. Daily arrival rates for the patient arrival process were estimated
by dividing the yearly arrival rates by 365 (see Appendix A.9 for sensitivity analysis on patient
arrival rates). We validated the model by comparing the outcomes generated by the model with
that observed in historical data. Each patient joining the waiting list has several characteristics and
attributes such as age group, gender, disease type, ethnicity, blood type, region, ventricular assist
device (VAD) status, pre-transplant (PTX) status, waiting time, and health status. UNOS considers
more than 70 disease groups for classifying the patients. Because the sample sizes in each group
were not enough to design statistical distributions, we aggregated these 70 groups into 9 broader
groups according to the organ data source of UNOS (Appendix A.1). At the time of listing, each
patient is assigned with one of four health statuses used by UNOS to represent the health condition
of a patient joining the waiting list. For details on medical criteria to assign a patient’s health status
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Figure 1.1: Overview of the Simulation Model of Heart Transplantation Waiting List
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see Appendix A.1.
The patient arrival module considers some hierarchal and conditional distributions to assign at-
tributes to patients (Figure 6 in Appendix). At the first level, regression was used to test the
time-dependency of each attribute and then the Chi-squared independence test was used for each
pair of attributes to assess the dependency among attributes. Among all the attributes, disease
group, VAD status, PTX status, gender, and arrival rates depended on calendar year. The distri-
bution of each of these attributes for each calendar year was generated based on historical data.
Heart status and age distributions were conditioned on disease group and the conditional distribu-
tions derived from historical data. After obtaining the distribution of age group conditioned on the
disease type, patient age was generated from a continuous uniform distribution for each age group.
Ethnicity and blood type are conditioned on gender, and their distributions were derived based on
gender distribution. The conditional region distribution was obtained using annual arrival rates. In
order to estimate the conditional distributions for each OPO, we aggregated the patient arrivals of
all the hospitals in that OPO. Hence, when a patient’s region was determined, the patient’s OPO
was generated according to the conditional distributions (Figure 6 in Appendix). Appendix A.2
elaborates on statistical dependency tests and creation of such hierarchy.
Heart Arrival Module
This module generates a newly donated heart and assigns its attributes that will be used
in the allocation process. Similar to the patient arrival module, each donated heart has several
attributes such as donor age, gender, blood type, region, ethnicity, and OPO.
Donated hearts arrive according to a nonstationary Poisson process varying by year, and the daily
arrival rates are estimated by dividing the yearly rates by 365 (see Appendix A.9 for sensitivity
analysis on heart arrival rates). UNOS datasets consider hearts from pediatric and adult donors as
the source for donated hearts. As we only considered the hearts from adult donors, we adjusted
the yearly arrival rates of hearts to account for this issue, as well as heart wastage. We did not
include the decision processes of patients in accepting/rejecting the offered heart, which depends
on the patient and heart characteristics, as well as geographical remoteness. However, extending
our simulation to incorporate such decisions is straightforward. Conditional arrival distributions for
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each heart attribute were estimated from historical data. Similar to the patient arrivals, at the first
level, the time-dependency of each attribute was tested using regression. Results showed that blood
type, age, and ethnicity depend on calendar year, and each distribution was estimated via historical
data. The Chi-squared test was then used to analyze the dependency of each pair of attributes in
the heart arrival process to create the second level conditional distributions. At the second level,
donor region, and gender depended on blood type and age, respectively (Figure 7 of Appendix).
Appendix A.3 elaborates on statistical tests and conditional distributions.
Patient Health Status Change Module
UNOS considers four medical urgency (health) statuses for the patients on the waiting list:
1A, 1B, 2, and Inactive. Health status 1A is for the patients with the most urgent health status.
These patients are mostly in hospitals requiring multiple intravenous (IV) medications and have
some sort of mechanical assist devices in their heart. Health status 1B is for the patients with less
urgent health status, who could be possibly at home using left ventricular assist devices (LVADs)
or multiple IV medications. The least urgent patients are assigned with the health status 2. A
patient who has already been evaluated and accepted by a transplant center, but cannot receive
a heart, is assigned with the Inactive health status. For instance, if a patient has another active
illness or infection that can possibly jeopardize the transplant process, she will be assigned with this
health status. Requirements for each health status are described in detail in OPTN policies (Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network, 2015) (see Appendix A.1 for more details). However,
the health status of a patient may change while waiting for transplant. We modeled the daily health
status progression of patients on the waiting list as a Markov chain and used UNOS/SRTR datasets
to estimate its transition probability matrix via maximum likelihood estimator (Ross, 2014). In
particular, we used the frequency of health status changes between each pair of health statuses over
time. Therefore, the module observes the health status of each patient at the start of each day
and determines her health status at the next day according to a transition probability matrix. This
module was validated by comparing the portion of patients in each health status produced by the
model with that observed in historical data (Table 20 in Appendix A.4).
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Pre-Transplant Survival and Delisting Module
In the absence of transplantation, removal of a patient from the waiting list may be due
to death or delisting. Different allocation policies induce different death and delisting distributions.
Therefore, in order to study the impacts of allocation policies on waiting list outcomes, one cannot
directly use historical data for death and delisting distributions (van den Hout et al., 2003). We
estimated the probability of death via Cox proportional hazard models. In particular, we used the
risk adjustment models of SRTR for estimating death probabilities (Scientific Registry of Transplant
Recipients, 2015a). We included all covariates of the Cox model regardless of statistical significance
because the magnitude of the proportional hazards is more important. The baseline hazard function
was estimated from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) datasets (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2015). Appendix A.6 provides details regarding pre-transplant
survival.
Delisting from the waiting list may occur as the patient has clinically improved or became too ill
to transplant. Annual number of delisted patients was used to estimate yearly delisting distribu-
tions. Also, Chi-squared tests revealed a significant correlation between delisting and health status.
Therefore, we produced annual delisting distributions for each health status (Appendix A.5). Death
and delisting modules were validated by comparing the outcomes produced by the model with those
observed in historical data. This module at the start of each day generates the probability of death
and delisting for each patient and updates the list accordingly. If none of these events happen, the
health status, waiting time, and age of the patient is updated and she moves to the next period
(day) (see Appendix A.6 for details).
Heart Allocation Module
Upon procurement of a donor heart to the system, this module ranks the patients on the
waiting list and offers it to the highest ranked patient. Because one of the purposes of this study was
to analyze the performance of any allocation policy, we used object-oriented programming to create
a flexible framework such that any combination of attributes could be used to rank the patients.
The current UNOS allocation rule was used as the baseline. With a few exceptions, the allocation
process uses the following hierarchy. Once a heart is procured in an OPO, it is offered to a suitable
candidate (based on prioritizing health status and considering primary and then secondary blood
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type match with the donor) that is registered on the waiting list of the same OPO. If the heart is
not matched or accepted at the procurement OPO, it is offered to larger areas with a hierarchy until
it is accepted and a match is found (see Appendix A.8 for details).
Post-Transplant Survival Module
In the model, after receiving a donor heart, patients enter the post-transplant phase. This
module keeps track of these patients and estimates their survival. To that end, we used the Cox
proportional hazard models reported in SRTR database to estimate the death probabilities after
transplantation (Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients, 2015a). Similar to the pre-transplant
survival module, all covariates were incorporated regardless of their statistical significance, and the
baseline hazards were estimated via CDC database (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2015). Therefore, at the start of each day, this module generates the probability of death for each
patient after transplantation and if a patient dies in a period, both the patient and graft are removed
from the system as organs are never transplanted more than once. Note that, however, we did not
consider graft survival and instead considered the patients who relist (after transplanted with a
heart) in the patient arrival module as UNOS datasets provide the arrival of patients demanding a
re-transplant (see Appendix A.7 for details).
1.2.2 Allocation Policies
Policy I: The geographical configuration of zones is a critical aspect in the heart allocation
system. An ideal zone is a geographically small one with a large population as the likelihood of finding
a match is higher and transportation time is short. We propose a three-tiered zone allocation system:
If a donor heart is matched with no one in its DSA, it is offered to Zone 1 (union of Zones A, B,
and C of UNOS allocation rule). Similarly, if it is not matched with a patient in Zone 1, it is offered
in hierarchy to patients in Zone 2 (Zone D of UNOS allocation rule) and Zone 3 (Zone E of UNOS
allocation rule). Note that in each zone we considered the same health status, blood type match,
and waiting time prioritization rules as UNOS. The rationale behind combining Zones A, B, and C
to form Zone 1 is that the 4- to 6-hour cold ischemic time for a heart is equivalent to approximately
1,500 air-line miles (Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients, 2015b) (Zone C also contains all
transplant hospitals within 1,500 miles of the donor hospital). A similar approach is proposed for
patients who are multi-listed for kidney transplantation (Ata et al., 2016) (see Appendix A.8 for
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details). In Appendix A.9, we conduct sensitivity analysis on priority zones combinations.
Policy II: To prioritize patients according to their health status, UNOS gives the first priority
to health status 1A, the second priority to health status 1B, and finally the third priority to health
status 2. The patients assigned with health status 7 (Inactive) are not considered in the heart-
patient matching algorithm. This allocation rule gives priority to patients with a higher medical
urgency status. However, it has led to a significant imbalance in the distribution of donated hearts.
In particular, more than 67% of all transplants correspond to status 1A while status 1A patients are
only 10% of those on the waiting list. Moreover, less than 30% of all transplants correspond to health
status 1B while these patients compromise 40% of the waiting list. This disparity has caused some
patients in status 1B relocate together with their families to other regions with shorter waiting time
(Stevenson, 2015). Also, prioritizing the sickest patients may not be optimal as they may experience
a shorter post-transplant survival compared to status 1B patients. Thus, in Policy we followed the
UNOS allocation system except that status 1B was prioritized over 1A in each classification (see
Appendix A.8 for details).
Policy III: In the current UNOS allocation policy, waiting time is the last priority. Prioritization
based on waiting time is unclear as van den Hout et al. (2003) wrote “waiting time as an allocation
factor has been a point of discussion for more than a decade.” Policy considered the UNOS allocation
rule except that in each zone waiting time is prioritized over health status, i.e., considering primary
and secondary blood type match, patients are ranked first by longer waiting time (see Appendix A.8
for details).
1.2.3 Model Validation
In order to compare the outcomes of the proposed allocation policies, we wanted to ensure
that the difference between policy outcomes is because of the real performance differences of policies
rather than randomness in the model. We used the standard variance reduction techniques to
decrease the effects of randomness in outcomes of allocation rules (Shechter et al., 2005). Because
patient and donor heart arrivals were assumed to be independent of the allocation policy, one stream
of random numbers was used to produce the patient population and another stream of random
numbers was used to produce the donor hearts across all policies.
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Once we combined all the modules, we validated the simulation model by comparing its outcomes
with the historical data for several measures, such as the number of patients on the waiting list at
the end of each year, yearly patient arrivals, yearly heart arrivals, number of transplants performed
at each year, number of deaths on waiting list at each year, and 1- and 5-year post-transplant
survivals. The simulation was run 30 times using the current UNOS allocation policy and the
average and standard deviation of the 30 replications were reported (Table 1.1). We also conducted
statistical t-tests to check the statistical difference between real data and simulation outputs (Table
1.2).
1.2.4 Fairness Analysis
Fairness is extensively studied in resource allocation problems involving a central decision
maker and multiple players where each player receives a utility based on the allocation chosen
by the central decision maker. In this context, the utility of a patient could be her post-listing
life expectancy or quality-adjusted life expectancy (one might also include perioperative pain and
distress). The utilitarian principle implies that an efficient allocation is one that maximizes the sum
of the expected utilities of the players, i.e., post-listing life expectancy of the patient population
(Rawls, 2009). However, the decision maker may settle on the utility allocation which incorporates
fairness considerations. In this work, we considered two axiomatically justified notions of fairness:
proportional fairness and max-min fairness (Young, 1995; Sen et al., 1997). The idea of max-min
fairness is to prioritize the players that are the least well off, so as to ensure the highest minimum
expected utility that each player derives (Rawls, 2009; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975). Proportional
fairness is the generalization of Nash solution where multiple players are involved (Nash, 1950).
In this fairness scheme, a transfer of resources is justified if the gainer utilities increase by a larger
percentage than loser utilities decrease. That is, an allocation rule is proportionally fair, if compared
to any other allocation rule, the aggregate proportional change is non-negative.
Suppose there are N players and Uj denotes the utility of player j and ωj is a weight such that∑N
j=1 ωj = 1. Note that since humans are equally precious, in the fairness analysis, we considered
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equal weights for all the patients (i.e., ωj =
1
N ). Define
Mα(U, ω) =

∏N
j=1 U
ωj
j if α = 1,(∑N
j=1 ωjU
α−1
j
) 1
1−α
if α ≥ 0, α 6= 1,
(1.1)
and let π denote an admissible policy. To find the fairest allocation, we considered a decision maker
who seeks to find a policy that yields the maximum value for the expected value of fairness measure
defined in (1.1), that is, a policy maker seeks a policy that maximizes the following quantity
vπ(s0) = Eπ {Mα(U, ω) | s0} (1.2)
where s0 is the initial patient population and expectation Eπ {·} is taken over all randomness in the
system. Let π∗ be the policy that maximizes formulation (1.2). Computing π∗ requires solving Bell-
man optimality equations and since the state space is extremely huge (may increase exponentially) ,
the current methods do not apply (Puterman, 2014). Thus, one needs to use approximate solutions
by approximate dynamic programming or fluid scaling (Powell, 2007), which is beyond the scope of
this study.
However, the fairness analysis studied in this section only provides the fairness ranking among
the policies and it reveals nothing about the fairness measure for the optimal fair policy. In order to
study the fairness in the heart allocation context, we considered a family of α-fairness that include
both max-min and proportional fairness as special cases. In particular, α = 1 and α→∞ correspond
to proportional and max-min fairness, respectively. Therefore, for a given allocation policy π and
initial patient population s0, we defined a metric (v
π(s0)), which measures the fairness of allocation
policies based on the α-fairness concept, i.e., assigns a numerical value to policy π. Then, an optimal
α-fair policy can be found by searching over all possible allocation policies.
In our implementation, we considered post-listing life expectancy as the utility for each patient,
defined as the expected life years that each patient gains from when he/she joins the waiting list,
until he/she dies. In order to estimate vπ(s0) for a given policy π, we created the initial patient
population s0 according to the waiting list distribution in 2006 and simulated the system until 2014.
Recall that we generated the same patient population and donor heart for all allocation policies. For
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each patient in the system (those who were in the system and arrived through the entire horizon), we
calculate the post-listing life expectancy as we know when he/she joined the system and when he/she
died. A patient may die while waiting for transplant or after transplant. For patients who went
under transplantation, after our simulation ends at 2014, we let the simulation of post-transplant
patients continue until all died. For patients who are still alive at the end of simulation horizon,
we let the simulation run until all die. This approach assumes that patients on the waiting list at
the end of the simulation horizon do not go under transplantation. However, this assumption is
not restrictive as this procedure (i) can easily incorporate the heart arrivals in the future, and (ii)
holds for all policies, therefore, their rankings remain intact. We removed the patients delisted from
the analysis as we could not locate historical data on their survival distribution. We estimated the
expected values in formulation (1.2) by the Monte Carlo simulation, i.e., we simulated the system
and in each simulation record the total utility of the entire patient population and take an average
over all runs. For each of the four considered policies, after simulating the policy, we calculated (1.2)
for both cases α = 1 and α→∞. These values are reported in Table 1.4. Note that our simulation
uses pre- and post-transplant Cox survival models to estimate the probability of death at each time
period for patients on the waiting list and those on the post-transplant phase. We validated these
models, which are the base for estimating post-listing life expectancies, by comparing our simulation
results with those in real data (Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3).
1.3 Results
This section provides the numerical results of our analysis, including validation of the model
and comparison of proposed allocation policies in terms of efficiency and fairness. Table 1.1 shows
the result of the simulation model outcomes along with UNOS reports from the start of 2006 to
the end of 2014. In particular, we reported the average and standard deviation of each output,
as well as the percentage of relative difference between historical data and model outputs. The
results of the simulation such as new patients listed, donor hearts, transplants performed, and
delisted patients closely match those observed in historical data for almost all years. Specifically,
we conducted statistical t-tests (Table 1.2) and our results show that simulation outputs are not
statistically different than real data. Our model slightly overestimated the pre-transplant deaths
and consequently underestimated the number of patients on the waiting list. All in all, the model
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mimics all the trends in different outcomes appropriately.
Table 1.1: Validation of Model Results
Outcome Measure 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
New Patients Arrival
UNOS 2554 2633 2825 2966 3029 2894 3115 3373 3730
Model Mean (x̄) 2586.3 2733.73 2953.7 3035.83 3129.5 2907.36 3293.83 3544.36 3816.1
Model Standard Deviation (s) 50.53 61.03 57.88 59.24 63.23 61.89 52.84 49.35 67.28
Difference (%) 1.24 3.68 4.35 2.3 3.21 0.45 5.42 4.83 2.25
Diseased Donors Arrival
UNOS 1893 1938 2100 1958 2080 2084 2165 2307 2437
Model Mean (x̄) 1897 1944.5 2107.6 1968.03 2072.1 2080.1 2158.53 2295.76 2429.43
Model Standard Deviation (s) 36.81 42.3 42.61 49.22 52.61 48.17 43.62 45.58 55.49
Difference (%) 0.21 0.33 0.36 0.5 -0.38 -0.18 -0.29 -0.48 -0.31
Deaths While on Waiting List
UNOS 331 279 299 301 263 287 269 285 309
Model Mean (x̄) 323.66 311 315.2 322.26 295 309.66 303.13 279.15 295.84
Model Standard Deviation (s) 23.23 22.35 26.54 28.37 22.37 30.59 26.6 25.36 26.84
Difference (%) -3.51 5.45 5.32 -3.87 16.25 8.54 -5.4 -5.88 -3.16
Number of Patients on the
Waiting List
UNOS 2551 2417 2466 2712 2904 2847 3063 3332 3400
Model Mean (x̄) 2504.23 2389.1 2224.4 2433.1 2565.8 2431.36 2606.36 2847.73 3044.06
Model Standard Deviation (s) 98.25 120.34 126.11 130.96 149.69 174.65 155.08 133.34 165.92
Difference (%) -1.86 -1.16 -10.86 -11.46 -13.18 -17.09 -17.51 -17 -11.69
Transplants Performed
UNOS 1870 1877 1796 1851 1967 1944 1998 2123 2241
Model Mean (x̄) 1897 1944.5 2107.6 1968.03 2072.1 2080.1 2158.53 2295.76 2429.43
Model Standard Deviation (s) 36.81 42.3 42.61 49.22 52.61 48.17 43.62 45.58 55.49
Difference (%) 1.42 3.47 14.78 5.94 5.07 6.54 7.43 7.52 7.75
Delisted Patients
UNOS 524 604 690 570 607 736 641 711 893
Model Mean (x̄) 520.43 609.26 694.96 569.33 598.26 740.23 640.66 710.16 890.8
Model Standard Deviation (s) 22.89 23.46 28.17 25.43 21.51 28.79 22.94 23.88 29.83
Difference (%) -0.68 0.86 0.71 -0.11 -1.45 1.24 1.5 0.44 0.87
Note. UNOS= United Network for Organ Sharing. Mean (x̄) and standard deviation (s) are the results of 30 replications.
15
Table 1.2: p-values of t-test for Comparing Real Data and Simulation Outputs
Measure New Patients
Arrival
Diseased Donors
Arrival
Deaths While on
Waiting List
Number of
Patients on the
Waiting List
Transplants
Performed
Delisted
Patients
p-value 0.58 0.99 0.1 0.14 0.07 0.99
Table 1.3 shows 1- to 5-year post-transplant survival rates produced by simulation and UNOS data
for patients transplanted between 2006 and 2014. The model predicts the post-transplant survival
rates accurately, especially 3- to 5- year post-transplant survival rates.
Table 1.3: Survival Rates of Patients Transplanted During 2006-2008
Survival 1-Year Survival
Rate
2-Year Survival
Rate
3-Year Survival
Rate
4-Year Survival
Rate
5-Year Survival
Rate
UNOS Reports 0.89 0.85 0.82 0.79 0.75
Model Mean (x̄) 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.8 0.75
Difference (%) 4.3 3.4 2.38 1.25 0
We compared the three policies described in the “Allocation Policies” section along with the
UNOS practice in terms of efficiency and fairness. We considered a policy to be the most efficient
if it achieves the least number of total deaths (pre- and post-transplant deaths), and closest to a
fair (proportional or max-min) policy if yields the highest value for the fairness measure defined
in formulation (1.2). Figure 1.2 shows pre-transplant, post-transplant, and total patient deaths for
each proposed policy from 2006 to 2014. The total number of deaths in the study period for the
current UNOS policy is 3788. However, this number is 3419, 3514, and 4148 for the Policies I, II,
and III, respectively. Policy I which combines Zones A, B, and C outperforms other policies. In fact,
Policy I reduced the expected number of deaths by 319. Also, policy II outperformed the UNOS
policy. Moreover, the performance of Policy III was worse than the UNOS practice. The results
indicate that prioritizing health status 1B over 1A and prioritizing waiting time are suboptimal.
Table 1.4 shows the results for vπ(s0) to analyze the fairness of proposed policies. Intuitively
speaking, a higher value of vπ(s0) for proportional (max-min) fairness indicates that the allocation
policy π is closer to an optimal proportional (max-min) fair policy for the initial population s0. In
particular, in an optimal proportionally fair policy, the aggregate proportional change in post-listing
life expectancy of patients compared to any other allocation rule is non-negative. Also, an optimal
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Figure 1.2: Comparison of Pre-transplant, Post-transplant, and total number of deaths for UNOS,
Policy I, Policy II, and Policy III (years: 2006-2014)
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Table 1.4: Results of Fairness Comparison of Policies
Policy Proportional Fairness Measure Max-Min Fairness Measure
UNOS 2209.28 108.76
Policy I 2356.5 109.45
Policy II 2294.4 109.77
Policy III 1921.92 108.86
Note. The proportional and max-min fairness measure columns indicate the values of vπ(s0) defined
in formulation (1.2) for α = 1 and α→∞, respectively. Note that a higher number implies a smaller
gap from the optimal policy. We used life days as a metric for each individual’s utility.
max-min fair policy obtains the largest post-listing life expectancy for the patients who have the
least life expectancy estimates, compared to any other allocation rule. Results show that Policy I is
closer to an ideal proportional fair policy among others as it has the highest fairness measure. Also,
our results show that in terms of proportional fairness, UNOS policy outperforms Policy III, which
prioritizes based on waiting time. Moreover, our results show that all the proposed policies perform
similarly in terms of max-min fairness.
1.4 Conclusion and Discussion
The problem of optimally allocating limited donor hearts to the patients on the waiting
list is one of the top priorities in heart transplant management as the imbalance between supply
and demand has increased over the last decade. Simulation models can help policy makers and
medical professionals to analyze allocation rules without actually implementing them. We developed
a stochastic simulation model of heart allocation system and validated it in several dimensions by
comparing the model outcomes with historical data from 2006 to 2014. We also adapted two well-
accepted fairness notions to develop a framework to analyze the fairness of allocation policies in the
context of organ allocation. In addition to the UNOS allocation rule, we considered three additional
policies: (1) one that combines Zones A, B, and C, (2) one that prioritizes status 1B over 1A,
and (3) one that prioritizes candidates based on waiting time. Our results showed that the policy
that combines Zones A, B, and C could avert 319 total deaths (pre- and post-transplant deaths)
and was closer to an ideal proportionally fair allocation policy. Hence, it seems that combining
these priority zones and broadening the organ sharing area may result in more efficient and fair
policies. Moreover, combining zones is easy to understand and straightforward to implement. Our
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results have a similar message with those observed for the Eurotransplant heart allocation simulation
model, where international organ exchange is estimated to reduce waiting list mortality in different
countries by 1.9% to 12.4% (van den Hout et al., 2003). Studies on other organs also found that
broadening the organ sharing area by multiple listing can significantly reduce the mortality rate
(Ata et al., 2016). Our results for the fairness analyses revealed that proportional fairness may be
of more interest to measure the fairness of organ allocation policies as the max-min fairness measure
for different policies was not significantly different. Our results show that this is due to the fact
that the post-listing expected life of the very sick patients does not significantly change by different
policies.
Our results indicated that the simulation model produced outcomes close to historical data, which
increases the confidence that the model can reasonably approximate the quantities of interest to
transplant community. In particular, one can use this model to analyze the performance of other
allocation policies and derive insights on how allocation policies change the waiting list population
dynamics. However, this study has several limitations, and by addressing them, we can develop a
more accurate decision-making tool to evaluate allocation rules.
First, although detailed data on patient and donor heart arrivals were available in the UNOS/SRTR
datasets for each region, these data were not available for each transplant center or OPO. Therefore,
we generated appropriate distributions for each region and assigned the OPO of a new patient or
donor heart based on a uniform distribution. The validation results show that patient and heart
arrivals closely match historical data. Second, since UNOS/SRTR datasets reported the frequency
of health status change independent of other patient attributes, we constructed a Markov chain in
the patient health status change module based only on health status and ignored other dependencies
such as age, gender, and waiting time. The validation of this module indicated that the distribu-
tions produced by the model are statistically the same as observed data. Third, because detailed
data for heart wastage was not available in UNOS/SRTR datasets, we adjusted the heart arrivals to
compensate heart wastage. Fourth, we did not model the patient choice in accepting/rejecting the
offered heart. However, adding such a feature to the model is straightforward upon availability of
data. Fifth, we considered post-listing life expectancy in analyzing the fairness of policies and did
not consider quality-adjusted life expectancy or cost. The cost component, which includes pre- and
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post-transplant care, may impact policy recommendations.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Allocation Rules for Heart
Transplantation
Summary: Identifying an efficient and fair allocation of limited donated hearts to patients
on the waiting list is one of the top priorities in heart transplantation management. The recent
heart allocation rule by the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) has emphasized medical
urgency to address the heart transplant crisis by further dividing the previous sickest patient group
into three subgroups. However, there is significant debate on optimality and fairness of such policy.
We undertake a rigorous study to address this debate. In particular, we quantify the price that the
society pays for following a medical urgency approach, which favors the sickest patients, compared
to a utilitarian approach, which seeks to maximize total life years (LYs). Our results, produced
by a validated simulation model, reveal that said price is 8% of total LYs and increases to 10% by
considering a broader regional sharing aligned with four hour cold-ischemic time for heart. In fact,
we provide concrete numbers for pre-transplant death and LYs broken down for each health and age
group to further shed light on this debate. We also consider relevant objectives in transplantation
and our results show that the “optimized” utilitarian policy outperforms that of the medical urgency
one in other measures. Our analysis provides novel insights on optimal patient allocation and sheds
light on the debate around this challenging problem. Furthermore, the UNOS Heart Subcommittee
plans to develop a scoring system for heart. We develop a heart allocation system which achieves
a similar performance to the optimized utilitarian policy in terms of LYs, and pave the way for
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designing future heart allocation systems.
2.1 Introduction
Motivation. Heart failure (HF) is a chronic and progressive condition in which the heart is
unable to maintain the blood flow. Over 5.8 million people in the U.S. are suffering from HF and
each year around 550,000 new cases are diagnosed (Bui et al., 2011). For late-stage HF patients,
heart transplantation is a life-saving treatment (Stevenson, 2015). Patients join a waiting list to
receive a cadaveric donor heart. Since 2004, the number of new adult candidates on the waiting list
has increased by 51%. The number of patients actively awaiting heart transplant has increased by
90% from 2004 to 2015. However, the donation rate remains flat with 2.8 donations per 1,000 deaths
in 2015 (Colvin et al., 2017). As a result of the shortage of supply, more than 3,000 patients died on
the heart transplant waiting list while waiting for a heart offer during 2006-2014 time horizon. This
shortage of supply raises an allocation question: How does one prioritize patients on the waiting list
in an efficient and fair manner?
The National Organ Transplant Act enacted new rules to ensure the fair and equitable distribution
of donated organs (Davis and Delmonico, 2005). Furthermore, certain priority rules for patients on
the waiting list should be used in the allocation process to find the best match for an available
donor organ (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 2015). Therefore, designing such
allocation policies is extremely challenging and faced with such issues, UNOS has revised the organ
allocation policies periodically over time (Colvin-Adams et al., 2012). Over the past two decades,
heart allocation policies have evolved due to the evolution of the clinical profile of end-stage HF
patients. The initial heart allocation policy, approved in 1988, was a two-tiered rule such that donor
hearts were allocated based on medical urgency and waiting time (Colvin-Adams et al., 2012). In
1998, UNOS revised the latest policy and restructured it into a three-tiered urgency-based system
(status 1A, 1B, and 2) which prioritized sickest patients with shorter survival rates (Renlund et al.,
1999). In July 2006, UNOS allowed a broader regional sharing of donor hearts keeping the three-
tiered urgency system intact (Singh et al., 2012). Recently, UNOS extended the three-tiered system
to a seven-tiered one, which is mainly medical urgency driven (Meyer et al., 2015). The seven-tiered
policy was approved by the OPTN/UNOS in December 2016 and is in effect since January 2018
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(Davies et al., 2017).
However, it is not clear that the current allocation policy is optimal for the transplant community,
and there are still significant discussions regarding enhancing its efficiency and fairness. In fact,
there are still debates among surgeons and policy makers in accepting the benefits of the seven-
tiered policy for the patient population (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 2016a;
Stevenson et al., 2016). Although the new proposal helps to reduce pre-transplant mortality rates
among sicker patients, it may worsen the post-transplant outcomes as it trades off a potential
decrease in waiting list mortality for an almost certain increase in post-transplant mortality.
Main Contributions and Results: In order to address the aforementioned debates, we quantify
the extent that LYs can be improved by shifting attention from a medical urgency approach, which
favors the sickest patients, to a utilitarian approach, which considers total LYs of the population.
In particular, we undertake the first study that investigates an optimal and fair dynamic allocation
of limited cadaveric hearts to heterogeneous patients on the waiting list for both perspectives rig-
orously. Previous attempts are ad-hoc, i.e., the proposals from OPTN/UNOS Heart Subcommittee
are evaluated via Thoracic Simulation Allocation Model (TSAM), which is a simulation model of the
waiting list, and decisions are made based on simulation results, among other factors. Our results
reveal that the said extent is around 8% of the total LYs and shed light on the trade-off between life
years gained and the number of deaths for each patient group by providing concrete numbers pro-
duced by a validated simulation model. In addition, the said extent increases to 10% if a broadening
of regional sharing is allowed in line of four-hour cold ischemic time for heart. Our analysis shows
that the improvement is mostly due to the post-transplant component of the total life years objec-
tive function. In fact, the UNOS policy performs slightly better than optimized utilitarian policy
(proposed policy) in terms of pre-transplant LYs, but its post-transplant performance is significantly
worse than that of the proposed policy. The analysis of the proposed allocation rule reveals that
its advantage emanates mainly from offering donor hearts away from the sickest patients and older
ones toward healthier and younger patients. Our results also show that the benefits from change in
health prioritization is more than that of age prioritization. Furthermore, our work sheds light on
the current debate around prioritization of patients with Ventricular Assistance Device (VAD). In
particular, our results show that the proposed policy does not prioritize patients with VAD, similar
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to UNOS.
We also consider other relevant objective functions and several methods developed for the total LYs
objective. In particular, policies produced by the utilitarian approach outperform UNOS policies in
terms of mean and standard deviation of waiting time among patient classes, which are measures of
fairness in transplantation. Specifically, the average waiting time can be reduced to half by following
the utilitarian approach. Moreover, if the objective is to minimize pre-transplant mortality (a true
medical urgency objective), our results show that UNOS or UNOS 7-tiered policy is near-optimal.
The UNOS Heart Subcommittee plans to develop a scoring system for heart allocation similar to
other organs such as kidney, liver, and lung (Meyer et al., 2015). We design such a heart allocation
scoring system (HAS), which involves two main challenges: (i) identifying relevant score components,
and (ii) estimating the coefficient of each component. We consider numerous sets of relevant score
components, use a data-driven approach to estimate the coefficients, and choose the best setup. In
fact, our proposed HAS policy achieves a similar performance to the optimized utilitarian policy in
terms of total LYs.
Finally, our results echo the recent change of heart allocation rules in Eurotransplant and France,
where post-transplant survival is included in prioritization (Smits et al., 2017). Moreover, post-
transplant survival is included in UNOS allocation rules for other organs. For example, UNOS lung
transplantation allocation rules consider post-transplant survival and age (Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network, 2015). Historically, a paradigm shift happened for kidney transplantation:
around two decades ago, the allocation rules prioritized the sickest patients but now they do include
post-transplant survival (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 2015). In fact, in “The
Complete Lives System” which seeks to establish an ethical framework to allocate scarce treatment
to a patient population, Persad et al. (2010) do not recommend a sickest-first prioritization as
it deprives treatment from other patients who may have benefited more (a utilitarian approach).
They also mention that when every patient cannot be saved, saving the sickest one is “flawed,” and
recommend an explicit preference for the young.
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2.2 Related Work
Two streams of work are related to our study: organ allocation and control of network
queuing systems.
Organ Allocation. We briefly review optimization/simulation work related to organ allocation
from a patient’s and policy maker’s perspective and then review related work on heart transplan-
tation. One stream of work in organ allocation focuses on finding the optimal time to accept an
offered organ based on patient/organ characteristics: see, e.g., Ahn and Hornberger (1996), David
and Yechiali (1985), and Alagoz et al. (2004, 2007). Our work is different from these studies because
we study the organ allocation problem from a policy maker’s perspective to find efficient and fair
allocation rules. In fact, optimal time to accept an organ is an optimal stopping problem while the
allocation problem is an optimization problem on a queuing network. Several studies considered
organ exchange programs such as Zenios (2002), and Ashlagi et al. (2011), which do not apply to
heart transplantation as organ exchange is not possible.
Transparency in the waiting list, regional redesign, and geographical equity are also addressed
in different contexts. For example, Sandıkçı et al. (2008) estimated the price of privacy in liver
transplantation; Kong et al. (2010) considered the redesign of allocation regions; Ata et al. (2016)
studied the problem of geographical disparities in access to donor kidneys. However, the objective
of our work is to find efficient allocation rules by considering fairness constraints and the methods
developed in these studies do not apply.
In a series of papers, Su and Zenios (2004, 2005, 2006) examined the impacts of patient choice
on (i) organ wastage and waiting times, (ii) efficiency of kidney allocation system, and (iii) post-
transplant information asymmetry on the kidney allocation system. We apply two methodologies
developed in these studies to heart allocation problem: one that seeks to improve the efficiency by
maximizing the total quality adjusted life years (QALYs) of the population, and one that seeks to
improve equity by maximizing the minimum QALYs of the patients. Also, Lee et al. (2008) studied
the allocation of dialysis capacity for patients with end stage renal disease considering fairness.
Bertsimas et al. (2013) developed a data-driven approximate dynamic programming model to
derive efficient policies for kidney allocation to maximize the total life expectancy while considering
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fairness constraints. We use this method to estimate the coefficients of numerous collections of point
systems that we design for heart transplantation in order to develop a novel scoring system for heart
allocation.
Akan et al. (2012) investigated the trade-off between medical urgency and efficiency in liver al-
location. A fluid model is used to minimize the total number of patient deaths while waiting for
transplant and to maximize total QALYs through a weighted combination of the two objectives. Our
work is different from this study in several dimensions: (1) we study the heart allocation problem,
where the source of hearts is only from cadaveric donors; (2) The fluid approximation of our stochas-
tic formulation differs from that in Akan et al. (2012). In particular, we consider fairness constraints
in formulating the stochastic system and show that the corresponding fluid approximation, which
contains integral constraints, has an optimal solution of the priority index type and provide novel
insights about the impact of fairness constraints on priority indices. Considering fairness constraints
is one of the major approaches to address fairness in organ transplantation (RFI, 2008).
In order to identify an efficient and fair heart allocation rule, simulation models are developed to
test the performance of different policies. For example, the TSAM is a model of heart allocation
system by UNOS/SRTR, which has been used to evaluate the proposed changes in policy (Scientific
Registry of Transplant Recipients, 2015b). van den Hout et al. (2003) developed a simulation model
of the Eurotransplant waiting list for heart transplantation to examine potential allocation policies.
Hasankhani and Khademi (2017) created a flexible simulation model of the U.S. heart allocation
system to compare the performance of several allocation policies. However, simulation models are
not able to find optimal allocation rules, which is the focus of this study.
Optimal Control of Queuing Networks. The fluid approximation is extensively used for an-
alyzing stochastic queuing networks for a variety of applications such as communication networks,
manufacturing systems, and service management.
Harrison and Zeevi (2005) studied a large call center with several numbers of input flows and agent
pools to minimize the expected total personnel costs and abandonment penalties via fluid approxi-
mation. Kiani et al. (2019, 2020); Yousefi et al. (2019) used classical techniques for solving MDPs
to find optimal appointment scheduling for healthcare systems. Bassamboo and Randhawa (2010)
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considered capacity selection in queuing problems with impatient customers who may abandon the
system to minimize the total cost. A fluid approximation of the original queue is applied to find the
optimal solution. Savin et al. (2005) formulated the problem of allocating capacity in rental systems
as a discrete-time MDP and analyzed the structure of the optimal policy of the original stochastic
system via fluid approximation. In a single server fluid network, Bäuerle and Rieder (2000) showed
that the optimal policy is a priority index policy. Perry and Whitt (2011) studied two queuing sys-
tems each having their own designated service pools, where servers of one queue may serve customers
of the other queue in the case of unexpected overload. They analyzed the system by approximating it
by a fluid model, and described its transient behavior under heavy traffic averaging principle. Meyn
(1997) studied the optimal scheduling problem for multiclass queuing network with deterministic
routing. It is shown that there is a close connection between the optimization of queuing networks
and the optimal control of their corresponding fluid network model. However, our study is different
from the literature of controlling queuing systems in several dimensions. For example, (1) If an
analogy is made where patients resemble customers and organs resemble servers, in our system the
number of servers is not fixed as servers arrive to the system according to a stochastic process and
leave permanently upon transplant; (2) There are two sources of abandonment as patients on the
waiting list may die or be delisted; (3) Patients on the waiting list may change their class as the
health of a patient on the waiting list may change, among other dynamics; (4) The objective is to
maximize total pre-transplant (waiting time) and post-transplant life years, which is different from
standard objective functions in queuing theory literature.
2.3 Problem Formulation
This section formulates the heart allocation problem as a finite-horizon continuous-time
constrained stochastic dynamic program. In particular, we consider a finite-horizon model because
UNOS changes allocation policies after a finite time (e.g., 10 years) and a continuous-time model
since arrival processes of patients and hearts are random. Patients arrive to the system according to a
random process and join a waiting list to receive a donor heart. We consider all patient characteristics
that affect the dynamics of the system, as well as pre- and post-transplant survival, e.g., age group,
health status, blood type, etc. Also, donor hearts arrive to the system according to a stochastic
process and are assigned to patients on the waiting list. We consider all donor heart characteristics
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that affect the evolution of the system such as donor age group and blood type. The donor heart
characteristics along with patient characteristics determine the (random) post-transplant survival.
Let I := {1, 2, . . . , I} and H := {1, 2, . . . ,H} be the set of patient and heart types.
Upon arrival of an organ, the decision maker offers it to a patient on the waiting list. If the patient
accepts the offer, a transplantation is carried out and the patient moves to the post-transplant phase.
If the patient declines the offer, the decision maker offers it to another patient on the waiting list
and this procedure continues until the organ is accepted or wasted (after several tries).
State Space. We assume that we keep track of N patients in the waiting list and let p =
(p1, p2, . . . , pN ) denote the state of all patients, where pn contains all information about patient
n. This assumption is not restrictive because one may consider a large N . The state of patient n
is given by pn = (in, τn, zn), where in ∈ I denotes the class of patient n, τn denotes the time that
patient n arrived to the system, and zn is a binary variable indicating whether patient n has declined
the current available heart. The indicator zn is set to zero upon patient arrival. If a patient declines
an offer, zn becomes 1 such that we do not re-offer the current available heart to the patient. If
the available heart becomes accepted or wasted, zn is set to zero for all patients on the waiting list.
Note that we keep track of patient arrival time to calculate his/her waiting time, among others.
Without loss of generality we assume that the dynamics of the system are driven by events. We
consider the following events in the system: “patient n arrives,” “heart type h arrives,” “patient
n dies,” “patient n delists,” “patient n changes class,” “patient n accepts offer of heart type h,”
“patient n declines offer of heart type h,” and “heart type h declined N times,” which triggers the
event “heart type h is wasted.” Therefore, state transitions take place at discrete points in time
when an event happens in the system.
Policy makers may face fairness constraints in offering high quality organs to specific groups of
patients. Therefore, let bhi denote the total cumulative offers of heart type h to patient type i and
b = (bhi : i ∈ I, h ∈ H). Hence, the state of the system is represented by s = (p, e, b, t), where p is
the list of patients containing state of all patients on the waiting list, e is the event type, b is the
offer history at time t, and t is the current time. Let P denote the set of all possible patient lists, E
the set of all possible events, and B the set of all possible offer histories. Therefore, the state space
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of the system can be expressed by
S := {s = (p, e, b, t) : p ∈ P, e ∈ E , b ∈ B, t ∈ R+}.
Because the state of the system does not change between events, the state trajectory is completely
characterized by {sκ : κ = 1, 2, . . . ,K}, where sκ is the system state right after the κth event, and
K denotes the final decision epoch, which corresponds to the end of the planning horizon. We let
t(sκ) be the time that event κ occurs, e(sκ) be the type of κ
th event, and b(sκ) be the offer history
up to the occurrence of κth event.
Action Space. When an organ becomes available, the decision maker offers it to the patients on
the waiting list. Let the event type be “heart type h becomes available.” Let H(s) = {h} be the
set that points to the available heart type, and let P (s) be the set of eligible patients with heart
type h when the state of the system is s, e.g., in terms of blood type compatibility, avoiding offer
to inactive patients on the list, and proximity consideration. Define ahn(s) = 1 if the available heart
of type h is offered to patient n, and ahn(s) = 0, otherwise. Let a(s) :=
(
ahn(s) : n ∈ P (s)
)
for
h ∈ H(s), the action space reads
A(s) :=
{
a(s) ∈ {0, 1}|P (s)| :
∑
n∈P (s)
ahn(s) = 1;h ∈ H(s)
}
. (2.1)
If an offer is made, b(s) is updated based on patient and heart types.
An offered organ may be declined by a patient. In this case, the organ will be offered to other
patients until it is accepted or wasted. Because the cold ischemic time for heart is around four hours
and each patient has about an hour to accept or decline the offer, the heart will be wasted after a
few offers, e.g., N = 4 (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 2017). Therefore, if the
event is of type “patient n declines heart type h offer,” patient n is removed from the list of eligible
patients, i.e., P (s) ← P (s) \ {n} and an offer is made similar to formulation (2.1). If the organ is
declined in the second effort, we continue offering it to the eligible patients until one of these events
happen: “patient n accepts heart type h offer,” or “heart type h is declined N time,” which triggers
the event “heart type h is wasted.” In modeling the patient decision in accepting/declining the
offer, we assume that the sequence of such events, that starts with heart arrival and ends with heart
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acceptance or wastage, happen sequentially but without time delay. That is, the time between organ
arrival and organ acceptance/wastage is zero. This assumption is for modeling purposes and is not
restrictive because when a heart becomes available, it will be accepted or wasted in less than four
hours, which is much less than the expected time for the arrival of the next heart in a Designated
Service Area (DSA). If the event is not of type “heart type h arrives,” or “patient n declines heart
type h offer,” the action space is empty, i.e., A(s) = ∅.
Transitions. We assume that patients of type i join the waiting list according to a stochastic
process with finite mean. Also, hearts of type h arrive to the system according to a stochastic
process with finite mean. In particular, our estimates of real data for the U.S. transplant system
show that the arrival processes of patients and hearts are non-stationary Poisson processes. Patients
on the waiting list may die before transplantation. The probability of death in a period on the
waiting list depends on patient characteristics such as age, health status, type of heart disease, etc,
and is estimated via a Cox proportional hazard model. Patients on the waiting list may be delisted
due to several reasons such as unsuitability for transplantation. Delisting probabilities may also
depend on patient characteristics. Dynamic characterization of patients may change over time. The
age of patients changes deterministically. The health of a patient may change probabilistically while
waiting for transplantation, which may depend on other characteristics and the time that a patient
has been in a health status. We assume that a heart is accepted by a patient with a probability that
depends on heart quality and patient characteristics.
Recall that κ denotes the index of the κth event. The complete trajectory of the system is therefore
represented by {(sκ, aκ) : κ = 1, 2, . . . ,K}, where sκ is the system state and aκ is the action taken
(if any) at the time of the κth event. The stochastic evolution of the system can be presented by
sκ+1 = F (sκ, aκ, ω(sκ, aκ)), where F (., ., .) is a transfer mapping and ω(sκ, aκ) is a random element
that contains all the sources of randomness in the system. In fact, ω(sκ, aκ) produces the time and
type of the next event considering all the stochastic processes involved.
Rewards. We consider a policy maker who seeks to maximize the QALYs of the entire patient
population in a finite horizon. Let h(sκ, aκ, sκ+1) be the total QALYs received by transition from
state sκ to sκ+1 when action aκ is taken at the time of the κ
th event. Let Xi(t) denote the number
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of patients of type i on the waiting list at time t. The expected immediate reward is then given by
h(sκ, aκ, sκ+1) =

(t(sκ+1)− t(sκ))(
∑I
i=1 βiXi(t(sκ))) if the event e(sκ) is of the form “patient n
arrives,” or “patient n dies,” or “patient n
delists,”or “patient n changes class”
or “heart h wasted,”
(t(sκ+1)− t(sκ))(
∑I
i=1 βiXi(t(sκ))) + α
h
i if the event e(sκ) is of the form “patient n
accepted heart type h offer,”
and is zero otherwise, where t(sκ) denotes the occurrence time of event κ, βi is the quality of life
for a patient type i on the waiting list, and αhi denotes post-transplant QALYs of a type i patient
receiving heart type h.
Recall that K denotes the last event index in the system which corresponds to the end of the
horizon, i.e., t(sK) = T . Let the final reward r(sK) be the total future QALYs of the patients who
are on the waiting list at the end of the planning horizon. We then have r(sK) =
∑
i ηiXi(t(sK)),
where ηi is the future expected QALYs for patients who are in the system at the end of the planning
horizon.
Optimality Equation. Let Π denote the set of all non-anticipative policies. Let Jπ(s) be the
expected total reward starting from state s0 = s under policy π ∈ Π. By letting π(sκ) denote the
action selected by an admissible policy π in state sκ, Jπ(s) can be written as:
Jπ(s) = Eπ
{K−1∑
κ=1
h(sκ, π(sκ), sκ+1)) + r(sK)
∣∣∣∣s0 = s}, for s ∈ S, π ∈ Π.
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Therefore, the decision maker solves for V (s) = sup
π∈Π
{Jπ(s)}, where V (s) is the optimal value func-
tion, which satisfies the Bellman optimality equation
V (s) = max
a∈A(s)
{
Ea
(
h(s, a, s′) + V (s′)
)}
, ∀s ∈ S, (2.2)
with a boundary condition V (sK) = r(sK), where s
′ is the next state after taking action a in state
s, and the expectation is taken with respect to action a.
In organ transplant, fairness may be seen by considering a lower bound on the percentage of total
offers to specific groups of patients (RFI, 2008). For example, if a policy maker seeks to offer at
least 10% of good quality hearts h′ to the oldest age group i′, a constraint of type Eπ
{
bh
′
i′ (sK)
}
≥
Eπ
{
0.1
∑
i b
h′
i (sK)
}
should be imposed, where bh
′
i′ (sK) is the total number of heart type h
′ offers
made to type i′ patients at the last event K. Consider K fairness constraints and let {Fk}1≤k≤K be
a collection of subsets of patient indices, where Fk ⊆ I for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, {Gk}1≤k≤K be a collection
of subsets of heart type indices, where Gk ⊆ H for 1 ≤ k ≤ K and {ak}1≤k≤K be a collection of real
numbers, where ak ∈ [0, 1] for 1 ≤ k ≤ K denotes the lower bound on the percentage of the hearts
belong to set Gk, allocated to the patients whose indices belong to the set Fk. Then, the fairness
constraints can be written as follows:
Eπ
{ ∑
i∈Fk
∑
h∈Gk
bhi (sK)
}
≥ Eπ
{
ak
∑
i∈I
∑
h∈Gk
bhi (sK)
}
; 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
Therefore, by letting b(sK) =
(
bhi (sK)
)
i∈I,h∈H fairness is modeled by imposing constraints of type
Eπ{Ab(sK)} ≥ 0 , where A is a K by IH matrix, with elements ak,ih defined by
ak,ih =

1− ak, if i ∈ Fk, h ∈ Gk
−ak, if i ∈ I \ Fk, h ∈ Gk.
In this case, the policy maker solves
sup
π∈Π
{
Jπ(s) : Eπ{Ab(sK)} ≥ 0
}
, (2.3)
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which is a constrained stochastic dynamic program (Altman, 1999). The standard dynamic pro-
gramming principles do not apply to (2.3) because of the fairness constraints.
2.4 Fluid Approximation
Solving formulations (2.2) and (2.3) to optimality is intractable due to the curse of dimen-
sionality. Therefore, we employ fluid approximation techniques to produce feasible allocation rules
to the constrained stochastic problem, and evaluate them in Section 2.6.
In creating the fluid approximation, we assume that the death, class change, and delisting rates do
not depend on the waiting time of patients. Our simulation results, however, show that the solutions
produced by this approach have high quality in a setting where these rates do depend on waiting
times. Recall that patients on the waiting list are categorized by different characteristics such as age
group, blood type, VAD status, and health status, indexed by i ∈ I. Therefore, there are I number
of queues for patients in the system. We let λi(t) be the arrival rate of class i patients at time
t. Similarly, hearts are categorized by different characteristics to reflect quality indexed by h ∈ H.
Hence, there are H classes associated with hearts and let µh(t) denote the arrival rate of heart type
h at time t. Let xi(t) be the number of patients in class i at time t, and x(t) = (x1(t), ..., xI(t))
T
be the state trajectory, which is an I-dimensional column vector with T denoting the transpose of
a matrix. There are xi(0) patients in class i initially, and x(0) is the initial state of the system.
According to the UNOS classification (2006-2018), there are four health statuses: 1A, 1B, 2, and
7 (Inactive), where health status 1A is the worst and 2 is the best health status. Status 7 is for
patients who are not considered in the allocation process, e.g., those who are too sick to transplant.
The health status of a patient may change over time, which corresponds to a change of queue in
our fluid model. Let ρij be the rate at which patients of class i become patients of class j and
ρ = [ρij ] be the class change matrix. For transitions that are not possible, set the rate ρij = 0 and
ρii = 0 for all i. Also, define ρ̂ = [ρ̂ij ] as an I × I diagonal matrix with ρ̂ii =
∑
j ρij . Patients
of class i die with rate di, which incorporates the delisting rate of class i patients as well. Let d
be an I × I dimensional diagonal matrix with dis on the diagonal and qh for h = 1, . . . ,H be the
offer acceptance probability matrix, which is an I × I dimensional diagonal matrix, with qhi s on its
diagonal, where qhi denotes the acceptance probability for patients in class i when offered with a
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heart with quality h. In particular, if phi is the probability that a patient type i accepts an offer
of heart type h, then qhi = 1 − (1 − phi )N . Since UNOS dynamically allocates organs to patients,
let the control variables uhi (t) be the rate of allocating a heart type h to patients of class i at time
t, and uh(t) = (uh1 (t), . . . , u
h
I (t))
T for h = 1, . . . ,H. Denote the control variable of the system by
u(t) = (uh(t) : h = 1, ...,H; t ≥ 0) which satisfies three sets of constraints: donor heart limitation,
non-negativity constraints, and constraints of type uhi (t) = 0 for (i, h) ∈ INF, where INF indicates
the infeasible set of patient-heart pairs, e.g., the pair (i, h) does not satisfy blood type matching.
Hence, a control u(t) is feasible if
u(t) ∈ Ω(t) := {u(t) : e.uh(t) ≤ µh(t); uh(t) ≥ 0, ∀h; uhi (t) = 0, ∀(i, h) ∈ INF}, (2.4)
where e is an I-dimensional row vector of ones. Given a feasible control u(t), the system state
evolution can be expressed by the following system of equations:
ẋ(t) = λ(t)−
H∑
h=1
qhuh(t)− (d+ ρ̂− ρT )x(t), x(0) = x0 (2.5)
x(t) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0, (2.6)
where λ(t) is a column vector whose ith entry at time t is λi(t). In order to incorporate fairness
constraints in an average sense (over time) into the fluid model, we consider the following set of K
fairness constraints
∫ T
0
( ∑
i∈Fk
∑
h∈Gk
uhi (t)
)
dt ≥ ak
∫ T
0
(∑
i∈I
∑
h∈Gk
uhi (t)
)
dt; k = 1, . . . ,K. (2.7)
Consider a policy maker who seeks to maximize the total QALYs of the population over a finite
horizon, which captures both pre- and post-transplant life expectancy of each patient on the trans-
plantation waiting list. In order to capture the reward accrued by patients on the waiting list, let
βi be the quality-adjusted coefficient of a patient in class i while waiting for transplantation and
β = (β1, ..., βI). Hence, the total QALYs rate for the entire population at time t can be written as
βx(t). To capture the post-transplant life expectancy of patients, let αhi denote the expected QALYs
of a patient in class i transplanted with a heart with quality h, and αh = (αh1 , ..., α
h
I ). The total
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post-transplant QALYs can then be written as
∑H
h=1
∫ T
0
αhqhuh(t)dt, where T denotes the end of
the planning horizon. Finally, in order to capture the final rewards, let ηi be the expected future
QALYs of a patient in class i who is still waiting for an organ at time T , and η = (η1, ..., ηI). The
expected final reward is then ηx(T ). Hence, the fluid model for the stochastic system in Section 2.3
is as follows: 
VF (x0) = max
∫ T
0
(∑H
h=1 α
hqhuh(t) + βx(t)
)
dt+ ηx(T )
subject to (2.4)− (2.7),
(P1)
where VF (x0) is the optimal objective function of the fluid model given that the initial state of the
system is x0, which is an optimal control problem with pure state constraints, as well as integral
constraints. Because the optimal control problem (P1) has integral constraints, the standard nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for optimality do not directly apply. Therefore, we transform (P1)
to a pure state optimal control problem with final time state constraints and show that the optimal
policy is a priority rule.
Let ki(t) be the shadow price of the i
th state evolution constraint in (2.5), which measures the
future benefit of type i patients in terms of QALYs if not transplanted at time t, and k(t) =
(k1(t), . . . , kI(t)). Let y
h
i (t) be the shadow price of the ih
th constraint corresponding to the evolution
of auxiliary state variables zhi (t) defined to transform (P1) (see B.2), y
h(t) = (yh1 (t), . . . , y
h
I (t)), and
y(t) = (yh(t) : h = 1, ...,H; t ≥ 0). Let wi(t) be the shadow price associated to the ith non-
negativity constraint in (2.6), and w(t) = (w1(t), . . . , wI(t)). Finally, let γk be the k
th adjoint
variable associated to the kth fairness constraint, and γ = (γ1, . . . , γK). The following theorem
characterizes the structure of the optimal policy.
Theorem 2.1. A feasible triple of state and control variables (x, z, u) is an optimal solution for
(P1) if and only if there exist shadow prices k(t) and y(t) with one sided limits everywhere, a non-
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decreasing vector w(t), and an adjoint vector γ such that
k̇(t) ≤ (k(t)− w(t))(d+ ρ̂− ρT )− β, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], k(T ) = η,
if xi(t) > 0 , k̇i(t) = [(k(t)− w(t))(d+ ρ̂− ρT )]i − βi,
ẏ(t) = 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], y(T ) = γA, (2.8)
γ · (Az(T )) = 0, γ ≥ 0 (2.9)
uh(t) ∈ argmax
v
{((
αh − k(t)
)
qh + yh(t)
)
v : v ∈ R|I|+ , e · v ≤ µh(t), vhi = 0; (i, h) ∈ INF
}
∀h ∈ H.
(2.10)
Equation (2.10) gives the optimal control of the fluid model, which shows that given the
shadow prices k(t), and y(t) the optimal control at each time t can be found by solving a Knapsack
problem whose solution is given by sorting the patient groups. In fact, at each time t and for each
available heart type h, the optimal solution prioritizes the patient groups based on the quantity(
αhi − ki(t)
)
qhi + y
h
i (t), which can be interpreted as the marginal benefit in terms of QALYs that
a patient type i may gain from transplanting a heart type h while considering the impact of the
fairness constraints. Given shadow prices, the optimal policy is of priority rule type which is easy
to understand and implement. A policy maker creates a priority list of patient types and offers the
available heart according to the priority list. In each class, the offer is given to the patients with the
largest waiting time. If there are less than N patients in a priority, a rejected heart will be offered
to patients in lower priorities. We denote this policy by optimal priority list (OPL) policy.
Theorem 2.1 shows that even in the presence of fairness constraints, the optimal policy is a priority
index policy with priority coefficients
(
αhi − ki(t)
)
qhi + y
h
i (t). To provide insights on this quantity,
note that by (2.8), shadow prices yhi (t) are constant in [0, T ] and this constant value is the ihth
element of the vector γA, i.e., yhi (t) =
(
γA
)
ih
=
∑K
k=1 γkak,ih. Therefore, the priority index policy
is with respect to the priority coefficient
(
αhi − ki(t)
)
qhi +
∑K
k=1 γkak,ih. The shadow price y
h
i (t) can
be interpreted as the impact of fairness constraints in the QALYs of the patients in class i receiving
a heart type h, where the contribution of the kth fairness constraint is equal to γkak,ih. By the
definition of matrix A (see Section 2.3), for i ∈ Fk, the entry ak,ih = 1−ak is non-negative, meaning
that the impact of kth fairness constraint on the priority coefficient is non-negative and imposing
fairness constraint k favors patients in Fk. On the other hand, the entry of matrix A for i ∈ I \Fk,
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ak,ih = −ak is nonpositive, showing the negative impact of the kth fairness constraint on the patients
in I \Fk. In other words, in the presence of the kth fairness constraint, patients in Fk have a higher
priority coefficient and patients in I \ Fk have a lower priority coefficient (note that γk ≥ 0 for
k = 1, . . . ,K). In addition, γk, the shadow price associated to the fairness constraint k, must be
zero when the corresponding constraint is not binding by (2.9), i.e., when the fairness constraint is
not active in the optimal solution, its contribution to yhi (t) is zero. Hence, when none of the fairness
constraints is active in the optimal solution (i.e., all fairness constraints are redundant), γ = 0 and
in such a case, the OPL policy coincides with the policy proposed in Akan et al. (2012).
The implementation of the OPL policy requires an efficient procedure to calculate shadow prices.
From the proof of Theorem 2.1 one can see that, when the system is overloaded, i.e., x(t) > 0 for all
t ∈ [0, T ], k(t) satisfies the following linear system of differential equations: k̇(t) = −β+k(t)(d+ ρ̂−
ρT ), with final condition k(T ) = η, which is solved by using the matrix methods for solving linear
systems of differential equations.
Remark 2.1. The indexibility property of the optimal policy holds when the fairness constraints
are applied in an “average” sense, i.e., during the planning horizon [0, T ] at least ak percent of the
total hearts of type Gk are allocated to the patients of type Fk. However, the indexibility property of
the optimal policy is not generelizable to an “almost sure” setting, where at each time t ∈ [0, T ] the
constraints must hold true, i.e., at least ak percent of the total hearts of type Gk are allocated to the
patients of type Fk, which can be written as Au(t) ≥ 0. In this case, the optimal solution solves the
following LP at time t: maximize
∑H
h=1[α
h − k(t)].qhuh(t), subject to, uh(t) ∈ Ω(t) ∩ {Au(t) ≥ 0},
whose solution is a randomized policy using a proof similar to Theorem 2.1.
Remark 2.2. Fluid models may provide an upper bound on the optimal value function of the stochas-
tic system. We show that the fluid model of a bounded Markovian version of our problem also provides
an upper bound, which can be used to assess the quality of solutions in that setting. We also test the
validity of such assumptions in our problem using real data: see Section B.3.
Remark 2.3. In our simulation model, the fluid model (P1) is solved for each region separately
based on data specific to that region for creating the priority lists. However, regional sharing is
an important issue in organ transplantation, which may address geographical disparity. In order to
address this issue, we reformulate problem (P1) to include Organ Procurement Organization (OPO)
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as one of the factors defining patient and heart classes, derive the optimal policy in the presence of
certain proximity constraints, and simulate it to investigate insights from such regional inclusion:
see B.6 for details.
2.5 Alternative Objective Functions
The main objective function considered in this work is the maximization of total QALYs
of the entire patient population. However, there are other related objective functions in organ
transplantation.We analyze the heart allocation problem with four alternative objective functions.
In particular, we formulate two optimal control problems with different objective functions but the
same feasible state-action region as (P1): one to minimize the total number of pre-transplant deaths,
and the other to minimize the total wastage of donor hearts, denoted by problems (P2) and (P3),
respectively. In particular, a policy maker who seeks to minimize the pre-transplant deaths solves
for 
min
∫ T
0
e.dx(t)dt
subject to (2.4)− (2.7).
(P2)
Similarly, if the objective of a policy maker is to minimize the total organ wastage, which is equivalent
to maximizing the total transplanted organs, the policy maker solves

max
∑H
h=1
∫ T
0
e · qhuh(t)dt
subject to (2.4)− (2.7),
(P3)
where e is an I-dimensional vector of all ones. Denote the optimal policies derived from solving
problems (P2) and (P3) by MPD, and MTW, respectively.
Similar arguments as in proof of Theorem 2.1 show that the optimal solution of both problems
are priority type policies. Specifically, at time t, the optimal solution of problem (P2) prioritizes
patients according to ascending order of the coefficients qhi k̂i(t)−ŷhi , where k̂i(t) is the ith component
of adjoint variables vector associated to state evolution constraints in (2.5) and ŷhi (t) is the shadow
price associated to the evolution of auxiliary variables introduced for each integral constraint (see
B.5.2). In fact, if the acceptance probability is the same among patients, and patients are only
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categorized by their health, then in the absence of fairness constraints, the optimal solution of
problem (P2) coincides with the UNOS policy, which prioritizes patients in the order of worst to
best health status (1A > 1B > 2), as pre-transplant death rates satisfy d1A > d1B > d2 from
real data estimation. On the other hand, when the objective is to minimize the total wastage of
hearts, the optimal policy prioritizes patients according to coefficient qhi + ỹ
h
i (t) where q
h
i is the
ith diagonal element of the acceptance matrix qh and ỹhi (t) is the shadow price associated to the
auxiliary variables introduced to transform integral fairness constraints (see B.5.2). In other words,
the optimal solution of problem (P3) is a priority index policy for each available heart type h, which
prioritizes patients with higher heart acceptance probability in the absence of fairness constraints.
Furthermore, we study two other objective functions related to the expected waiting time of
patient classes on the waiting list, because reducing the waiting list and time to transplantation is
a top priority of UNOS. Zenios (1999) studied the organ allocation problem as a queuing model
with reneging and derived asymptotic expressions for the expected waiting time of different patient
classes. We use these expressions and formulate a problem that minimizes the mean of the expected
waiting time across all patient classes (MWT Policy). Furthermore, we study the equity policy
(VWT Policy) introduced in Zenios (1999), which equalizes waiting times of patient classes: see B.5
for details.
2.6 U.S. Heart Transplantation System
This section presents the result of applying the methods discussed in Sections 2.3-2.5 to
the U.S. heart transplantation waiting list and explains novel insights. In the U.S., the OPTN
maintains the national registry for donated organs and manages the organ allocation process under
the administration of UNOS. Patients demanding transplant have to register in OPOs waiting lists
to receive an offer. Donated hearts also become available in OPOs and are offered to the patients
according to a policy which is based on certain priority rules. There are a total of 59 OPOs in the
U.S. distributed in 11 geographical regions across the country and each OPO includes one or more
transplant centers. According to the UNOS data reports, adult patients are categorized into four
age groups ([18-35], [35-50], [50-65], and [65+]), four health status groups (1A, 1B, 2, and Inactive),
four blood type groups (O, A, B, and AB), and two VAD status groups (showing whether a patient
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has ventricular assist device in their heart) (Colvin-Adams et al., 2015). Hence, we classify the
patients on the waiting list into 128 classes. Similarly, donor hearts are classified into 16 heart
types based on the age (four age groups) and blood type (four blood type groups) of the donor. We
consider the planning horizon 2006-2014 because the three-tiered allocation policy was implemented
since 2006 (Kobashigawa et al., 2015). The initial population in each class at the start of the
planning horizon is estimated by using the SRTR annual data reports. All the parameters defined
in Sections 2.3-2.5 are directly estimated from the UNOS and SRTR data sets or, if not available, by
the validated simulation model of Hasankhani and Khademi (2017). The overview of the simulation
model is enclosed in B.4. Using this set of parameters, we solve the discretized version of the optimal
control problem (P1), explained in Section B.3, for each region separately to find its optimal solution
and calculate the total LYs received by the patients of each region in the absence of the fairness
constraints. In the numerical analysis we use LYs instead of QALYs due to unavailability of data.
2.6.1 Benchmark Policies
We consider several benchmark policies along with the policies proposed in Sections 2.4
and B.3 and study their performance via the simulation model. In particular, we consider UNOS,
UNOS 7-tiered (new OPTN proposed policy), Su/Zenios efficiency (SZE), and Su/Zenios equity
(SZQ) policies, a heart allocation scoring system (HAS) policy, as well as a broadening regional
sharing (BRS) policy and policies that reverses the health prioritization of patients in UNOS/UNOS
7-tiered policy (UNOS-HR/UNOS 7-tiered-HR). This is motivated by the fact that prioritizing
healthier patients achieves a higher total LYs in our simulations. The UNOS allocation policy which
was implemented by UNOS during the 2006-2018 time period, prioritizes patients on the waiting
list in three different levels, i.e., geographical (proximity to the donor hospital), health status, and
waiting time level. Each policy has its own prioritization criteria. See B.5 for details.
2.6.2 Numerical Results
This section reports the results of applying said policies in the validated simulation model.
Table 2.1 compares the total LYs in simulating the OPL policy with those resulted from the UNOS
policy for each region. Results indicate that the total LYs under the OPL policy is significantly
greater than that of the UNOS policy in each region. The improvement is as large as 8.6% in Region
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Table 2.1: Percentage Improvement of OPL over UNOS
Region R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 Total
OPL vs. UNOS (%) 7.2 8.1 7.8 7.5 8.6 8.5 7.7 7.1 8.0 8.4 8.1 7.9
5 and for the whole country is 7.9%.
Total LYs consists of three parts: (i) pre- and (ii) post-transplant LYs for the patient population
during the planning horizon 2006-2014, and (iii) future LYs for the patients who are on the waiting
list at the end of the planning horizon (final reward). Table 2.2 compares the results of simulating
the OPL, UNOS, and other benchmark policies for these three measures. Our results show that the
OPL policy is worse than UNOS in terms of pre-transplant LYs and final reward. However, it is
significantly better than UNOS in terms of post-transplant LYs such that in overall it outperforms
the UNOS policy by 7.9%. Furthermore, Table 2.2 illustrates that the recently proposed UNOS
7-tiered policy performs similarly to the UNOS policy in terms of all the measures except a slight
improvement for the pre-transplant LYs. In addition, a comparison between OPL and SZE reveals
that the performance of SZE is similar to that of OPL in terms of pre-transplant and final LYs, while
it is outperformed by OPL in terms of post-transplant and total LYs. A similar conclusion holds
true between OPL and SZQ as the former yields a significantly higher post-transplant and total
LYs. The BRS policy achieves an improvement over UNOS in terms of pre- and post-transplant as
well as total LYs by broadening the regional sharing of donor organs. In fact, BRS is the best in
terms of pre-transplant mortality.
Furthermore, Table 2.2 reports the results of simulating the MPD, MTW, MWT, and VWT
policies introduced in Section 2.5. Recall that MPD seeks to minimize the number of pre-transplant
deaths, roughly speaking, an objective that UNOS is seeking in heart transplantation. Our results
show that the performance of MPD is marginally better than UNOS or UNOS 7-tiered in terms
of pre-transplant LYs, which suggest that if the objective is to focus on pre-transplant LYs, UNOS
is already doing a good job. Furthermore, recall that we analytically show that MPD prioritizes
patients similar to UNOS in terms of health, if health is the only patient characteristic (note that
the improvement of MPD over UNOS in terms of pre-transplant LYs is because MPD considers age
and VAD prioritization as well). In addition, results indicate that the MWT and VWT policies
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that minimize the mean and variance of waiting times respectively, perform slightly worse than
UNOS in terms of pre-transplant LYs while outperform UNOS in post-transplant LYs. Although
MWT and VWT have a better pre-transplant performance in simulation compared to the SZE, their
post-transplant outcomes are outperformed by the SZE which yields a similar total LYs for these
policies. In summary, our results suggest that the policies that consider post-transplant survival such
as OPL, SZE, and SZQ perform better than those that consider pre-transplant survival like UNOS
and MPD in terms of maximizing the LYs of the patient population. Table 2.2 also reports the
results of simulating the OPL-RS policy that is derived from solving the fluid model (Po) discussed
in Section B.6. The OPL-RS policy that considers proximity in allocating organs, performs similar
to OPL in terms of pre-transplant LYs but achieves a higher post-transplant and total LYs. The
reason is that under OPL-RS organs can be shared within patients of a wider area and as a result
the opportunity of finding healthier and younger matches is higher compared to OPL. In addition,
we provide an estimate for LYs per patient by dividing total LYs gain under each policy by total
number of patients.
Table 2.2 for each policy, next to the last column, indicates the average waiting time among patient
groups over several simulation runs and the last column reports the standard deviation of the waiting
times across patient classes. Our results show that OPL significantly reduces the expected waiting
time and is the closest to the MWT policy (which minimizes the mean of waiting times), e.g., it
reduces the waiting time by almost half compared to UNOS. We also observe that the order of the
policies in terms of mean waiting time in Table 2.2 is similar to that of pre-transplant LYs, i.e.,
the mean waiting time of a policy increases if pre-transplant LYs increases. This observation is an
application of Little’s law: the mean waiting time is proportional to the expected number of patients
in the queue, which depends on the allocation policy. In particular, allocation policies that seek to
minimize the number of pre-transplant deaths give more priority to sicker patients who have higher
pre-transplant mortality rates, causing healthier patients who have lower pre-transplant mortality
rates to stay on the waiting list, which consequently results in large waiting list and expected waiting
time. In fact, our results show that the size of waiting list is smaller under OPL than UNOS. In
summary, in this context because the pre-transplant mortality rate is significantly greater for sicker
patients, with similar arrival rates, their prioritization naturally increases the size of waiting list,
thus the waiting time.
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Table 2.2: Benchmark Policies Comparison
Objective Function (Life-Days ×106) Waiting Time (Days)
Policy Pre-TX Post-TX Final Total Life Days per
Patient
Mean STD
UNOS 9.05 147.25 0.035 156.33 5073 189 168
(0.216) (0.899) (0.0012) (0.710) (23.05)
UNOS 7-Tiered 9.14 147.28 0.035 156.45 5077 191 191
(0.243) (1.010) (0.0012) (0.892) (28.98)
OPL 6.89 163.00 0.021 169.91 5514 91 63
(0.372) (0.0572) (0.0009) (0.509) (16.52 )
SZE 7.22 157.91 0.025 165.16 5359 110 73
(0.207) (0.665) (0.0003) (0.506) (16.43)
SZQ 7.24 155.57 0.025 162.83 5284 105 72
(0.138) (0.735) (0.0001) (0.596) (19.35)
BRS 10.74 148.58 0.034 159.36 5171 206 234
(0.167) (0.187 ) (0.0004) (0.285) (9.27)
HAS 6.77 162.38 0.021 169.71 5507 97 75
(0.148) (0.883) (0.0011) (0.997) (32.37)
UNOS-HR 7.63 150.02 0.032 157.68 5117 96 66
(0.162) (0.707) (0.0007) (0.793) (25.74)
UNOS 7-tiered-HR 7.57 149.44 0.031 157.041 5096 101 65
( 0.076) (0.722) (0.0011) (0.776) (25.19)
MPD 9.55 146.6 0.034 156.07 5064 157 140
(0.868) (1.0759) (0.0015) (1.113) (36.15)
MTW 7.86 151.28 0.032 159.17 5165 122 56
(0.429) (1.520) (0.0019) (1.188) (38.58 )
MWT 7.63 156.41 0.024 164.08 5324 82 147
(0.031) (1.470) (0.0004 ) (1.439) (46.70)
VWT 8.81 154.63 0.031 163.49 5305 136 53
(0.474) (0.352) (0.0005) (0.335) (10.88)
OPL-RS 6.72 165.24 0.023 171.98 5581 95 82
(0.126) (0.587) (0.0009) (0.642) (20.84)
Note. Numbers in parenthesis show the standard deviation of each measure over the simulation runs; SZE: Su and Zenious efficiency policy;
SZQ: Su and Zenious equity policy; BRS: a policy that broadens regional sharing priority; HAS: heart allocation scoring system policy;
UNOS-HR: a policy that reverses the UNOS health priority; UNOS 7-Tiered-HR: a policy that reverses the UNOS-7-Tiered health priority;
MPD: a policy that minimizes pre-transplant death ; MTW: a policy that minimizes total heart wastage; MWT: a policy that minimizes
mean waiting time among patient classes; VWT: a policy that minimizes variance of waiting times among patient classes; OPL-RS: OPL
policy with proximity considerations (regional sharing)
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Regarding standard deviation of waiting times our results show that the policies that prioritize
healthier patients such as OPL and SZE have a lower standard deviation and are closer to the VWT
policy (which equalizes the waiting times among patient classes) compared to those that prioritize
sicker patients. The reason for this observation is that in heart transplantation, where the arrival
rates of sick and healthy patients are not significantly different, prioritizing sicker patients with high
mortality rates causes more healthier patients be on the waiting list who have lower mortality rates.
Therefore, the difference between the waiting times of sicker and healthier patients is exacerbated,
thus a higher variance. Furthermore, SZQ which considers equity in allocation yields a waiting time
variance similar to that of SZE and is closer to the OPL and VWT policies in terms of this measure.
These results suggest that OPL improves the variance of waiting time among patient groups, which
is a measure of equity, compared to UNOS.
2.6.3 Policy Analysis
As shown in Table 2.2, the improvement of the OPL policy over UNOS is due to the post-
transplant LYs. This section analyzes the OPL and UNOS policies in detail to shed light on how
these policies allocate hearts and provide insights on the proposed policy. Note that the OPL policy
prioritizes patients at each time based on shadow prices, which are time dependent. In particular,
it ranks patient groups by
(
αhi − ki(t)
)
qhi + y
h
i (t), which represents the life expectancy benefit
from transplant compared to not having one while reflecting the impact of fairness constraints.
Among patient characteristics we focus on health and age as they are important factors in heart
transplantation and subjects of debate. Therefore, Table 2.3 shows the value of
(
αhi − ki(t)
)
qhi for
each pair of (health, age) when the effect of other patient characteristics, time, and heart types
is averaged out. Note that red and green indicate higher and lower priority, respectively. Similar
tables are provided in B.8 for each heart type h ∈ H. Results in Table 2.3 provide insights about
how the OPL policy prioritizes patients and suggests implementable guidelines for allocating donor
hearts. In particular, it indicates that the marginal benefit of younger and healthier patients from
transplant is much larger than that of the oldest and sickest ones, emphasizing the fact that the
OPL policy gives priority to younger and healthier patient groups, those with higher post-transplant
survival. B.8 shows similar tables in the presence of fairness constraints.
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Table 2.3: Color-Coded Graph of Age and Health Prioritization for OPL
Policy
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 9358.52 6189.24 3278.25 1148.56
1B 9682.77 6725.66 4199.26 1913.78
2 10288.39 6590.31 3973.45 3282.51
Note: Red denotes higher and green shows lower priority.
Next, in order to investigate how in practice (simulation), the OPL policy prioritizes patients, we
record the number of times heart type h is allocated to patient type i for all (i, h) pairs. A similar
count is carried over for UNOS policy. In particular, we conduct further analysis on the OPL policy
by using the simulation model and comparing the percentage of hearts allocated to different patient
classes under OPL and UNOS. In the simulation, for both policies the same stream of random
number generators are used for patient and organ arrival to have a fair comparison. Results of this
analysis is reported in B.8. Specifically, the percentage of donor hearts assigned to different patient
health status (Figure 18a), age groups (Figure 18b), and VAD groups (Figure 18c) are calculated for
each policy. Results suggest that the OPL policy, unlike UNOS, prioritizes healthier and younger
patients, but similar to UNOS patients with VAD are not prioritized.
Further analysis of the pre- and post-transplant death rates shows that the expected survival of
younger and healthier patients after transplantation is higher than older and sicker ones. More-
over, the expected post-transplant survival is much larger than the expected pre-transplant survival.
Therefore, if the goal of a policy is to maximize the total life expectancy (pre- and post-transplant)
of the patient population, it naturally gives higher priority to younger and healthier patients. This
observation is consistent with our results that the OPL policy significantly outperforms the UNOS
policy in post-transplant survival while it is dominated by UNOS in pre-transplant LYs. In particu-
lar, since the OPL policy prioritizes the younger and healthier patients, the percentage of older and
sicker patients, who have larger pre-transplant death rates, increases on the waiting list under the
OPL policy, which results in shorter pre-transplant life-years compared to UNOS. The same logic
holds true for the final reward.
In order to provide further insights on the trade-off between utilitarian and medical urgency
approaches, Tables 2.4 and 2.5 report the number of pre-transplant deaths the OPL policy trades
off to obtain an increase in total LYs for each health and age group compared to UNOS. The results
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Table 2.4: LYs/Death Trade-off for Patient Health Groups (OPL minus UNOS)
Health Group 1A 1B 2 Inactive Total
Death 215 22 -171 511 577
Total Life-Days (×107) -5.48 1.55 5.41 -0.012 1.46
Table 2.5: LYs/Death Trade-off for Patient Age Groups (OPL minus UNOS)
Age Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+] Total
Death -39 -262 470 408 577
Total Life-Days (×107) 1.1 0.47 -0.066 -0.043 1.46
indicate that the OPL policy produces 577 more pre-transplant deaths compared to UNOS, but
achieves 1.46 × 107 more total life days. See B.8 for similar analysis for UNOS 7-tiered and OPL
policy with fairness constraints.
2.6.4 Fairness Analysis
Policy analysis for the UNOS and OPL allocation rules reveals that the improvement of the
objective function is related to a shift in allocation rule towards prioritizing younger and healthier
patients. However, this efficient policy may disproportionately affect sickest and older patients on the
waiting list, which may raise equity issues. Therefore, this section provides a systematic and flexible
framework to study fairness by applying lower bounds on the percentage of donor hearts allocated to
specific groups of patients. Specifically, we match the percentage of hearts allocated to different age
and health groups by UNOS in the following analysis, by which the contribution of age/health on the
objective function can be assessed separately. To that end, a fairness analysis on the optimization
problem (P1) is conducted by adding extra constraints to the set of feasible actions. See Section B.7
for details. Recall that by Theorem 2.1 the OPL policy in the presence of fairness constraints is still
a priority index policy depending on shadow prices, which are estimated by the optimal dual values
of the corresponding constraints in the discretized version of problem (P1), a linear program. The
improvement of our proposed OPL policy over UNOS in the presence of several fairness constraints
is reported in Tables 2.6-2.8. Table 2.6 reports the results of imposing age fairness constraints. In
particular, our results suggest that imposing age fairness constraints to match UNOS reduces the
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Table 2.6: Improvement of the OPL over UNOS in the presence of age fairness constraints (%)
Constraint Applied for [35+] [50+] [65+] [50-65] and [65+] [35-50] and [50-65] and [65+]
Improvement 3.0 3.9 5.7 2.2 2.1
Table 2.7: Improvement of the OPL over UNOS in the presence of health fairness constraints (%)
Constraint Applied for [1A] [1B] [2] [1A] and [1B]
Improvement 1.5 4.9 7.2 0.8
percentage of improvement, but there is still room for improvement because, e.g., by optimizing
health priority and other age groups, the OPL policy outperforms UNOS by 5.7% if only the oldest
age group is matched. All in all, results in Table 2.6 illustrates the significance of allocation priority
shift from older to younger patients in improvement of OPL compared to UNOS. Table 2.7 reports
the improvement of the OPL policy over UNOS in the presence of each health fairness constraint.
Results show that if we set the percentage of allocated hearts to the patients with health status 1A
to be at least as high as UNOS, the improvement over UNOS reduces to 1.5%. This result suggest
that the OPL improvement is mainly due to a priority shift from the sickest patient group (status
1A) to the healthier ones (status 1B and 2). However, considering a health fairness constraint of
[1B] reduces the 7.9% improvement to 4.9% which shows that in terms of health priority, the most
part of improvement is due to a priority shift from 1A toward 1B and 2. The results in Table 2.7
corroborate this insight. Finally, Table 2.8 reports the improvement of the OPL policy over UNOS
in the presence of combined age-health constraints and shows that in these cases the improvement
becomes marginal. See B.7 for more details regarding the fairness constraints studied in this work.
Table 2.8: Improvement of the OPL over UNOS in the presence of age-health fairness constraints
(%)
Constraint Applied for [65+] and [1A] [50-65] and [65+] and [1A]
Improvement 0.8 0.4
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Table 2.9: Percentage Improvement of OPL over UNOS for Different
Cases of Parameters (%)
Case Baseline Case (1) Case (2) Case (3) Case (4) Case (5) Case (6)
Improvement 7.9 11.2 5.6 5.9 10.1 7.8 7.7
2.6.5 Sensitivity Analysis
This section provides the results of conducting sensitivity analysis on the patient and heart
arrival rates. In order to test the robustness of the results to the change in model parameters,
we conduct several one- and two-way sensitivity analysis. Specifically, we change the arrival rates
of patients and hearts by 10% and calculate the percentage improvement of the OPL policy over
UNOS in terms of the total LYs for the following cases: (1) patient arrival rates increased by 10%,
(2) patient arrival rates decreased by 10%, (3) heart arrival rates increased by 10%, (4) heart arrival
rates decreased by 10%, (5) patient and heart arrival rates both increased by 10% simultaneously,
and (6) patient and heart arrival rates both decreased by 10% simultaneously. Note that we use
a mis-specified policy in conducting the sensitivity analysis, i.e., we keep the policy derived under
the base case parameters fixed and run the simulation in different cases using the corresponding
parameter values. The results are reported in Table 2.9 and show that as we increase arrival rates
of patients (Case (1)), or decrease arrival rates of hearts (Case (4)), the improvement of the OPL
over UNOS increases to 11.2% and 10.1%, respectively, compared to the 7.9% improvement of the
baseline scenario. The reason is that in cases (1) and (4) the system becomes closer to a fully
overloaded one and the fluid model provides a more accurate approximation. Also, the OPL policy
has more opportunity to allocate hearts in a near-optimal fashion. However, as we decrease the
arrival rates of patients (Case (2)), or increase arrival rates of hearts (Case (3)), the percentage
improvement of the OPL over UNOS practice decreases from 7.9% to 5.6% and 5.9%, respectively.
Furthermore, the results in Table 2.9 show that in Case (5) and (6) the improvement of OPL over
UNOS does not significantly change compared to the baseline case.
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2.7 Conclusions and Managerial Insights
We studied the problem of dynamically allocating scarce donor hearts to a heterogeneous
patient population on the transplant waiting list from a variety of viewpoints in the efficiency and
fairness spectrum. For efficiency we considered (i) maximization of total QALYs of the entire patient
population; (ii) minimization of the expected waiting time; and (iii) minimization of pre-transplant
mortality. For fairness we considered (i) maximization of the minimum QALYs over patient groups;
(ii) minimization of the variance of expected waiting time among patient groups; and (iii) applying
fairness constraints. We applied the optimal policies for each measure of efficiency and fairness into
a simulation model of the U.S. heart allocation system, developed and validated from UNOS/SRTR
data.
Our results provide the following insights into heart transplantation allocation rules: (1) OPL
outperforms UNOS by almost 8% in terms of total LYs and reduces the expected waiting time by
almost half. Our analyses show that the improvement for total LYs and expected waiting time is
due to significant improvement on post-transplant LYs and reducing the size of the waiting list,
respectively. (2) Our analytical and numerical analyses show that, unlike UNOS, the OPL policy
prioritizes healthier and younger patients who have a higher post-transplant survival. In addition,
OPL does not prioritize VAD status. (3) In order to investigate the contribution of health and
age in the improvement, we applied certain constraints that matched UNOS allocation percentages
for each age and health and our results show that health prioritization is more important than
age. (4) The new proposed UNOS 7-tiered policy marginally improves over the previous UNOS
practice. In fact, UNOS/UNOS 7-tiered policies perform similarly to the policy that minimizes the
pre-transplant mortality. This suggests that if the objective is to focus on pre-transplant mortality,
the UNOS policy is near-optimal. (5) The performance of OPL with respect to mean and variance
of waiting time is closer to that of MWT (which minimizes expected waiting time) and VWT(which
minimizes variance of waiting time) than UNOS. A similar result is observed with respect to the
objective of maximization of the minimum LYs. These results suggest that OPL is more robust than
UNOS with respect to change in different objective functions especially in terms of fairness measures
considered in this study. (6) Incorporating the location of patients and organs in allocation rules
and considering a broader regional sharing can significantly improve total LYs, size of the waiting
list, and help address geographical disparity.
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The OPTN/UNOS Heart Subcommittee plans to develop a point-based heart allocation rules in
the near future similar to Kidney Allocation System. We developed a Heart Allocation System by
designing relevant score components and estimating the corresponding coefficients by a data-driven
approach. Our simulation results show that HAS achieves a similar performance to OPL in terms of
LYs and could pave the way for the future UNOS HAS. A natural path forward is to test our proposed
policies and HAS by TSAM, the UNOS/SRTR heart simulation model. This is because although we
used a simulation model that is validated in several dimensions, it has limitations which may impact
the results. For example, (i) detailed data on patients and donors were available for each region and
not for every DSA or OPO. Therefore, appropriate distributions were generated for each region and
a new patient/heart in a region is assigned to OPOs based on a uniform distribution; (ii) the patient
health status change module only considers health and does not consider other attributes such as age,
gender, etc.; (iii) because detailed data for heart wastage was not available, the donor heart arrival
rates were adjusted for wastage compensation; (iv) the acceptance probabilities for each heart type
depends only on patient health; (v) we used health classes and age groups definitions by UNOS and
better results may be obtained if there was flexibility in such definitions; (vi) our analysis focused
on life years and did not consider quality of life due to unavailability of data. However, considering
QALYs will bolster our results because the sicker and older patients have a lower quality of life
and as a result the gap between the utilitarian and medical urgency-based approaches is likely to
increase. Finally, we did not consider the cost of changing allocation rules, which may impact the
recommendation based on the results.
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Chapter 3
Proportionally Fair Organ
Allocation Rules for
Transplantation
3.1 Introduction
Organ transplantation is the only viable life-saving treatment option for patients with late-
stage organ disease, who join a waiting list to receive a donated organ and have a transplant. There
are more than 113,000 patients on the waiting list as of April 29, 2019, which is caused by a significant
imbalance between the rate of patients joining the waiting list (demand) and that of donor organs
(supply) (United Network for Organ Sharing, 2019). In fact, on average, 18 patients die every day
while waiting for a transplant (United Network for Organ Sharing, 2019).
This public health crisis has received significant attention from governmental entities and research
communities. For example, the White House Office of Science and Technology issued a call to action
to reduce the size of the waiting list noting that “ending the wait for organ transplant ... [is] some of
what America can do” (The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2016). Because of
the notable imbalance between supply and demand, organ transplantation rules play a critical role
in the performance of the transplant system and have striking impact on patients’ life and society.
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To that end, the United States (US) Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) in
1984, which enacted new rules to ensure that organ allocation rules are efficient and fair. However,
designing efficient and fair allocation policies is extremely challenging and the United Network for
Organ Sharing (UNOS) has periodically changed them because of advancements in research and
technology (Colvin-Adams et al., 2012). In fact, there is a fundamental and natural conflict between
efficiency and fairness in organ allocation as long as organ shortage persists.
The principles of efficiency is well-established and the consensus is around maximization of the
overall utility of patients, which is dominantly measured by total Quality-Adjusted Life Years
(QALYs) of the entire patient population (United Network for Organ Sharing, 2019). While the
bulk of the literature on organ allocation is driven by the objective of maximizing total QALYs
of the patient population, we believe that fairness is a crucial objective in organ transplantation
systems. However, because of the subjective nature of fairness, it is difficult to lay out a universally
accepted framework for fair organ allocation. In fact, following an axiomatic approach, no fairness
scheme can satisfy all five axioms of fairness simultaneously under mild conditions (Bertsimas et al.,
2011). Nonetheless, in order to provide some principals for fair allocation, UNOS proposed the
following six factors: 1) medical urgency, 2) likelihood of finding a suitable organ in the future, 3)
waiting time, 4) first versus re-transplantation, 5) age, and 6) geographical fairness considerations
(United Network for Organ Sharing, 2019).
The goal of this study is to propose a new measure of fairness in organ allocation, elaborate
its potential benefits, analyze the structure of optimal allocation policies under this measure, and
numerically quantify the benefits via a simulation model validated by real data for heart transplan-
tation. Next, we discuss the results of studies that consider efficiency and fairness in organ allocation
and close the discussion by providing evidence on inefficiency of current measures of fairness. In
particular, because our focus is in proposing a fairness measure in the objective function, we begin
with discussing other perspectives of fairness in organ transplantation and then focus on available
measures of fairness for the objective function.
As mentioned earlier, geographical disparity is a factor that UNOS highlights for fairness pur-
poses. Ata et al. (2016) addressed this issue by proposing multiple listing and initiating Organ Jet
service. Fairness may also be imposed by incorporating lower bounds on percentage of total offers
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to specific groups of patients (Bertsimas et al., 2013). Bertsimas et al. (2013) applied a data-driven
approach to design allocation rules, where fairness constraints were studied. Now, we describe the
fairness measures as the objective and report their inefficiencies compared to a utilitarian policy.
(1) Medical urgency. Medical urgency is perhaps a major criteria that UNOS has followed for
organ allocation, which tends to prioritize the sickest patients. For example, the current heart
allocation policy is mainly medical urgency driven (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Net-
work, 2015). A natural path to formulate this measure in the objective function is to minimize
pre-transplant mortality. However, numerical evidence reveals that allocation policies that are med-
ically urgent driven cause significant performance loss. For example, see Su and Zenios (2006), Akan
et al. (2012), and Hasankhani and Khademi (2017).
(2) Waiting (list) time. In many queuing systems involving human beings, the principle of first-
come first-served is believed to be the most relevant in terms of fairness. However, in transplant
systems it is not a primary factor in prioritization because prioritization based on waiting time will
cause severe consequences in terms of total life yeas of the patient population. In fact, Childress
(1991) mentioned that “length of time on the waiting list is the least fair, most easily manipulated,
and most mindless of all methods of organ transplantation.” Therefore, the current practice is to
use waiting time as a tie-breaker or a part of the scoring system. Our numerical results shows that
prioritizing patients solely based on waiting time will cause around 10% efficiency loss and around
24% more total deaths in heart transplantation.
(3) Equalizing waiting time among patient groups. One measure of fairness in service queuing
theory is the minimization of the variance between the expected waiting time of customer (patient)
classes. Inspired by observing a notable difference between waiting times of different ethnic groups,
Zenios (1999) studied the transplant queuing system with this objective and observed significant
inefficiency of such policies. In particular, he wrote “Focusing on equalizing waiting time alone can
be misleading because the patient mortality serves as a confounding factor.” Our simulation results
corroborate with previous studies and show that following such policies results in 5% performance
loss.
(4) Max-min utility. The notion of max-min fairness was introduced as a design objective in the
literature of communication networks by Bertsekas et al. (1992) and is widely used in the political
sciences (Rawls, 2009). In the resource allocation problems, the principle of max-min fairness is to
allocate network resources such that the utility of a player cannot be increased without decreasing
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the utility of another player having a smaller utility. Under max-min fairness for a multi-player
game, the decision maker allocates resources to the players to maximize the lowest utility level
among players. Then, tries to maximize the second lowest utility level and so on. The main princi-
ple of max-min fairness in organ allocation systems is to design allocation rules that guarantee that
the QALYs of the worst patient group is maximized (Rawls, 2009). However, the said measure will
result in a significant performance loss. For example, see Su and Zenios (2006) and Hasankhani and
Khademi (2017).
Since the common measures of fairness in organ allocation cause a significant performance loss, a
natural question arises: can an alternative fairness measure be applied to transplant systems with
a less performance loss? This study provides an answer to this question and our results yield an
affirmative answer. In particular, we propose an application of proportional fairness, which is a
generalization of Nash standard for comparison, in organ transplantation.
Proportional fairness is widely used in queuing networks and resource allocation problems such
as bandwidth allocation of network capacities. For example, Bonald et al. (2006) study a communi-
cation network whose resources are shared by a random number of data flows under proportional,
max-min, and balanced fairness and compare their performance. Li et al. (2008) study a multi-rate
wireless LAN network. Their model allocates access points to the users in order to achieve optimal
proportional fairness in a network with several access points. Manfredi (2014) propose a healthcare
traffic control over the modern heterogeneous wireless network to avoid congestion and guarantee
quality of service from the service reliability and responsiveness point of view. They propose policies
based on proportional fairness and study the performance of the proposed policies in simulation.
Swenson (1992) study the problem of allocating scarce resources (incentive care units) to patients
demanding for ICU. They used Rawl’s theory of justice to rank patients on the waiting list in a fair
fashion.
Under the Nash principle for two players, an allocation is fair if the percentage increase in
utility of one player is larger than the percentage decrease in utility of the other player. By the
generalization of the Nash solution for multiple players, a fair policy is the one that achieves a non-
positive aggregate proportional change, compared to any feasible allocation policy. In particular,
for N players, the PF policy is proportionally fair if for every feasible policy π ∈ Π and its induced
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feasible utility uπ = (uπ1 , . . . , u
π
N ) ∈ U ,
N∑
j=1
uπj − uPFj
uPFj
≤ 0, (3.1)
where Π and U are the set of feasible allocations and utilities, respectively. We interpret this
inequality by dividing the N players into two groups, the ones who gain utility due to switching
from allocation π to PF , and the ones who lose utility. The inequality (3.1) ensures that the amount
of utility that gainers gain is not less than that of the losers lose. For a convex utility set U , the fair
allocation under proportional fairness PF is unique and can be obtained by solving the following
problem:
max
u
N∑
j=1
log(uj),
subject to u ∈ U.
The first order optimality condition for this problem coincides with the Nash standard of comparison
principle for N players. The Nash bargaining game is a game between two players that demand a
portion of some good, in our context divisible organ. Both players receive their request if the total
amount requested by the players is less than that available, and they receive nothing, otherwise
(disagreement value is set to zero here). John Nash proposed a solution satisfying the axioms of
scale invariance, symmetry, efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Various solutions
are proposed for this game with slightly different assumptions.
To better understand the application of Nash principle for a two patient problem in trans-
plantation queuing systems and the distinctions between different fairness measures, consider the
following example:
Example 3.1. Suppose we have two patients: Patient 1 is sick and Patient 2 is healthy, and one
organ is available. Patient 1 lives 1 year if she does not receive the organ, and lives 2 years if she
receives an organ. Patient 2 lives 3 year if she does not receive the organ, and lives 5 years if she
receives an organ. Define the utility as the life-years of the patients. That is, u1 and u2 are the
utility of Patients 1 and 2, respectively. The allocation question is to whether allocate the organ to
the sick or healthy patient. Thus, if we assign the organ to the sick patient, then u1 = 2 and u2 = 3;
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if we assign the organ to the healthy patient, then u1 = 1 and u2 = 5. However, assume in general
that the organ assignment could be randomized. Let the decision variable be π = (π1, π2), where
π1 and π2 are the probability that the organ is assigned to the sick and healthy patient, respectively
and belong to the set of admissible decisions X = {(π1 + π2) : π1 + π2 = 1, π1, π2 ≥ 0}. Thus, we
can write the utilities of patients as u1 = 2π1 + π2 and u2 = 3π1 + 5π2. In the following, we find
the optimal allocation rule following the (1) utilitarian approach, (2) max-min fairness, and (3)
proportional fairness.
Utilitarian approach: The objective is to maximize the total utility, i.e., maximize u1 + u2 =
5π1 + 6π2 subject to π ∈ X . Then it follows that the solution π = (0, 1) is the optimal solution.
Therefore, the optimal allocation in the utilitarian approach is to allocate to the healthy patient with
probability one with utilities u1 = 1, u2 = 5.
Max-min fairness: The objective here is to maximize the minimum utility across patients, i.e.,
maxπ∈X min{u1, u2} = maxπ∈X min{2π1 +π2, 3π1 + 5π2}. The optimal solution is π = (1, 0) in this
case. Thus, the optimal allocation is to allocate to the sick patient and the utilities are u1 = 2, u2 = 3.
Proportional fairness: The objective is to maximize the multiplication of the utilities, i.e., u1 ×
u2 = (2π1 + π2)(3π1 + 5π2) subject to π ∈ X . It is not difficult to see that the optimal solution is
π = (0.75, 0.25), which is a randomized policy allocating the organ to the sick patient with probability
0.75 and to the healthy one with probability 0.25 and the utilities are u1 = 1.75, u2 = 3.5.
The optimal solution of the proportional fairness problem satisfies the equilibrium point of the Nash
bargaining problem. In particular, we have
2∑
i=1
ui − uPFi
uPFi
=
2π1 + π2 − 1.75
1.75
+
3π1 + 5π2 − 3.5
3.5
≤ 0,
for all π ∈ X . Therefore, aggregate proportional change is non-positive and the solution π =
(0.75, 0.25) is the Nash bargaining solution and hence the optimal proportional fair policy. This
result is in line with the fact that a policy is proportionally fair if compared to any other allocation
policy, the players who gain utility, gain higher than those who lose utility. Note that this observation
is true only when the organ is assumed to be divisible and in the case of indivisible organ there is no
solution to the Nash bargaining problem.
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As can be seen from this example, the total utility (u1 + u2) under the utilitarian approach
(UA), max-min fairness (MF), and proportional fairness (PF) are 6, 5, and 5.25, respectively. This
observation shows that the total utility under the PF policy is between that of MF and UA policies.
The utilitarian approach is maximizing the total utilities of the patient population by prioritizing
healthier and younger patients who have better post-transplant survival but it is not fair with respect
to older and sicker patients. On the other hand, max-min fairness achieves a lower total utility
compared to the utilitarian approach, but improves the minimum expected utility among patients.
This observation encouraged us to propose proportional fairness in organ transplantation queuing
systems, a fairness measure that sits at the midway point between the two extremes, utilitarian
approach and max-min fairness and compensates for the utility loss in max-min fairness. This
observation is in line with the results in Bertsimas et al. (2011), where they compare the max-min
and proportional fairness and show that the bounds on the price of fairness are higher for the max-
min fairness criteria resulting in a lower total utility for this policy compared to the proportional
fairness criteria. The price of fairness is defined by the total utility loss under max-min/proportional
fairness criteria compared to the utilitarian criteria.
One interpretation for Nash solution is that it is a solution to a bargaining among players, i.e., the
solution to the bargaining is the proportional fairness utility for each player. For the construction
of Nash bargaining between two individuals and the required assumptions for the Nash solution see
Nash (1950). Since we apply proportional fairness as a measure of fairness in transplant systems,
the solution that we propose may have similar interpretations. That is, patients seek to maximize
their QALYs (utility) and bargain among themselves for the limited organs. Then, UNOS allocation
based on the proportionally fair policy in organ allocation implies that UNOS believes a fair policy
is the one that corresponds to the patient bargaining in the Nash bargaining sense. Viewing the
transplant system as a game among patients and UNOS seeking an objective is not unprecedented
in the literature. Ata et al. (2020) modeled the transplant system as a game among rational patients
who seek to maximize their total QALYs by accepting/rejecting the offered organ and UNOS seeks
to optimize the total QALYs over the Nash equilibrium of the game among patients. Note, however,
that the proportional fairness can be used as a measure by itself and not tied to a bargaining problem
similar to the literature of bandwidth allocation of network capacity.
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The goal of our study in this chapter is to (I) quantify the extent that efficiency loss due to
fairness consideration in organ allocation can be improved by introducing proportionally fair organ
allocation, and (II) provide insights on the structure of optimal proportionally fair organ allocation
policies in different settings. While policy makers in UNOS have significant debates on the efficiency
and fairness of the current allocation policy (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network,
2016a; Stevenson et al., 2016), our results in this study can pave the way to modify the organ
allocation policies and shift them towards incorporating fairness measures that are less sensitive to
the inequality in utility allocation compared to the policies considering max-min fairness. To that
end, we make the following contributions.
We formulate an optimization problem to incorporate proportional fairness as an equity measure
in organ allocation. In particular, in Section 3.2 we use a fluid approximation of the transplanta-
tion queuing system for deriving the necessary ingredients for utility estimation and feasibility set.
In Section 3.3 an achievable region based approach is utilized to transform the said optimization
problem to an equivalent one over the space of all performance outcomes. Then, we show that the
optimal policy is assortative if certain assumptions are made on the problem parameters (Theorem
3.1). Assortative policies are attractive, easy to understand and implement, and have the following
insight: higher quality organs are assigned to higher QALYs-to-gain patients (see Section 3.2 for
detailed discussions). Section 3.4 presents the numerical results and contributions and Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Problem Formulation
We formulate the organ allocation problem as a queuing model with n queues associated
with patient types. Available organs, which their type lies between [0, 1], are partitioned into n
subsets where each subset is allocated to one of the patient classes. As a result of this allocation,
each patient receives a utility, which depends on the patient type and their expected waiting time,
as well as the type of the donor organ. Su and Zenios (2006) studied a similar queuing system for
kidney transplantation and provided expressions for the expected waiting times and the utilities by
studying a fluid approximation of the queuing model. They formulate a partitioning problem to
study the kidney allocation problem. We consider a similar formulation where decision is to find
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a way to partition the organ pool (available donor organs with different qualities) into n subsets
such that the resulting allocation is optimal in terms of proportional fairness. A policy is optimal
in being proportionally fair (PF), if it attains the maximum value for the sum of the logarithm of
patient utilities compared to any other allocation (partition).
Let I = {1, . . . , n} be the set of patient classes with λi being the arrival rate of patients in class i ∈ I,
and λ =
∑n
i=1 λi be the total arrival rate of patients. Donor organs arrive to the system according
to a Poisson process with rate µ with µ < λ (without loss of generality assume µ = 1). Patients on
the waiting list may die within an exponentially distributed time with mean d (note that we assume
d1 = . . . = dn = d, that is the life expectancy while waiting is the same across all patient classes).
We make this assumption to derive structural properties for the policy and relax it in our numerical
results. Also, arriving organs have different types (categorized based on their qualities) and for each
organ there is a random number X ∈ X associated to the organs in an i.i.d. fashion. We assume
that X is uniformly distributed in the interval X = [0, 1]. Let Li(x) be the post-transplant life
expectancy of a patient in class i that receives an organ of type x. The goal of our formulation is to
find the best way to divide the arriving organ pool into n subsets each allocated to one of the patient
classes. Thus, we formulate the organ allocation problem as a partitioning problem of organ pool,
where the decision maker looks for the best partition A = {A1, . . . , An} of [0, 1] into disjoint subsets
Ai. The resulting allocation policy corresponding to a partition A under the fluid scaling allocates
an organ with type X to a patient in class i if X ∈ Ai, where X is a uniform [0, 1] random variable.
The utility of patients in class i under any allocation partition A is given by (Su and Zenios, 2006):
Ui = βDi + αpiTi,
where the utility function Ui denotes the Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) of the patients in
class i, Di denotes pre-transplant life years (from the time a patient has arrived until death or
transplant), Ti denotes post-transplant life years (from the time a patient receives an organ until
death), pi denotes the probability that a patient survives until receiving a transplant, and α and β
are the quality of life scores corresponding to pre- and post-transplant life years, respectively. The
quantities Di, pi, Ti depend on the allocation policy (partition A). Under the fluid scaling these
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quantities are estimated in Su and Zenios (2006) and are as follows:
Di =
[
λi − µi
λi
]+
di,
pi =
µi
λi
,
Ti = E
[
Li(X)|X ∈ Ai
]
,
where µi = µP(X ∈ Ai) = P(X ∈ Ai) is the allocation rate to the patients in class i. Then, the
utility function for patients in class i can be written as follows:
Ui = β
[
λi − µi
λi
]+
di + α
µi
λi
E
[
Li(X)|X ∈ Ai
]
.
We consider a decision maker seeking for an allocation (partition) A that maximizes the proportional
fairness objective (
∑n
i=1 λi log(Ui)), subject to the fluid condition µi ≤ λi for every i:
max
A
( n∑
i=1
λi log
(
βdi(
λi − µi
λi
) + α
µi
λi
E[Li(X)|X ∈ Ai]
))
(P4)
subject to 0 ≤ µi ≤ λi i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (3.2)
Next, we simplify the objective function. We assume that Li(x) = m+ cig(x), where m > 0 denotes
the LYs gained by receiving an organ of the lowest quality, g(x) ≥ 0 is the quality of the type x
organ, and ci > 0 denotes the risk of death for patients in class i after transplantation. Without loss
of generality, we order patient and organ types such that ci > ci+1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1 (i.e., patients
with lower index have a lower post-transplant risk) and g(·) is a decreasing function on organ type
x, i.e., organs with smaller x have a higher quality. Our numerical study in Section 3.4 reveals that
these assumptions are all satisfied for the heart transplantation dataset considered as the case study.
By using these assumptions and setting a = mα− dβ, bi = ciα, and γi = E[g(x)1{X ∈ Ai}] we can
rewrite the utility of patients in class i as follows:
Ui =
λi − µi
λi
dβ +
µi
λi
(
m+ ciE[g(X)|X ∈ Ai]
)
α
= dβ +
µi
λi
a+ bi
γi
λi
.
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After omitting the constant term dβ from the utility function of all the patient classes, we end up
with the following formula for the utility, which only depends on µi and γi as the decision variables:
Ui =
aµi + biγi
λi
.
Thus, we observe that the utility of patients in class i depends on the allocation policy (partition
A) through the variables µi = P{X ∈ Ai} and γi = E[g(x)1{X ∈ Ai}] in a linear way. Variables µi
and γi can be interpreted as the intensity of organ allocation, and the quality of organs allocated
to the patients in class i, respectively. By using the derived utility function, problem (P4) can be
written in a more compact way as follows:
max
A
( n∑
i=1
λi log
(aµi + biγi
λi
))
(P5)
subject to 0 ≤ µi ≤ λi i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
This optimization problem is very difficult to solve, since the search is over all the partitions in
A. In fact, partitioning the interval [0, 1] into n subsets has infinite possibilities. One solution is
to discretize the organ space into finitely disjoint subsets and solve the problem over the discrete
organ space which yields a randomized allocation policy. However, the issue here is that the size of
the latter is still huge and it involves an exponential number of decision variables growing with the
number of subsets that the organ space is partitioned. Moreover, randomized policies are difficult
to implement in practice and do not provide insight to this problem. Due to theses issues, and the
dependency of the number of variables to the number of discretized subsets, we use the technique
introduced by Bertsimas (1995) to transform the problem into a computationally tractable one,
which also enables us to derive structural properties for the allocation problem. The technique is
called the achievable region method and involves solving an optimization problem over 2n decision
variables that does not depend on the number of the subsets explained above.
3.3 Analysis of the Optimal Policy
Due to the dependency of the utilities to the allocation partition A through the variables
~µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) and ~γ = (γ1, . . . , γn), we express them by ~µ(A) and ~γ(A). Since the space of the
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decision (space of partitions A) is complex, we use the achievable region method to transform the
decision space into a more tractable one. For any allocation partition A, the method finds vectors
~µ(A) and ~γ(A) that can be achieved by that partition. In particular, the method characterizes the
space of all performance measures ~µ(A) and ~γ(A) that can be achieved by any feasible decision
(allocation partition A). Then it optimizes the objective over the new decision space to find the
optimal value of the transformed performance measures, i.e., ~µ∗(A) and ~γ∗(A). Finally, the method
finds the partition A∗ that achieves these optimal performance measures. Such a method is used in
the multi-class scheduling literature as well, e.g., see Federgruen and Groenevelt (1988).
Let AR(A) denote the achievable region of the performance measures
(
~µ(A), ~γ(A)
)
corresponding
to the allocation partition A defined by
AR(A) :=
{
(~µ,~γ) :
n∑
i=1
µi = µ, γ(S) ≤ G(µ(S)) ∀S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
}
, (3.3)
where for each S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, µ(S) =
∑
i∈S µi, γ(S) =
∑
i∈S γi, and G(x) =
∫ x
0
g(t)dt. In fact,
for each subset of patient classes S, function G(·) provides an upper bound on the quality of share
of organs allocated to the patients in that subset. Su and Zenios (2006) showed that (i) under an
allocation partition A, every achievable performance measure
(
~µ(A), ~γ(A)
)
must satisfy (3.3), and
(ii) for any given (~µ,~γ) satisfying (3.3) one can construct an allocation partition A(~µ,~γ) corresponding
to (~µ,~γ) via an algorithm called the synthesis algorithm.
The result above helps transform the complex decision space of the partitions into the decision space
over (~µ,~γ) ∈ R2n+ specified in (3.3). By using the newly introduced decision space (variables (~µ,~γ)),
the proportional fairness objective function can be represented by
n∑
i=1
λi log(Ui) =
n∑
i=1
λi log
(aµi + biγi
λi
)
=
n∑
i=1
λi log
(
aµi + biγi
)
− λi log(λi).
We omit the constant term λi log(λi) which does not affect the optimal solution. Thus, the par-
titioning problem (P5) can be reformulated in the new decision space as a nonlinear programming
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problem as follows:
max
(~µ,~γ)
n∑
i=1
(
λi log
(
aµi + biγi
))
(P6)
subject to,
γ(S) ≤ G
(
µ(S)
)
, ∀S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, (3.4)
0 ≤ µi ≤ λi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n, (3.5)
n∑
i=1
µi = µ. (3.6)
From now on, we focus on this problem which is a combinatorial optimization problem as it involves
constraints (3.4) that form a polymatroid.
Definition 3.1. An allocation policy A is called an assortative partition if
A1 = [0, µ1] , A2 = [µ1, µ1 + µ2], . . . , An = [µ1 + . . .+ µn−1, µ1 + . . .+ µn].
Note that the allocation domain i is of length µi, and since by assumption, patient groups are
ordered such that b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bn, the policy being assortative is interpreted as follows: the
organs with the highest quality are allocated to the patients with better post-transplant survival.
The following lemma by Su and Zenios (2006) shows that the assortativeness property of an allocation
policy is tied to the bindingness of certain constraints in (3.4) at optimality.
Lemma 3.1. Any achievable performance measure (~µ,~γ) satisfying
i∑
k=1
γk = G(
i∑
k=1
µk), i = 1, . . . , n,
corresponds to a partition which is assortative.
Let Sk for k = 1, . . . , n be a subset of size k of the patient indicies {1, . . . , n} and Sk be the
set of such subsets, e.g., S1 =
{
{1}, {2}, . . . , {n}
}
. The following proposition proves an interesting
property about the activeness of constraints of problem (P6) at optimality. Specifically, it shows
that for every k = 1, . . . , n, at most one of the constraints in (3.4) corresponding to the elements of
Sk can be binding at the optimal solution.
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Proposition 3.1. At most one of the constraints of size k in (3.4) corresponding to the elements
of Sk is binding at optimality for every k = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. We prove this proposition by using the proof by contradiction for constraints corresponding
to S1, i.e., k=1. The proof for k > 1 is similar. We prove that among the following constraints, at
most one of them can be binding:
γ1 ≤ 1− e−µ1 ,
...
...
...
γn ≤ 1− e−µn .
Suppose this is not true and assume there exist some i and j such that γi = 1−e−µi and γj = 1−e−µj
for i 6= j. This yields γi + γj = 2− e−µi − e−µj . However, the constraint corresponding to {i, j} (an
element of S2) in (3.4) imposes that γi + γj ≤ 1− e−(µi+µj). Thus, we get:
2− e−µi − e−µj ≤ 1− e−(µi+µj) (3.7)
=⇒ e−µi + e−µj − e−(µi+µj) ≥ 1 (3.8)
Now, let the function h(·, ·) be defined by h(x, y) = e−x+e−y−e−(x+y). Note that for this function,
we have h(0, 0) = 1 and
∂h(x, y)
∂x
= e−(x+y) − e−x,
∂h(x, y)
∂y
= e−(x+y) − e−y,
both being negative for x, y ≥ 0, meaning that h(·, ·) is a non-increasing function for x, y ≥ 0.
Therefore, we have h(x, y) ≤ 1 for x, y ≥ 0 and h(x, y) < 1 for x, y > 0. This argument proves that
e−µi + e−µj − e−(µi+µj)− 1 ≤ 0 for µi, µj ≥ 0 with equality holding for µi = µj = 0. Now, note that
µi = µj = 0 cannot yield an optimal solution since it implies γi = γj = 0 and the objective goes to
−∞ in this case. Therefore, at optimality, we have e−µi + e−µj − e−(µi+µj) < 1 which contradicts
(3.8), and completes the proof for k=1. The proof for constraints corresponding to the elements of
Sk for k > 2 follows by a similar logic.
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Next, we discuss two assumptions on the parameters of our problem under which optimal
solution is an assortative partition policy. Assumption 3.1 is for strictly overloaded queuing systems
where arrival rate of patients are significantly higher than that of donors.
Assumption 3.1. The transplantation queuing system is strictly overloaded, i.e., λi > µ := 1 for
all i = 1, . . . , n.
Then, we explore the setting where this assumption does not hold but still the optimal policy is
assortative. In order to find the optimal solution of problem (P6) in this case, we write the KKT
condition for this nonlinear problem and show that under some looser conditions on λi, the problem
still this property that constraints corresponding to the subsets [j] for j = 1, . . . , n in (3.4) are
binding at the optimal point. Note that due to the presence of constraints (3.4) in the model, which
form a polymatroid, one may use combinatorial optimization techniques to find the optimal solution
for problem (P6). The theoretical results we get from KKT conditions coincide with the solution
based on the combinatorial optimization techniques in Fujishige (2005). Before stating Theorem 3.1,
which is the main results of this section, we consider the following assumption.
Assumption 3.2. The nonlinear system of equations,

λi(a+bie
−(µ1+...+µi))
aµi+bie
−(µ0+...+µi−1)(1−e−µi )
= λi+1(a+bi+1e
−(µ1+...+µi))
aµi+1+bi+1e−(µ0+...+µi)(1−e−µi+1 )
, i = 1, . . . , n− 1,∑n
i=1 µi = µ = 1,
has a solution ~µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) such that 0 < µi < λi for i = 1, . . . , n.
The following lemma shows that Assumption 3.2 is more general than Assumption 3.1 for n = 1, 2, 3.
Lemma 3.2. If Assumption 3.1 holds, then the nonlinear system of equations in Assumption 3.2
has a solution.
Proof. To prove the statement for n = 1, assume Assumption 3.1 holds, i.e., λ1 > 1, then the system
of non-linear equations reduces to a single equation µ1 = µ = 1, which clearly has a solution µ1 = 1
in the interval (0, λ1), where λ1 > 1 and the statement is trivial.
65
For n = 2, the system of non-linear equations is given by
λ2(a+ b2e
−µ1)
aµ2 + b2e−µ1(1− e−µ2)
=
λ1(a+ b1e
−µ1)
aµ1 + b1(1− e−µ1)
,
µ1 + µ2 = 1,
which can be reduced to a single equation by substituting µ1 = x and µ2 = 1 − x with max{0, 1−
λ2} ≤ x ≤ min{1, λ1}. Therefore, we need to find the roots of function f(x) on the interval
(max{0, 1− λ2},min{1, λ1}), where
f(x) = λ2(a+ b2e
−x)
(
ax+ b1(1− e−x)
)
− λ1(a+ b1e−x)
(
a(1− x) + b2e−x(1− e−(1−x))
)
. (3.9)
If Assumption 3.1 holds, i.e., λ1, λ2 > 1, the feasible interval for x is [0, 1]. Since f(·) is continuous
and we have f(0) = −λ1(a+b1)
(
a+ b2(1− e−1)
)
< 0 and f(1) = λ2(a+b2e
−1)
(
a+ b1(1− e−1)
)
>
0, by the intermediate value theorem it follows that the equation f(x) = 0 has a solution in the
interval (0, 1). This step shows that for n = 2, Assumption 3.1 implies Assumption 3.2 proving the
statement.
Before proving the lemma for n = 3, we discuss the Borsuk’s theorem for the existence of solu-
tions of nonlinear equations (Frommer and Lang, 2005). In particular, for our problem the theorem
provides sufficient conditions on the parameters a, b, and λ under which the nonlinear system of equa-
tions in Assumption 3.2 has a solution in the interior of {(µ1, . . . , µn) : 0 ≤ µi ≤ λi for i = 1, . . . , n}.
In fact, these conditions are a generalization of the intermediate value theorem for n ≥ 3. These
conditions can be numerically tested via interval analysis but it is difficult to derive closed form equa-
tions in a clean format on the parameters of the problem. Nonetheless, we tested these sufficient
conditions for the problems that we knew the solution exists, but the tests were inconclusive.
To prove the statement for n = 3, first note that in the linear setting, the necessary an sufficient
condition for existence and uniqueness of solution to a system of equations is that the Jacobian
determinant be nonzero. In nonlinear setting if the Jacobian matrix has nonzero determinant, then
one gets the same result locally, i.e., for small perturbations. For n = 3, the nonlinear system of
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equations is given by
λ2(a+ b2e
−µ1)
aµ2 + b2e−µ1(1− e−µ2)
=
λ1(a+ b1e
−µ1)
aµ1 + b1(1− e−µ1)
,
λ3(a+ b3e
−(µ1+µ2))
aµ3 + b3e−(µ1+µ2)(1− e−µ3)
=
λ2(a+ b2e
−(µ1+µ2))
aµ2 + b2e−µ1(1− e−µ2)
,
µ1 + µ2 + µ3 = 1,
which can be reduced to a system of two nonlinear equations by substituting µ1 = x, µ2 = y, and
µ3 = 1 − x − y, where (x, y) is defined in a feasible two dimensional polygon P := {(x, y) : 0 ≤
x ≤ λ1, 0 ≤ y ≤ λ2, 1 − λ3 ≤ x + y ≤ 1}. In particular, we need to find the zeros of the function
f(x, y) = (f1(x, y), f2(x, y)) in the interior of P, where f1 and f2 are defined by
f1(x, y) = λ2(a+ b2e
−x)
(
ax+ b1(1− e−x)
)
− λ1(a+ b1e−x)
(
ay + b2e
−x(1− e−y)
)
,
f2(x, y) = λ3(a+ b3e
−(x+y))
(
ay + b2(1− e−y)
)
− λ2(a+ b2e−(x+y))
(
a(1− x− y) + b3e−(x+y)(1− e−(1−x−y))
)
.
A sufficient condition for the continuous function f with continuous Jacobian to have a root in
the interior of P is to ensure the system has a Jacobian with nonzero determinant locally at the
extreme points of P (Ortega and Rheinboldt, 2000). This is true when the Jacobian determinant
det(J(x, y)) is a concave function of the variables (x, y). To see the reason, assume there are two
pints (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ P such that det(J(x1, y1)), det(J(x2, y2)) > 0, then for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 we have
det (J(θ(x1, y1) + (1− θ)(x2, y2)) ≥ θdet(J(x1, y1)) + (1− θ)det(J(x2, y2)) > 0,
that is, the determinant function det(J(x, y)) is positive for any convex combination of the points
(x1, y1) and (x2, y2), i.e., on the line segment between (x1, y1) and (x2, y2). Thus, in order to check
the sign of the Jacobian determinant in P, it suffices to check its sign at extreme points of the
polygon P, as every point in its interior is a convex combination of its extreme points.
Now, to prove the statement assume λi > 1 for i = 1, 2, 3. In this setting, the Jacobian
determinant is a concave function and the polygon P has three extreme points, i.e., (0, 0), (1, 0),
and (0, 1). The Jacobian determinant of the non-linear system f(x, y) = (0, 0) is positive at these
points, thus positive on the entire P.
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The following example shows that there are sets of parameters for which Assumption 3.1
does not hold, but the system of nonlinear equations in Assumption 3.2 has a solution in the interior
of {(µ1, . . . , µn) : 0 ≤ µi ≤ λi}, supporting the fact that Assumption 3.2 includes more general set
of parameters compared to Assumption 3.1.
Example 3.2. Consider an example of an organ transplantation system with only 3 patient groups
ordered in their post-transplant survival, i.e., b1 = 20, b2 = 15, b3 = 10, with the same pre-transplant
survival, i.e., a1 = a2 = a3 = a = 2. Assume further that their arrival rates are λ1 = 0.6, λ2 =
0.7, λ3 = 0.8. Then, for such an example, the nonlinear system of equations in Assumption 3.2 has
a solution as follows: µ1 = 0.22, µ2 = 0.31, µ3 = 0.47, which clearly belongs to the interior of the
polygon formed by constraints (3.5). However, the condition in Assumption 3.1 does not hold for
this problem. Therefore, the solution of optimization problem (P6) for this set of parameters is an
assortative partition policy.
Next, in the following theorem we construct the condition under which the optimal solution
of problem (P6) is an assortative partition policy, i.e., Assumption 3.2.
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumption 3.2, the optimal solution of problem (P6) is an assortative par-
tition policy.
Proof. Let F : R2n+ → R be a continuous real valued function on (~µ,~γ) representing the objective
function of problem (P6) defined by,
F (~µ,~γ) =
n∑
i=1
(
λi log
(
aµi + biγi
))
.
Furthermore, for S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} let TS be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the corresponding
constraint in (3.4), Li and Hi be the Lagrange multipliers associated to the i
th lower and upper
constraints in (3.5), respectively, and Y be the multiplier associated with the single organ availability
constraint (3.6). Let L be the Lagrangian function that adjoints the constraints to the objective
function using the Lagrange multipliers, defined by:
L(~µ,~γ, ~T , ~L, ~H, Y ) = F (~µ,~γ) +
∑
S⊆{1,...,n}
TS
(
G
(
µ(S)
)
− γ(S)
)
+
n∑
i=1
Liµi +
n∑
i=1
Hi(λi − µi) + Y (
n∑
i=1
µi − 1).
Now, KKT conditions for problem (P6) can be stated through the following three conditions:
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(I) Primal Feasibility: The variable vector (~µ,~γ) must be feasible to the primal problem, that is,
γ(S) ≤ G
(
µ(S)
)
, ∀S ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
0 ≤ µi ≤ λi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
i=1
µi = µ.
(II) Dual Feasibility: The dual variables ~T =
(
TS : S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
)
, ~L =
(
Li : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
)
,
and ~H =
(
Hi : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
)
, must be nonnegative vectors.
(III) Complementary Slackness: The primal and dual variables must satisfy the following con-
dition:
TS
(
G
(
µ(S)
)
− γ(S)
)
= 0, ∀S ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
Liµi = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
Hi(λi − µi) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
Y (
n∑
i=1
µi − µ) = 0.
Furthermore, for each i = 1, . . . , n, partial derivative of the Lagrangian function L with respect to
µi and γi at the optimal point (~µ,~γ, ~T , ~L, ~H, Y ) must be zero, that is, for each i = 1, . . . , n,
∂L
∂µi
(~µ,~γ, ~T , ~L, ~H, Y ) =
aλi
aµi + biγi
+
∑{
S⊆{1,...,n}:i∈S
}TS ∂G(µ(S))∂µi (~µ,~γ, ~T , ~L, ~H, Y ) + Li −Hi + Y = 0, (3.10)
∂L
∂γi
(~µ,~γ, ~T , ~L, ~H, Y ) =
biλi
aµi + biγi
−
∑{
S⊆{1,...,n}:i∈S
}TS ∂γ(S)∂γi (~µ,~γ, ~T , ~L, ~H, Y ) = 0. (3.11)
By Lemma 3.1, in order to have an assortative partition policy, constraints (3.6) must be non-
binding at optimal solution, and among the constraints corresponding to the elements of the set Sk
in (3.4), the constraint corresponding to the subset [k] must be binding at the optimal solution for
k = 1, . . . , n. We construct such a solution that satisfies the KKT optimality condition as follows: we
let ~L = ~H = 0, TS = 0 for each S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} that S 6= [k] for k = 1, . . . , n, and G
(
µ(S)
)
−γ(S) = 0
for S = [k] and each k = 1, . . . , n with
∑n
i=1 µi = µ. This construction clearly satisfies the primal
feasibility and complementary slackness. Furthermore, it is easy to see that such a solution satisfies
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the dual feasibility. By using this solution and choosing g(x) = e−x, as mentioned earlier, we have
G(x) =
∫ x
0
g(u)du = 1− e−x, and the equations (3.10) and (3.11) can be rewritten as follows,
aλi
aµi + biγi
+
∑{
S=[k]:k=1,...,n
}TSe−µ(S) + Y = 0, (3.12)
biλi
aµi + biγi
−
∑{
S=[k]:k=1,...,n
}TS = 0. (3.13)
By equations (3.12) and (3.13) and eliminating Lagrange multipliers TS and Y from the equations,
we get the following system of nonlinear equations:
λi(a+ bie
−(µ1+...+µi))
aµi + bie−(µ0+...+µi−1)(1− e−µi)
=
λi+1(a+ bi+1e
−(µ1+...+µi))
aµi+1 + bi+1e−(µ0+...+µi)(1− e−µi+1)
i = 1, . . . , n− 1,
(3.14)
where µ0 := 0 by convention. Also, note that by equations (3.12) and (3.13), for each S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
the dual variables TS are non-negative and satisfy the dual feasibility condition (II) as required for
a KKT solution. Equations in (3.14) together with constraint (3.6), form a non-linear system of
equations with n variables and n equations on the variables µi. By construction, any solution to
this system of nonlinear equations that lies in the space {~µ : 0 < µi < λi, i = 1, . . . , n} is in fact the
optimal solution of the problem (P6), which is an assortative partition policy according to Lemma 3.1.
Note that by Assumption 3.2 such a solution exists. Once ~µ is characterized, we can easily construct
the corresponding solution ~γ, i.e., for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have γi = e
−(µ0+...+µi−1)(1 − e−µi). It
remains to note that since the objective function F (·, ·) of the problem (P6) is concave, and the
constraints form a convex set, the KKT optimality solution is a unique solution. This completes the
proof.
3.4 Numerical Results
This section presents the numerical results of applying the methods discussed in Sections
3.2 and 3.3 of Chapter 3 to the U.S. heart transplantation waiting list. For the purpose of numerical
study, we categorize patients based on their health status, age, blood-type, and VAD status into
128 classes. The input parameters of the optimization models (P5) and (P6) are estimated from
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the UNOS/OPTN heart transplantation data sets. Specifically, λi, the arrival rate of patients in
class i and µ, total arrival rate of donor hearts are estimated from the OPTN data sets for the
2006-2014 period. Pre-transplant quality of life coefficients, αis, are estimated for every health class
i by mapping from the coefficients for heart failure disease classes presented in Tengs and Wallace
(2000). Note that without loss of generality, we set the post-transplant quality of life coefficient to
be one, i.e., β = 1, and adjust the pre-transplant coefficients accordingly.
Table 3.1 summarizes the results of the simulation runs for the UA, MF, and PF policies: see
Hasankhani and Khademi (2017), Hasankhani and Khademi (2019), and Su and Zenios (2006) for
details. Furthermore, we include two policies by UNOS in our analysis, UNOS policy and recently
proposed UNOS-7 Tiered heart allocation policy (see Chapter 2 for more discussion on the UNOS
policies). We compare the proportional fair policy proposed in this study with these benchmark
policies in terms of total utilities of the patient population, minimum expected utility (MEU), sum
of logarithm of expected utilities (SLEUs), and the variance of waiting times. These benchmarks
include a policy that minimizes the variance of the waiting time between patient classes (VWT
policy), and an equity policy proposed by Su and Zenios (2006) (SZE policy).
In order to measure fairness in the simulation, we calculate the expected QALYs of patients in
different classes under simulation from the time they join the waiting list until they die or receive
an organ, i.e., the post-listing QALYs. The first three columns in Table 3.1 report the sum of the
QALYs of patients, the minimum expected QALYs among patient groups, and sum of the logarithm
of QALYs of the patients, respectively. The last column indicates the variance across patient classes
of the expected waiting times, which is introduced to be a measure of fairness in the literature (Su
and Zenios, 2006). All the measures reported are in terms of days except for the variance which is
in terms of the square of a day. Note that since the patients change class due to health deterioration
or age change, we consider the initial listing class of the patients in reporting the simulation results.
Results in Table 3.1 are in line with what we observed in Example 3.1, emphasizing on the fact that
the PF policy has higher total utility outcome than that of MF and lower than that of UA policy.
The price of fairness, i.e., utility loss with respect to UA, for MF and PF policies are around 6% and
2%, respectively. That is, the PF policy performs with a lower price in losing utility compared to
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Table 3.1: Policy Comparison
Policies Total QALYs(×108) MEU SLEUs(×102) Variance of Waiting Times
UA 1.651 115 2642.32 8100
MF 1.560 133 2574.33 6888
PF 1.605 119 2929.26 4489
VWT 1.600 122 2625.04 2601
UNOS 1.524 117 2527.09 23409
UNOS 7-Tiered 1.528 116 2555.91 30625
MF. This is because MF policy allocates organs more to the patients who have the lowest expected
utility, e.g., sicker patients, to maximize their utility. However, as a result of this allocation patients
who expect to gain higher utilities will not receive enough donor organ to increase their utilities.
On the other hand, since the goal of the proportional fairness is to have a non-positive aggregate
proportional change compared to other allocations, its solution, i.e., PF policy, will produce policies
performing better than MF policy in terms of aggregate utility while at the same time preserving a
certain degree of fairness based on the Nash solution. Therefore, the PF policy has a significantly
smaller price of fairness. Note that the price of fairness for VWT policy, which introduced in Chapter
2 as a policy focusing on fairness by equalizing the waiting time among patients, is around 3%.
Furthermore, the PF policy outperforms UNOS and UNOS 7-Tiered policies by around 7% in terms
of total utility. In addition, the minimum utility of the patients under PF policy is slightly higher
than that of UA. In terms of minimum expected utility, the MF policy achieves the highest minimum
utility among patients and all other policies perform almost similar in terms of this measure. In terms
of the sum of logarithm of utility of patients, the PF policy outperforms all other policies. Policies
that consider fairness in their prioritization, i.e., MF, PF, and VWT, achieve smaller variance for
waiting time across different patients compared to the UA and UNOS policies. This is an interesting
observation of the impact of incorporating fairness in transplant queuing system allocation rules.
In addition, we conduct an analysis on the percentage of hearts allocated to different patient classes
under each policy and discuss the priority focus in each of them. This analysis helps us capture
the utility allocation among different patient classes and compare them for different allocations.
72
In particular, we report the percentages of donor hearts allocated to each patient health, age, and
VAD status class in the simulation. Figures 3.1-3.3 report the results of this analysis for the PF,
UA, MF, and UNOS policies. We observe an interesting behavior from the PF policy. In fact, the
results reported in Figure 3.1 show that in terms of health prioritization, the PF policy allocates
only around 29% of the total hearts to patients in health class 1A, i.e., sickest patient class, less
than the 49% of the UNOS policy but greater than the 18% of UA policy. The MF policy, on the
other hand, is closer to UNOS policy with 41% allocation to the sickest patient group, and this is in
line with its objective as it tries to maximize the lowest utility among patients, e.g., sickest patients.
These results suggest that PF policy prioritize healthier and sicker patients in a same manner as
it assigns almost the same percentage of hearts to patients in 1A and 2, the sickest and healthiest
patient classes. Furthermore, compared to the UA policy, it imposes certain level of fairness with
respect to sicker patients, as it shifts priority from healthier to sicker patients.
In terms of age prioritization also we observed an interesting behaviour from PF policy. Although
it is not surprising to see that UA policy prioritizes younger patients more than that of UNOS
and MF, we observe that PF policy even allocates slightly higher percentage of organs to younger
patients compared to UA policy. Specifically, PF policy allocates 56% of total hearts to the younger
patient groups, i.e., [18-35] and [34-50] compared to the 51% of the UA policy and 38% of the MF
policy. The reason is that as we show in chapter 2, the improvement of the UA policy over UNOS
policy in terms of total utility is mainly due to a shift in patients prioritization from sicker and older
patients towards healthier and younger ones, with an emphasize on shift in health prioritization.
Thus, relatively speaking, UA policy tries to allocate more organs to healthy patients than the
young patients. That is, among two patients, the healthy-old one and the sick-young one, the policy
allocates organ to healthy-old patient rather than to sick-young one. Nonetheless, our results in
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 suggest that the improvement of the PF over UNOS policy is also because of
a shift towards prioritizing healthier and younger patients in PF policy, but with more emphasize
on the shift in age prioritization. These results are consistent with the findings in Ladin and Hanto
(2011) for kidney, where they state that prioritizing younger patients is more equitable, not because
they are likely to gain higher utilities, but because they have not experienced their “fair innings”,
i.e., they have not had an opportunity to live as long as older ones. Specifically, they write “Fair
innings enhances equity by affording all patients the opportunity to achieve as much of a normal
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of Hearts Allocated to Each Health Group
lifespan as possible.” Note that the impact of patients’ age is considered in the quality of life
coefficients used to estimate the QALYs of the patients in our analysis. On the other hand, MF
policy prioritizes patients similar to the UNOS policy as its objective is to ensure the maximum
amount of life-expectancy for the patients in the oldest age group, i.e., patients gaining the least
utility level in terms of age categorization. Thus, it allocates more hearts to older patients compared
to the PF and UA policies.
Finally, from the viewpoint of patient prioritization based on their VAD status, our results demon-
strate a slight shift toward prioritizing patients without VAD in the two policies with the objective
of fairness, PF and MF policy, compared to the UNOS policy. In addition, the PF policy performs
similar to the UA policy in prioritizing patients according to their VAD status. All in all, our nu-
merical results are in agreement with the theoretical results about the proportional fairness stating
that it produces policies in the midway point between max-min fairness and utilitarian approach.
3.5 Conclusion
We study the problem of allocating donor organs to patients on the transplant waiting list
under different fairness measures in the objective. Since the common measures for fairness have
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a high price and cause a significant performance loss, we propose incorporation of a new fairness
measure in organ transplantation system. Specifically, we introduce an application of proportional
fairness, which is a generalization of Nash standard, and analyze it both mathematically and nu-
merically. In addition to proposing an application of proportional fairness measure, we study the
performance of two existing policies that incorporate fairness, i.e., a policy based on max-min fairness
measure, which maximizes the minimum expected utility among patients, as well as VWT policy,
which is introduced in the literature of organ allocation as a policy that equalizes the waiting times
among patients.
We formulate the organ transplantation problem with proportional fairness, being a measure
of equity in its objective, as a queuing model and analyze its fluid approximation. Our analytical
results show that under certain assumptions, the solution of the resulting optimization problem is an
assortative partition policy, which is easy to implement in practice and provides analytical insights.
In particular, under assortative partition allocation policies, good quality organs are assigned to
healthier and younger patients who receive higher utilities. From a numerical viewpoint, we quantify
the extent that incorporating proportional fairness measure in organ transplantation improves the
price of fairness compared to existing fairness measures. While the efficiency loss is high under the
max-min fairness, we show that the loss can be significantly reduced by incorporating proportional
fairness in designing allocation policies. In addition, we numerically compare the performance of
the policies studied in this work with that of the PF policy under different metrics, including total
utility of the patients, minimum expected utility, sum of the logarithm of utilities, and variance
of the waiting time of patients. Finally, we show via simulation that how these policies prioritize
different patient classes in practice and how many percentages of organs are allocated to each patient
health status, age, and VAD status classes. Results confirm that the model which has proportional
fairness measure in its objective produces policies (the PF policy) that prioritize healthier patients
more than UNOS and less than UA policies. Furthermore, interestingly, it puts slightly more priority
on younger patients than UA policy. However, all in all, it yields a total utility, which is a measure
of efficiency, less than that of UA and greater than that of MF. This observation is in line with the
results in the existing literature of proportional fairness in bandwidth allocation in wireless networks
which corroborate our findings.
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Appendix A Appendix of Chapter 1
A.1 Attributes
In order to create a reliable simulation model of the heart transplantation system and a
flexible allocation policy module, several attributes and characteristics for patients and donated
hearts were considered in this study. Tables 2 and 3 show these attributes for patients and hearts,
respectively.
Table 2: Patient Characteristics
Attribute Groups
Age group(4) [18-35]; [35-50]; [50-65]; [65+]
Gender(2) [Female]; [Male]
Blood type(4) [O]; [A]; [B]; [AB]
Region(11) [Region 1];. . .; [Region 11]
Ethnicity(7) [White]; [African-American]; [Hispanic]; [Asian]; [American Indian/Alaska Native]; [Pacific
Islander]; [Multiracial]
Disease(9) [Dilated Myopathy (2 Groups)]; [Heart Re-transplant (Graft Failure)]; [Hypertrophic
Cardiomyopathy]; [Restrictive Myopathy]; [Valvular Heart Disease]; [Congenital Heart Defect];
[Coronary Artery Disease]; [Other]
VAD status(2) [1= If the patient has a VAD]; [0=Otherwise]
PTX status(2) [1=If the patient has gone under transplantation before]; [0=Otherwise]
Health status(4) [1A]; [1B] ; [2]; [Inactive (7)]
OPO(58) [OPO 1];. . .; [OPO 58]
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Table 3: Heart Characteristics
Attribute Groups
Donor age group(4) [18-35]; [35-50]; [50-65]; [65+]
Donor gender(2) [Female]; [Male]
Donor blood type(4) [O]; [A]; [B]; [AB]
Donor region(11) [Region 1]; . . .; [Region 11]
Donor ethnicity(7) [White]; [African-American]; [Hispanic]; [Asian]; [American Indian/Alaska Native]; [Pacific
Islander]; [Multiracial]
Donor OPO(58) [OPO 1];. . .; [OPO 58]
A.1.1 Disease Groups
UNOS considers more than 70 disease groups for patients with heart failure (United Network
for Organ Sharing, 2015). Table 4 shows the number of patients in each disease group on the waiting
list (Feb 2016). As can be seen from Table 4, some disease groups have small number of candidates,
which make it impossible to create meaningful statistical distributions. In order to produce more
accurate arrival distributions, we aggregated the UNOS heart disease categorization into 9 groups
as listed in Table 5. We used the UNOS categorization of reasons for heart transplantation in
aggregating disease groups (United Network for Organ Sharing, 2015) (Table 6).
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Table 4: Waiting List Disease Group Categorization in Feb 2016 (Adults)
Disease Group Registrations
All Diagnosis 3,886
Dilated Myopathy: Post-Partum 61
Dilated Myopathy: Viral 54
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Acute Rejection 2
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Chronic Rejection 10
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Coronary Artery Disease 75
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Hyperacute Rejection 2
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Non-Specific 4
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Other Specify 4
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Primary Failure 6
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Restrictive/Constrictive 3
Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy 95
Arrhythmogenic Right Ventricular Dysplasia/Cardio 9
Restrictive Myopathy: Amyloidosis 20
Restrictive Myopathy: Idiopathic 25
Restrictive Myopathy: Other Specify 7
Restrictive Myopathy: Sarcoidosis 21
Restrictive Myopathy: Sec To Radiat/Chem 7
Valvular Heart Disease 40
Other, Specify 88
Not Reported 200
Congenital Heart Defect : Hypoplastic Left Heart 1
Congenital Heart Defect : Prior Surgery Unknown 7
Congenital Heart Defect : With Surgery 125
Congenital Heart Defect : Without Surgery 14
Coronary Artery Disease 117
Dilated Myopathy: Adriamycin 56
Dilated Myopathy: Alcoholic 7
Dilated Myopathy: Familial 112
Dilated Myopathy: Idiopathic 1,307
Dilated Myopathy: Ischemic 1,111
Dilated Myopathy: Myocarditis 22
Dilated Myopathy: Other Specify 274
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Table 5: Disease Categorization in Model
Group Diseases Included
Dilated Myopathy 1. Dilated Myopathy: Adriamycin
2. Dilated Myopathy: Alcoholic
3. Dilated Myopathy: Familial
4. Dilated Myopathy: Idiopathic
6. Dilated Myopathy: Myocarditis
7. Dilated Myopathy: Other Specify
8. Dilated Myopathy: Post-Partum
Dilated Myopathy : Viral 1. Dilated Myopathy : Viral
Restrictive Myopathy 1. Restrictive Myopathy: Amyloidosis
2. Restrictive Myopathy: Idiopathic
3. Restrictive Myopathy: Other Specify
4. Restrictive Myopathy: Sarcoidosis
5. Restrictive Myopathy: Sec To Radiat/Chem
Hypertrophic Cardiomiopathy 1. Hypertrophic Cardiomiopathy
Valvular Heart Disease 1. Valvular Heart Disease
Congenital Heart Defect 1. Congenital Heart Defect : Hypoplastic Left Heart
2. Congenital Heart Defect : Prior Surgery Unknown
3. Congenital Heart Defect : With Surgery
4. Congenital Heart Defect : Without Surgery
Coronary Artery Disease 1. Coronary Artery Disease
2. Dilated Myopathy: Ischemic
Heart Re-Tx/Gf 1. Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Acute Rejection
2. Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Chronic Rejection
3. Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Coronary Artery Disease
4. Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Hyperacute Rejection
5. Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Non-Specific
6. Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Other Specify
7. Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Primary Failure
8. Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Restrictive/Constrictive
Other 1. Arrhythmogenic Right Ventricular Dysplasia/Cardio
2. Not Reported
3. Other/specify
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Table 6: UNOS Table of Reasons for Heart Transplantation
Heart Diagnosis Categories Heart Diagnoses
Cardiomyopathy Dilated Myopathy: Idiopathic
Dilated Myopathy: Myocarditis
Dilated Myopathy: Other Specify
Dilated Myopathy: Post-Partum
Dilated Myopathy: Familial
Dilated Myopathy: Adriamycin
Dilated Myopathy: Viral
Dilated Myopathy: Alcoholic
Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy
Restrictive Myopathy: Idiopathic
Restrictive Myopathy: Amyloidosis
Restrictive Myopathy:Sarcoidosis
Restrictive Myopathy: Endocardial Fibrosis
Restrictive Myopathy: Other Specify
Restrictive Myopathy: Sec To Radiat/Chem
Coronary Artery Disease Coronary Artery Disease
Dilated Myopathy: Ischemic
Congenital Heart Disease Congenital Heart Disease
Valvular Heart Disease Valvular Heart Disease
Retransplant/Graft Failure Heart Re-Tx/GF: Coronary Artery Disease
Heart Re-Tx/GF: Other Specify
Heart Re-Tx/GF: Non-Specific
Heart Re-Tx/GF: Acute Rejection
Heart Re-Tx/GF: Hyperacute Rejection
Heart Re-Tx/GF: Primary Failure
Heart Re-Tx/GF: Chronic Rejection
Heart Re-Tx/GF: Restrictive/Constrictive
Other Cardiac Disease: Other Specify
Heart: Other Specify
Cancer
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A.1.2 Health Status Assignment
This section closely follows UNOS/OPTN policy reports. Each heart transplant candidate
is assigned a health status that reflects the candidate’s medical urgency for transplant. Heart
candidates (18+) at the time of registration may be assigned one of the following health statuses
(Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 2015).
• Adult status 1A
• Adult status 1B
• Adult status 2
• Inactive status
Adult Heart Status 1A Requirements: To assign a candidate adult status 1A, the candidate’s
transplant program must submit a Heart Status 1A Justification Form to the OPTN Contractor. A
candidate is not assigned adult status 1A until this form is submitted. If the candidate is at least
18 years old at the time of registration, then the candidate’s transplant program may assign the
candidate adult status 1A if either of the following conditions is met:
1. The candidate is admitted to the transplant hospital that registered the candidate on the waiting
list, or an affiliated Veteran’s Administration (VA) hospital, and the candidate also meets at least
one of the requirements in Table 7.
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Table 7: Adult Status 1A Requirements for Candidates Currently Admitted to the Transplant
Hospital
If the candidate meets this condition: Then adult status 1A is valid for:
Has one of the following mechanical circulatory support devices
in place:
• Total artificial heart (TAH)
• Intra-aortic balloon pump
• Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO)
14 days, and must be recertified by an attending physician every
14 days from the date of the candidate’s initial registration as
adult status 1A to extend the adult status 1A registration.
Requires continuous mechanical ventilation. 14 days, and must be recertified by an attending physician every
14 days from the date of the candidate’s initial registration as
adult status 1A to extend the Status 1A registration.
Requires continuous infusion of a single high-dose intravenous
inotrope or multiple intravenous inotropes, and requires
continuous hemodynamic monitoring of left ventricular filling
pressures. The OPTN Contractor will maintain a list of the
OPTN-approved qualifying inotropes and doses.
7 days, and may be renewed for additional 7 day periods for each
occurrence of an adult status 1A listing under this criterion for
this candidate.
2. A candidate who is at least 18 years old at the time of registration, and may or may not
be currently admitted to the transplant hospital, may be assigned adult status 1A if the candidate
meets at least one of the requirements in Table 8.
84
Table 8: Adult Status 1A Requirements for Candidates Current Hospitalization Not Required
If the candidate meets this condition: Then adult status 1A is valid for:
Has one of the following mechanical circulatory support devices
in place:\begin{itemize}\item Left ventricular assist device
(LVAD)\item Right ventricular assist device (RVAD) \item Left
and right ventricular assist devices (BiVAD)\end{itemize}
30 days, and the candidate may be registered as adult status 1A
for 30 days at any point after being implanted once an attending
physician determines the candidate is medically stable. The 30
days do not have to be consecutive. However, if the candidate
undergoes a procedure to receive another device, then the
candidate qualifies for a new term of 30 days. Any 30 days
granted by the new device would substitute and not supplement
any time remaining from the previous adult status 1A
classification.
Candidate has mechanical circulatory support and there is
medical evidence of significant device-related complications
including, but not limited to, thromboembolism, device
infection, mechanical failure, or life-threatening ventricular
arrhythmias. A candidates sensitization is not an acceptable
device-related complication to qualify as adult status 1A. If a
transplant program reports a complication that is not listed
here, the registration will be retrospectively reviewed by the
heart regional review board (RRB).
14 days, and must be recertified by an attending physician every
14 days from the date of the candidate’s initial registration as
adult status 1A to extend the adult status 1A registration.
If the attending physician does not update the qualifications for adult status 1A registration
when required according to Tables 7 and 8, then the candidate’s adult status 1A will expire and the
candidate will be downgraded to adult status 1B.
Adult Heart Status 1B Requirements: To assign a candidate adult status 1B, the candidate’s
transplant program must submit a Heart Status 1B Justification Form to the OPTN Contractor. A
candidate is not assigned adult status 1B until this form is submitted. The candidate’s transplant
program may assign the candidate as adult status 1B if the candidate is at least 18 years old at the
time of registration and has at least one of the following devices or therapies in place:
• Left ventricular assist device (LVAD)
• Right ventricular assist device (RVAD)
• Left and right ventricular assist devices (BiVAD)
• Continuous infusion of intravenous inotropes
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Candidates that continue to qualify for adult status 1B may retain this status for an unlimited
period and this status does not require any recertification, unless the candidate’s medical condition
changes.
Adult Heart Status 2 Requirements: If the candidate is at least 18 years old at the time of
registration and does not meet the criteria for adult status 1A or 1B but is suitable for transplant,
then the candidate may be assigned adult status 2. The candidate may retain adult status 2 for
an unlimited period and this status does not require recertification, unless the candidate’s medical
condition changes.
Status Updates: If a candidate’s medical condition changes and the criteria used to justify that
candidate’s status is no longer accurate, then the candidate’s transplant program must update the
candidate’s status and report the updated information to the OPTN Contractor within 24 hours of
the change in medical condition. Hence, we decided to update the patients’ health status daily in
our simulation model.
A.1.3 Region
For the administration of organ allocation and appropriate geographic representation within
the OPTN policy structure, the membership is divided into 11 geographic regions (Organ Procure-
ment and Transplantation Network, 2015). Members belong to the Region in which they are located
(Figure 4). Different states are categorized into 11 regions as follows:
• Region 1: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Eastern
Vermont.
• Region 2: Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, West Vir-
ginia, and the part of Northern Virginia in the Donation Service Area served by the Washington
Regional Transplant Community (DCTC) OPO.
• Region 3: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Puerto Rico.
• Region 4: Oklahoma and Texas.
• Region 5: Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah.
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• Region 6: Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington.
• Region 7: Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
• Region 8: Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, and Wyoming.
• Region 9: New York and Western Vermont.
• Region 10: Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio.
• Region 11: Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
Figure 4: Map of UNOS Regional Categorization
OPO is an organization authorized by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
under Section 1138(b) of the Social Security Act, to procure organs for transplantation. Each region
consists of several OPOs (Figure 5). There are 58 OPO centers in the U.S.; each includes one or
more transplant centers (hospitals). Table 9 shows the number of OPOs and transplant centers in
each region (United Network for Organ Sharing, 2015).
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Figure 5: Map of OPO Locations
Table 9: Number of OPO and Transplant Centers in Each Region
Region Number of OPO Centers Number of Transplant Centers
1 2 14
2 5 35
3 10 30
4 4 30
5 8 33
6 3 9
7 4 22
8 5 19
9 4 14
10 6 20
11 7 24
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Since the OPO-level arrival data were not available in UNOS datasets, in order to generate
the OPO for an arrived patient/heart, we first generated her/its region, and then using Table 9,
randomly assigned one of the OPOs of the generated region as her/its OPO.
A.2 Patient Arrival Analysis
In order to generate the attributes of an arrived patient, we used statistical methods to
create a series of conditional relationships. Figure 6 demonstrates the three levels of these hierarchal
relationships. We assessed the dependency of each of the attributes to time at the first level and
to each other at the second and third levels in the patient arrival process. Since data for VAD
were not available in UNOS datasets at the time of study, we assumed that it is dependent to time
and included it in the first level of this hierarchy. We also excluded region and OPO from this
statistical study, as yearly arrival rate generates the region arrival rates and region generates OPO.
However, we reported the p-values of region dependency to time in the regression test for the first
level. Another attribute that we did not consider in the first level of dependency was health status
as health status arrival rates is more dependent to disease and age. Other patient attributes were
included in the statistical tests.
First, for each group of patient attributes, we used regression to test its dependency to time
(calendar year). For example, for blood type, we tested 4 null hypotheses, i.e., the dependency of
blood type “O,” “A,” “B,” and “AB” to time. In particular, for blood type “O,” the two variables
included in the regression are A0 which stands for arrival of blood type “O” and T which shows
time (in years). We tested whether the coefficient of time in equation A0 = aT + b equals zero or
not. In fact, the null hypothesis is defined by:

H0 : a = 0,
H1 : a 6= 0.
By choosing a significance level α, a p-value less than α rejects the null hypothesis, and shows that
the variable depends on time. Similar statistical tests were used to test the dependency of blood
type groups “A,” “B,” and “AB” to time. By repeating the same procedure for the other patient
attributes, we created Table 10, which shows the p-values for each test (we used α = 0.1 for the
analysis reported in 10). Then, for each attribute, we defined the degree of dependency to time,
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which is the percentage of groups of an attribute dependent on time. By comparing these degrees
of dependency, we chose attributes gender, PTX status, and disease group to be dependent on time
in our model. By doing so, we then created the first layer shown in Figure 6. Note that we used
programming language R to perform our statistical tests throughout this thesis.
Table 10: Regression p-values for Testing the Time Dependency of Attributes
Attribute Groups Regression
p-value
Dependency
to time?
Degree of dependency
Gender Female: 0.0004452 Yes 2 out of 2
Male: 0.0004450 Yes (100%)
Ethnicity White: 0.0279300 Yes 4 out of 7
African-American: 0.0001934 Yes (57.14%)
Hispanic: 0.0005916 Yes
Asian: 0.0055590 Yes
American Indian/Alaska Native: 0.2516000 No
Pacific Islander: 0.3977000 No
Multiracial: 0.6751000 No
Blood type O: 0.8458000 No 1 out of 4
A: 0.3584000 No (25%)
B: 0.2806000 No
AB: 0.0718700 Yes
Disease Dilated Myopathy: Post-Partum 0.1939000 No 13 out of 32
Dilated Myopathy: Viral 0.7376000 No (40.62%)
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Acute
Rejection
0.1313000 No
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Chronic
Rejection
0.1423000 No
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Coronary
Artery Disease
0.1100000 No
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Hyperacute
Rejection
0.1117000 No
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Non-Specific 0.3074000 No
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Other Specify 0.6850000 No
Heart Re-Tx/Gf: Primary
Failure
0.8999000 No
Heart Re-Tx/Gf:
Restrictive/Constrictive
0.0875900 Yes
Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy 0.0005736 Yes
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Table 10 continued from previous page
Arrhythmogenic Right
Ventricular Dysplasia/Cardio
0.2825000 No
Restrictive Myopathy:
Amyloidosis
0.9744000 No
Restrictive Myopathy:
Idiopathic
0.0016430 Yes
Restrictive Myopathy: Other
Specify
0.0001368 Yes
Restrictive Myopathy:
Sarcoidosis
0.0001163 Yes
Restrictive Myopathy: Sec To
Radiat/Chem
0.7919000 No
Valvular Heart Disease 0.1260000 No
Other, Specify 0.9980000 No
Not Reported 0.9143000 No
Congenital Heart Defect :
Hypoplastic Left Heart
0.0783000 Yes
Congenital Heart Defect : Prior
Surgery Unknown
0.0446000 Yes
Congenital Heart Defect : With
Surgery
0.1449000 No
Congenital Heart Defect :
Without Surgery
0.0175300 Yes
Coronary Artery Disease 0.2912000 No
Dilated Myopathy: Adriamycin 0.6545000 No
Dilated Myopathy: Alcoholic 0.0137200 Yes
Dilated Myopathy: Familial 0.3949000 No
Dilated Myopathy: Idiopathic 0.0000042 Yes
Dilated Myopathy: Ischemic 0.0818800 Yes
Dilated Myopathy: Myocarditis 0.0000056 Yes
Dilated Myopathy: Other
Specify
0.0021600 Yes
Age group [18-35]: 0.1635000 No 1 out of 4
[35-50]: 0.3096000 No (25%)
[50-65]: 0.0036680 Yes
[65+]: 0.1369000 No
PTX status 1: 0.0012420 Yes 1 out of 2
0: 0.1329000 No (50%)
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Table 10 continued from previous page
Region Region 1: 0.1275000 No 3 out of 11
Region 2: 0.1257000 No (27.27%)
Region 3: 0.1599000 No
Region 4: 0.0168600 Yes
Region 5: 0.9526000 No
Region 6: 0.1880000 No
Region 7: 0.9564000 No
Region 8: 0.2506000 No
Region 9: 0.0145800 Yes
Region 10: 0.0005045 Yes
Region 11: 0.2114000 No
After creating the first level, the Chi-squared independency test was used to test the de-
pendency of each attribute in the first level to the remaining attributes. Results (p-values) of the
Chi-squared independency test of attributes gender, PTX status, and disease group are reported
in Tables 11, 12, and 13, respectively. In the Chi-squared test the null hypothesis is to check the
independency of the two tested variables. When the p-value reported by the test is smaller than a
significance level, the null hypothesis is rejected and consequently the dependency of the variables
is concluded.
Table 11: P-values for Chi-squared Independency Test for Gender
Independency test of gender and: P-value
Blood type 0.0008254
Age < 2.2× 10−16
Ethnicity < 2.2× 10−16
Table 12: P-values for Chi-squared Independency Test for PTX Status
Independency test of PTX status and: P-value
Blood type < 2.2× 10−16
Age < 2.2× 10−16
Ethnicity < 2.2× 10−16
Table 13: P-values for Chi-squared Independency Test for Disease
Independency test of disease and: P-value
Blood type 0.6651
Age < 2.2× 10−16
Ethnicity 0.4259
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Based on reported p-values of the tests, we developed the hierarchy such that each attribute
in level one had only one dependent variable in level two. Since most of the p-values were smaller
than the usual significance levels, we chose the attribute with the smallest p-value as the dependent
variable for each of the attributes in level one (Table 14). Note that 2.2 × 10−16 is the smallest
p-value that R programming language reports and this small number in fact shows a dependency
between attributes.
Table 14: Second Level Dependency of Patient Attributes
Attribute Dependent Attributes
Gender Age, Ethnicity
PTX Status Blood Type, Age, Ethnicity
Disease Age
Age was the only dependent attribute to disease, and it was chosen as the second level
variable depending on disease. The only remained choice for gender was ethnicity. For PTX status,
though, we could choose blood type as its second level, we did not do so because blood type depends
more on ethnicity than previous heart transplant (PTX status). The only remained variables are
health status, and blood type. So far, we created three conditional branches, that is, gender/ethnicity
branch, disease/age branch, and PTX status branch. Among these branches we chose health status
as the third level variable for disease/age branch, because the health status arrival depends more on
disease/age than to gender/ethnicity or PTX status. Also, blood type group arrival rates depend
more on gender/ethnicity. Creating the conditional relationships for patient attributes helps to
estimate patient attribute arrival distributions more accurately.
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Figure 6: Pattern of Dependency in Patient Arrival Data
A.3 Heart Arrival Analysis
When a heart is procured to the system, the model assigns its various attributes according
to a series of conditional relationships. We used the same statistical methods described in Appendix
A.2 for patient arrivals to test the dependency of heart attributes to each other, as well as time
(calendar year). We included all the attributes of a heart considered by UNOS in our analysis.
Table 15 shows the p-values of time dependency test for each group of heart attributes, as well as
their degree of dependency to time. Based on the results of Table 15, we created the first level
of hierarchy, which involves age group, blood type, and ethnicity because these attributes have a
larger degree of dependency to time compared to the other attributes. Tables 16, 17, and 18 show
the p-values for Chi-squared independency test between each of the attributes in the first level
with gender and region. However, since almost all the p-values were close to zero, we decided to
consider the region to depend on blood type and gender to depend on age group in the second level.
We generated the OPO of an arrived heart randomly based on its region. Figure A.4 shows these
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conditional relationships.
Table 15: Regression p-values for Testing the Time Dependency of Attributes
Attribute Groups Regression
p-value
Dependency
on time?
Degree of dependency
Gender Female: 0.1974000 No 0 out of 2
Male: 0.1974000 No (0%)
Ethnicity White: 0.0006164 Yes 3 out of 7
African-American: 0.0056930 Yes (42.85%)
Hispanic: 0.5378000 No
Asian: 0.0000042 Yes
American Indian/Alaska Native: 0.9271000 No
Pacific Islander: 0.2107000 No
Multiracial: 0.2567000 No
Blood type O: 0.1157000 No 2 out of 4
A: 0.8177000 No (50%)
B: 0.0179900 Yes
AB: 0.0030470 Yes
Age group [18-35]: 0.1635000 No 1 out of 4
[35-50]: 0.3096000 No (25%)
[50-65]: 0.0036680 Yes
[65+]: 0.1369000 No
Region Region 1: 0.0010610 Yes 3 out of 11
Region 2: 0.5411000 No (27.27%)
Region 3: 0.0811700 Yes
Region 4: 0.3148000 No
Region 5: 0.5095000 No
Region 6: 0.7325000 No
Region 7: 0.1348000 No
Region 8: 0.1945000 No
Region 9: 0.0119400 Yes
Region 10: 0.6285000 No
Region 11: 0.5649000 No
95
Table 16: P-values for Chi-squared Independency Test for Age Group
Independency test of age group and: P-value
Region < 2.2× 10−16
Gender < 2.2× 10−16
Table 17: P-values for Chi-squared Independency Test for Blood Type
Independency test of blood type and: P-value
Region < 2.2× 10−16
Gender < 6.7× 10−8
Table 18: P-values for Chi-squared Independency Test for Ethnicity
Independency test of ethnicity and: P-value
Region < 2.2× 10−16
Gender < 2.2× 10−16
Table 19: Second Level Dependency of Heart Attributes
Attribute Dependent Attributes
Age Group Gender, Region
Blood Type Region
Ethnicity Gender, Region
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Figure 7: Pattern of Dependency in Heart Arrival Data
A.4 Patient Health Status Change Module
We validated the health status change module by comparing the portion of patients in each
health status produced by our simulation model with the historical data reported in UNOS datasets
(United Network for Organ Sharing, 2015). In particular, we used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
to check whether the health status distributions produced by the model are statistically identical
to the real health status distributions at the end of each calendar year during 2006-2014. P-values
reported in Table 20 indicate that the Markov chain developed to describe the health status change
of patients on the waiting list, accurately estimates the proportion of patients in each health status
over time. The transition probability matrix of the Markov chain is given by:
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P =
1A 1B 2 Inactive

1A 0.97919 0.01864 0.00103 0.00114
1B 0.00447 0.99267 0.00052 0.00234
2 0.00012 0.00071 0.99668 0.00249
Inactive 0.00021 0.00012 0.00031 0.99936
In order to estimate this matrix, we first estimated the monthly frequency of transition matrix using
the SRTR annual data reports. Then, by using Chapman-Kolmogorov equations, we estimated the
daily frequency of transition matrix by taking the 30th root of the monthly transition frequencies.
Table 20: P-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
P-value 0.7714 0.2286 1 0.7718 0.77 1 1 1 1
A.5 Delisting
In our simulation model, outflow of patients from waiting list occurs due to three reasons:
transplant, death, and delisting. According to UNOS data, there are several reasons for delisting
such as transplanted in another country, unable to contact candidate, medically unsuitable, refused
transplant, transferred to another center, condition improved, too sick to transplant, transplanted
at another Center, etc (United Network for Organ Sharing, 2015). Using UNOS delisting data, we
calculated the number of delisted patients during each year from 2006 to the end of 2014. Table 21
shows the historical data for daily delisting rates (computed by dividing numbers delisted annually
by 365) at each year. We model the delisting process as a nonstationary Poisson process. That is, at
each day, using Table 21, we generate a Poisson random number with the mean of the daily delisting
rate. The generated number determines the number of patients to be delisted at that day. We then
picked the patients who are going to be delisted according to a distribution that depends on the
health status. The rationale behind the choice of health status for the delisting process is that the
delisting distribution significantly depends on health status, while weakly correlates with the other
attributes according to the historical data reported by UNOS (United Network for Organ Sharing,
2015). For example, the daily delisting rate for year 2014 is equal to 2.42. Suppose that the Poisson
random number generated using a mean of 2.42 is equal to 3 in the simulation. Therefore, we delist
3 patients from the waiting list. The health status removal distribution of patients in 2014 is given
by (United Network for Organ Sharing, 2015):
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• Health status 1A: 8.6 % of all delisted patients
• Health status 1B: 15 % of all delisted patients
• Health status 2: 14 % of all delisted patients
• Health status 7 (Inactive): 62.4 % of all delisted patients
Table 21: Number of Yearly and Daily Delisting for UNOS Waiting List During 2006-2014
Year 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Transplanted in another country 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unable to contact candidate 14 13 6 19 17 3 68 5 13
Medically unsuitable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Refused transplant 24 13 22 17 13 24 22 26 17
Transferred to another center 76 42 62 60 70 32 34 37 45
Other 218 191 154 214 122 120 165 97 129
Condition improved 203 149 151 171 173 202 255 315 196
Too sick to transplant 317 274 219 234 196 177 134 111 108
Transplanted at another center 30 25 17 16 9 10 11 7 8
Total removal 883 707 631 731 600 568 689 598 516
Daily removal rate 2.42 1.94 1.73 2 1.64 1.56 1.89 1.64 1.41
A.6 Pre-Transplant Death
Patients may die while waiting for a donor heart on the waiting list. We used the SRTR
Cox proportional hazard model to generate the daily death probability for each patient on the
waiting list (Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients, 2015a). Although this model estimates the
patient survival based on patient data from 07/01/2012 to 06/30/2013, we used it to generate death
probabilities for the other years. The covariates for 1-year patient survival are reported in Table 22
(Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients, 2015a). Covariates for VAD status, Region, and OPO
were not available in the proportional hazard model. Hence, we assigned 0 for those covariates.
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Table 22: Heart Waitlist Mortality Rates (07/01/2012-06/30/2013)
Characteristic Level Estimate Standard Error P-value
Age 17 and less 0.1383 0.2213 0.5321
35-49 0.5141 0.1978 0.0093
50-64 0.5834 0.1904 0.0022
65+ 0.7811 0.2059 0.0001
18-34 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Blood Type A -0.0188 0.0984 0.8486
AB -0.0324 0.2755 0.9064
B 0.0438 0.1355 0.7465
O 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Diagnosis (Disease) Cardiomyopathy -0.1261 0.1091 0.2479
Retransplant 0.7975 0.2066 0.0001
Valvular Heart Disease 0.9104 0.2393 0.0001
Congenital Heart Disease 0.6431 0.1977 0.0011
Missing 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Other 0.139 0.3649 0.7032
Gender Female -0.1655 0.106 0.1185
Male 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Race (Ethnicity) African-American/Black -0.0048 0.113 0.9663
Hispanic/Latino 0.0168 0.1582 0.9152
Asian 0.061 0.2861 0.8313
Other -0.4669 0.5804 0.4212
White 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Health Status 1A 1.1268 0.202 <0.0001
1B 0.3857 0.2012 0.0552
Inactive 2.3946 0.1754 <0.0001
Waiting Time >Median -0.9484 0.0933 <0.0001
The mechanism of our pre-transplant survival module is such that it assigns a probability
of death for each patient at the start of each day, generates a random number between 0 and 1, and
determines if the patient is going to die during that day, that is,
• Suppose that for a patient, the covariate coefficient associated with his attributes are equal to
β1, β2, . . . , β11 (we read these numbers from the estimate column reported in Table 22).
• Yearly probability of death (Pyearly) for the patient is equal to:
Pyearly = (baseline hazard). exp (
11∑
i=1
βi)
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• We convert it to a daily probability of death Pdaily, by
Pdaily = 1− exp (−
Pyearly
365
)
• We generate a random number between 0 and 1 denoted by R:
– If Pdaily ≥ R, the patient dies.
– If Pdaily < R, the patient will remain on the waiting list,
where exp(x) is the exponential function and baseline hazard is a function that assigns
a baseline probability of death for a patient according to the patient’s age. We used the U.S.
population life tables during 2013 reported in the CDC database to estimate this baseline hazard
function(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015) (Table 23).
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Table 23: Abridged Life Table for the U.S. Total Population, 2013
Age of a Person
(Years x to x+n)
Probability of
Dying Between
Ages x to x+n
Number
Surviving to Age
x
Number Dying
Between Ages x
to x+n
Person-Years
Lived Between
Ages x to x+n
Total Number of
Person-Years
Lived Above
Age x
Life Expectancy
at Age x
0-1 0.005958 100,000 596 99,475 7,882,785 78.8
1 5 0.001021 99,404 102 397,372 7,783,311 78.3
5 10 0.00059 99,303 59 496,355 7,385,939 74.4
10 15 0.000705 99,244 70 496,080 6,889,584 69.4
15-20 0.002227 99,174 221 495,400 6,393,505 64.5
20-25 0.004158 98,953 411 493,788 5,898,105 59.6
25-30 0.004869 98,542 480 491,535 5,404,318 54.8
30-35 0.005727 98,062 562 488,941 4,912,783 50.1
35-40 0.007072 97,500 690 485,855 4,423,842 45.4
40-45 0.009949 96,811 963 481,799 3,937,986 40.7
45-50 0.015604 95,848 1,496 475,781 3,456,188 36.1
50-55 0.024272 94,352 2,290 466,384 2,980,407 31.6
55-60 0.035563 92,062 3,274 452,547 2,514,024 27.3
60-65 0.05006 88,788 4,445 433,361 2,061,477 23.2
65-70 0.071576 84,343 6,037 407,404 1,628,116 19.3
70-75 0.109091 78,306 8,543 371,349 1,220,712 15.6
75-80 0.170567 69,764 11,899 320,641 849,363 12.2
80-85 0.271135 57,864 15,689 251,503 528,722 9.1
85-90 0.425836 42,175 17,960 166,078 277,219 6.6
90-95 0.614587 24,216 14,883 81,352 111,141 4.6
95-100 0.786379 9,333 7,339 25,247 29,789 3.2
100+ 1 1,994 1,994 4,541 4,541 2.3
A.7 Post-Transplant Death
The mechanism of the post-transplant survival module is similar to the pre-transplant sur-
vival module. The only difference is that we used the post-transplant Cox proportional hazard model
reported in the SRTR website (Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients, 2015a) to generate the
daily probability of death for patients after transplantation (Table 24). Some of the covariates pre-
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sented in the Cox proportional hazard model were not available in our simulation and we did not
consider them. However, some of these covariates such as bilirubin at transplant (mg/dL), dialysis at
transplant, drugtreated HTN at listing, ischemic time (hrs), most recent CPRA/PRA, PA (Sys, mm
Hg), and sudden death at listing have a possibility for missing data. Hence, we used the estimates
for missing covariates in such attributes.
103
Table 24: 1-Year Patient Post-Transplant Survival
Characteristic Level Estimate Standard Error P-value
Bilirubin at Transplant (mg/dL) mg/dL 0 0.014 <0.0001
Missing 0 0.5145 0
Dialysis at Transplant Yes 1 0.2255 0
Unknown/Missing 0.6518 0.6263 0
No 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Donor Age 0-34 0.1602 0.1094 0
35+ 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Donor Cause of Death CVA/Stroke 0 0.1288 0
Other 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Drug-Treated HTN at Listing Missing 0.2993 0.2348 0
Yes 0 0 0
No 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Ischemic Time (hrs) In Hours (hrs) 0 0 0
Missing 1 0 0
Medical Condition In ICU 0 0 0
Hospitalized Not in ICU 0 0 0
Not Hospitalized 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Most Recent CPRA/PRA Percent (%) 0 0 1
Missing 0 0 0
PA (Sys, mm Hg) Systolic (mm HG) 0 0 0
Missing 1 0 0
Recipient Diagnosis Cardiomyopathy 0.0761 0 0
Congenital Heart Disease 0.522 0.2408 0.0302
Other/Missing 0.4738 0.369 0.1991
Coronary Artery Disease 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Recipient Height (cm) In Centimeters (cm) 0.0124 0.0054 0.021
Recipient Race/Ethnicity Black 0.0408 0.1287 0.7513
Hispanic/Latino 0.1307 0.1893 0.4899
Asian 0.2627 0.2998 0.3808
Multiracial/Other/Unknown/Missing 0.2733 0.5826 0.639
White 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Recipient Serum Creatinine (mg/dL) >1.6 0.635 0.1094 <0.0001
1.6 or Less 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Recipient on Life Support (ECMO) Yes 0.8371 0.3776 0.0266
No 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Recipient on VAD Yes 0.4382 0.1115 0.0001
No 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Recipient on Ventilator Yes 0.4903 0.3452 0.1556
No 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
Sudden Death at Listing Yes 0.073 0.1437 0.6115
Unknown/Missing 0.4062 0.1637 0.0131
No 0 (Ref.) (Ref.)
The other possibility that can occur for patients in the post-transplant is the graft (heart)
failure. Since in the arrival of patients, we considered such patients (patients whose PTX status
is equal to 1), to avoid double-counting them, we did not include the graft failure event in the
post-transplant phase.
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A.8 Allocation Policies
A.8.1 Current UNOS Allocation Policy (Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network, 2015)
Waiting Time Accumulation: Waiting time for heart candidates begins when the candidate is
first registered as an active heart candidate on the waiting list, and is calculated within each heart
status. As a result, waiting time accrued at a higher status will be added to any time accumulated
at a lower status, but waiting time accumulated at a lower status will not be added to any higher
status. If a candidate’s status is upgraded, waiting time accrued while registered at the lower status
is not transferred to the higher status. Conversely, waiting time accrued while registered at a higher
status is transferred to a lower status if the candidate is downgraded. Waiting time does not accrue
while the candidate is inactive.
Heart Allocation Classifications and Rankings: Allocation of Hearts by Blood Type Within
each heart status, hearts will be allocated to candidates according to the primary blood type match-
ing requirements in Table 25.
Table 25: Primary Blood Type Matching Requirements
Hearts from donors with: Are allocated to the candidates with:
Blood Type O Blood type O or blood type B
Blood Type A Blood type A or blood type AB
Blood Type B Blood type B or blood type AB
Blood Type AB Blood type AB
After hearts are allocated to primary blood type candidates, they are allocated to any
secondary blood type compatible candidates, then to any eligible incompatible blood type candidates
(Table 26).
Table 26: Secondary Blood Type Matching Requirements
Hearts from donors with: Are allocated to the candidates with:
Blood Type O Blood type A or blood type AB
Blood Type A Not applicable
Blood Type B Not applicable
Blood Type AB Not applicable
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Sorting Within Each Classification: Candidates are sorted within each classification by the
total amount of waiting time that the candidate has accumulated at that status.
Allocation of Hearts from Donors at Least 18 years Old: Hearts from deceased donors
at least 18 years old are allocated to candidates according to Table 28. Table 27 shows the zone
definitions for the current UNOS policy.
Table 27: Zone Definition for the UNOS Policy
Zone Includes transplant hospitals:
A Within 500 nautical miles from the donor’s hospital but outside of the donor’s hospital DSA.
B Within 1000 nautical miles from the donor’s hospital but outside of the zone A and donor’s hospital DSA.
C Within 1500 nautical miles from the donor’s hospital but outside of the zone B and donor’s hospital DSA.
D Within 2500 nautical miles from the donor’s hospital but outside of the zone C and donor’s hospital DSA.
E More than 2500 nautical miles from the donor’s hospital.
Table 28: Allocation of Hearts from Deceased Donors At Least 18 Years Old in the UNOS Policy
Classification Candidates
within:
And are:
1 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
2 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
3 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
4 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
5 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
6 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
7 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
8 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
9 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
10 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
11 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
12 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
13 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
14 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
15 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
16 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
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Table 28 continued from previous page
Classification Candidates
within:
And are:
17 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
18 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
19 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
20 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
21 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
22 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
23 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
24 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
25 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
26 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
27 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
28 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
29 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
30 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
31 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
32 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
33 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
34 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
35 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
36 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
In order to determine the set of OPOs in each zone and for each OPO center, by using
Figure 5, we calculated the distances between any pair of OPO centers (distances estimated by the
Google Maps (Google, 2015)) and followed the definition of each zone.
A.8.2 Policy I
This section explains how we proposed the three-tiered zone allocation system. If a donor
heart is matched with no one in its Designated Service Area (DSA), it is offered to Zone 1 (union
of Zones A, B, and C of UNOS allocation rule). Similarly, if it is not matched with a patient in
Zone 1, it is offered in hierarchy to patients in Zone 2 (Zone D of UNOS allocation rule) and Zone
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3 (Zone E of UNOS allocation rule). Table 29 shows the zone definition for Policy I. Note that in
each zone we considered the same health status, blood type match, and waiting time prioritization
rules as UNOS. Table 30 shows the allocation procedure for Policy I in the model.
Table 29: Zone Definition for Policy I
Zone Includes transplant hospitals :
1 Within 1500 nautical miles from the donor’s hospital but outside of the donor’s hospital DSA.
2 Within 2500 nautical miles from the donor’s hospital but outside of the zone A and donor’s hospital DSA.
3 More than 2500 nautical miles from the donor’s hospital.
Table 30: Allocation of Hearts from Deceased Donors At Least 18 Years Old in Policy I
Classification Candidates within: And are:
1 OPO’s DSA and Zone 1 Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
2 OPO’s DSA and Zone 1 Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
3 OPO’s DSA and Zone 1 Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
4 OPO’s DSA and Zone 1 Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
5 Zone 2 Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
6 Zone 2 Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
7 Zone 2 Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
8 Zone 2 Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
9 OPO’s DSA and Zone 1 Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
10 OPO’s DSA and Zone 1 Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
11 Zone 3 Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
12 Zone 3 Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
13 Zone 3 Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
14 Zone 3 Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
15 Zone 2 Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
16 Zone 2 Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
17 Zone 3 Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
18 Zone 3 Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
A.8.3 Policy II
To prioritize patients according to their health status, UNOS gives the first priority to health
status 1A, the second priority to health status 1B, and finally the third priority to health status
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2. The patients assigned with health status 7 (inactive) are not considered in the heart-patient
matching algorithm. UNOS allocation rule gives priority to patients with a higher medical urgency
status. However, it has caused a significant imbalance in the distribution of donated hearts. In
particular, more than 67% of all transplants correspond to status 1A while status 1A patients are
only 10% of those on the waiting list. Moreover, less than 30% of all transplants correspond to
health status 1B while these patients compromise 40% of the waiting list. This disparity has caused
some patients in status 1B relocate together with their families to other regions with shorter waiting
time6. Also, prioritizing the sickest patients may not be optimal as they may experience a shorter
post-transplant survival compared to status 1B patients. Thus, in Policy II we followed the UNOS
allocation system except that status 1B was prioritized over 1A in each classification. Table 31
summarizes the allocation priority for this policy.
Table 31: Allocation of Hearts from Deceased Donors At Least 18 Years Old in Policy II
Classification Candidates within: And are:
1 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
2 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
3 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
4 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
5 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
6 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
7 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
8 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
9 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
10 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
11 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
12 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
13 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
14 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
15 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
16 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
17 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
18 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
19 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
20 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
21 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
22 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
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Table 31 continued from previous page
Classification Candidates within: And are:
23 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
24 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
25 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
26 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
27 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
28 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
29 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
30 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
31 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
32 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
33 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
34 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
35 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
36 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
A.8.4 Policy III
Policy III considered the UNOS allocation rule except that in each zone waiting time is
prioritized over health status, i.e., considering primary and secondary blood type match, patients
are ranked first by longer waiting time. Section A.8.1 explains how the waiting time in each health
status is accumulated.
A.9 Sensitivity Analysis
A.9.1 On Patient and Heart Arrival Rates
In this section, we conducted sensitivity analysis on the arrival of patients and hearts to
assess the impacts of change in the number of arrivals on the outcomes such as total death (pre-
and post-transplant deaths). We let the arrival rates of patients and hearts to increase and decrease
by a certain percentage (e.g., 10 percent) and compare the total patient death (including pre- and
post-transplant deaths) for the following seven cases: (1) baseline scenario, (2) daily arrival rates
of patients increased by 10 percent compared to the baseline rates, (3) daily arrival rates of hearts
increased by 10 percent compared to the baseline rates, (4) daily arrival rates of patients and hearts
both increased by 10 percent compared to the baseline rates, (5) daily arrival rates of patients
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decreased by 10 percent compared to the baseline rates, (6) daily arrival rates of hearts decreased
by 10 percent compared to the baseline rates, (7) daily arrival rates of patients and hearts both
decreased by 10 percent compared to the baseline rates. Figures 8, 9, and 10 summarize the result
of the sensitivity analysis for the aforementioned cases.
Figure 8: Total Number of Deaths for Different Patient and Heart Arrival Rates
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Figure 9: Pre-Transplant Deaths for Different Patient and Heart Arrival Rates
Figure 10: Post-Transplant Deaths for Different Patient and Heart Arrival Rates
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A.9.2 On Allocation Priority Zones
As we have described in Chapter 1, allocation priority zones are defined based on the
proximity of patients’ hospital to the donor’s hospital. Current UNOS allocation policy, considers
5 allocation priority zones, i.e., Zone A, Zone B, Zone C, Zone D, and Zoned E, in addition to
DSA. Our proposed Policy I aggregates Zones A, B, and C in the current UNOS policy into one
single priority zone. We conducted sensitivity analysis on different combinations of priority zones.
Specifically, we considered a policy that combines Zones A and B into single priority zone (Policy
IV). Similar to the other policies, we calculated the total number of deaths (including pre- and
post-transplant deaths) for this policy (Figures 11, 12, and 13). We also conducted fairness analysis
on policy IV. We measured the proportional fairness and max-min fairness for this policy using the
same approach discussed in Section 1.2.4 of Chapter 1 (Figures 14 and 15). These measures are
reported for the following three policies:
(1) Current UNOS allocation policy: After offering an available heart in its DSA, it shares the
organ to patients in Zone A (within 500 miles of the OPO of the available heart), Zone B (within
500-1000 miles of the OPO of the available heart), Zone C (within 1000-1500 miles of the OPO of
the available heart), Zone D (within 1500-2500 miles of the OPO of the available heart), and Zone
E (more than 2500 miles distance from the OPO of the available heart), respectively.
(2) Policy I: This policy combines Zones A, B, and C in the UNOS policy. After offering an
available heart in its DSA, this policy shares it to patients in Zone 1 (within 1500 miles of the OPO
of the available heart), Zone 2 (within 1500-2500 miles of the OPO of the available heart), and Zone
3 (more than 2500 miles distance from the OPO of the available heart), respectively.
(3) Policy IV: This policy combines Zones A and B in the current UNOS policy. After offering
an available heart in its DSA, this policy shares it to patients in Zone 1 (within 1000 miles of the
OPO of the available heart), Zone 2 (within 1000-1500 miles of the OPO of the available heart),
Zone 3 (within 1500-2500 miles of the OPO of the available heart), and Zone 4 (more than 2500
miles distance from the OPO of the available heart), respectively.
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Figure 11: Pre-Transplant Deaths
Figure 12: Post-Transplant Deaths
Figure 13: Total Deaths
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Figure 14: Proportional Fairness Measure
Figure 15: Max-Min Fairness Measure
Furthermore, we conducted a sensitivity analysis on the arrival rate of patients to check its
effect on the order of the policies in terms of efficiency (number of total deaths). As can be seen
from Figure 16, the order of policies remain unchanged as we increase the patient arrival rates. We
increased arrival rates of patients by 10 percent in our planning horizon, and compared the total
number of deaths for UNOS policy, three considered policies in Chapter 1 (Policies I, II, and III),
and Policy IV. Our results show that order of the policies does not change by changing the input
parameters in the described range.
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Figure 16: Total Number of Deaths for 10 Percent Increased Patient Arrival Rates for Different
Policies
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Appendix B Appendix of Chapter 2
Appendix B includes several details regarding the mathematical proofs of the theorems that
appear throughout Chapter 2, model validation results, alternative objective functions, and further
OPL analysis. In particular, Section B.1 provides notation tables and a mapping from mathematical
model to application. Section B.2 provide proof for Theorem 2.1. Section B.3 studies the heart
allocation problem in a Markovian setting and provides the mathematical analysis of the optimal
solution of problem (PU ) introduced therein. Section B.4 provides an overview of the simulation
model used to test the performance of allocation policies in this study, as well as the results of
statistical tests performed for validation purposes of the assumptions made in Section B.3 under
which an upper bound for the Markovian network is justified. Section B.5 provides details about the
benchmark policies studied in Section 2.6.1 and derives the optimal policies for alternative objective
functions introduced in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2. Section B.6 studies the reformulated fluid model
which incorporates the proximity considerations in heart allocation system. Section B.7 describes
details of the fairness constraints imposed in Section 2.6.4. Finally, Section B.8 provides detailed
insights on the mechanism of the OPL policy in the absence and presence of fairness constraints.
B.1 Lists of Notations and Abbreviations
This section provides lists of notations and abbreviations used throughout the text. In
particular, Tables 32, 33, 34, and 35 describe the notations used in mathematical formulations in
Sections 2.3, 2.4, B.3, and B.5, respectively. Furthermore, Table 36 provides a list of abbreviations
used in Chapter 2 and its appendix.
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Table 32: Notations Used in Stochastic Formulation in Section 2.3
Notation Description
i Patient type index
h Heart type index
I Number of patient classes
H Number of heart types
I Set of patient type indicies
H Set of heart type indicies
p List of patients (defined on P)
pn n
th patient’s information on list p
in Class that patient n in list p belongs to
τn Arrival time of patient n in list p
zn Binary variable indicating whether patient n has declined the current offer
bhi Total cumulative offers of heart type h to patient type i
κ Decision epoch indicator
sκ State of MDP at epoch κ
aκ Action of MDP at epoch κ
e(κ) Event type (defined on E)
b(κ) Heart offer history (defined on B)
t(κ) Current time (defined on R+)
K Final decision epoch
H(s) A set indicating available heart at state s
P (s) Set of eligible patients (for transplant) at state s
ahn(s) A binary variable indicating if the available heart type h is offered to patient n on list
A(s) Action space at state s
S State space
F (sκ, aκ, ω(sκ, aκ)) State evolution mapping governing transition probabilities
h(sκ, aκ, sκ+1) Immediate reward of transition from sκ to sκ+1 when action aκ is taken
r(sκ) Final reward
Xi(t) Number of patients in class i at time t
Π Set of all admissible policies
π Allocation policy
Jπ(s) Value function of MDP with initial state s under policy π
V (s) Optimal value function of MDP with initial state s
k Index of fairness constraints
K Total number of fairness constraints
Fk Set of patient class indices under consideration in fairness constraint k
Gk Set of heart type indices under consideration in fairness constraint k
ak Lower bound imposed in fairness constraint k
A A K by IH matrix of fairness constraints coefficients
N Maximum number of patients that we keep track of in the system
N Maximum number of times a donor heart can be offered before its wasted
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Table 33: Notations Used in Fluid Approximation (P1) in Section 2.4
Notation Description
λi Arrival rate of patients in class i
µh Arrival rate of heart type h
xi(t) Number of patients in class i at time t
ρij Rate at which patients of class i become patient of class j
ρ Class change matrix with elements ρij
di Pre-transplant death rate of patients in class i
d Pre-transplant diagonal death rate matrix with elements di
qhi Heart type h offer acceptance for patients in class i
qh Diagonal offer Acceptance probability matrix with qhi as its diagonal elements
uhi (t) Rate of allocating heart type h to patients in class i at time t
INF Set of infeasible pair of patients/hearts for transplantation
Ω(t) Set of feasible controls at time t
T End of the planning horizon
βi QALYs for patients in class i waiting on the waiting list
αhi QALYs for patients of class i receiving a heart type h
ηi Future QALYs for patients of class i who are on the transplant waiting list at time T
VF (x0) Optimal value function of the fluid approximation (P1) with initial state x0
ki(t) Shadow price associated to evolution of i
th constraint at time t in (5)
yhi (t) Shadow price associated to evolution of ih
th auxiliary state variable at time t
wi(t) Shadow price associated to i
th non-negativity constraint in (6)
γk Shadow price associated to the k
th fairness constraint
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Table 34: Notations Used in Stochastic Formulation in Section B.3
Notation Description
Xi(t) Number of patients on the waiting list of class i at time t
Yi(t) Number of patients in class i in the post-transplant phase at time t
{Tn : n ≥ 0} Sequence of jump times of Markov queuing network in Section B.3
ahi (t) Probability of assigning a heart type h to a patient in class i
A Action space of queuing network in Section B.3
Q Generator matrix of the queuing network in Section B.3
q((x, y), a, (x′, y′)) Transition rate from state (x, y) to (x′, y′) when action a is taken
d′i Post-transplant death rate for patients in class i
A(x, y) Set of all admissible actions in state (x, y)
b((x, y), a) Expected drift of the Markovian queuing network in Section B.3
γi QALYS for the patients in class i in the post-transplant phase
δi Future QALYs for patients of class i who are on the post-transplant phase at time T
r(x(t), y(t)) Reward rate function
g(x(T ), y(T )) Final reward function
Jπ(x, y) Value function of queuing network in Section B.3 with initial state (x, y) under policy π
V (x, y) Optimal value function of the queuing network in Section B.3 with initial state (x, y)
VF̂ (x0, y0) Optimal value function of the fluid approximation (PU ) with initial state (x0, y0)
V
(m)
F̂
(x0, y0) Optimal value function of the descritized fluid model (PU ) with initial state (x0, y0)
Table 35: Notations Used in Alternative Objective Function Formulation in Section B.5
Notation Description
k̂i(t) Shadow prices associated to the i
th state evolution constraint in optimal control problem (P2)
ŷhi (t) Shadow price associated to evolution of ih
th auxiliary state variable at time t in problem (P2)
k̃i(t) Shadow prices associated to the i
th state evolution constraint in optimal control problem (P3)
ỹhi (t) Shadow price associated to evolution of ih
th auxiliary state variable at time t in problem (P3)
ahi Allocation rate of heart type h to patients in class i
ai Total allocation rate of hearts to patients in class i
Wi Expected waiting time of patients in class i
λ =
∑I
i=1 λi Total arrival rates of patients
µ =
∑H
h=1 µ
h Total arrival rates of hearts
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Table 36: Abbreviations Used Throughout the Text
Abbreviation Description
UNOS United Network for Organ Sharing
SRTR Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipient
HF Heart Failure
DSA Designated Service Area
OPO Organ Procurement Organization
VAD Ventricular Assist Device
OPTN Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
UB Upper Bound
LB Lower Bound
OPL Optimal Priority List Policy (Optimal solution of problem (P1))
SZE Su and Zenios Efficiency Policy
SZQ Su and Zenios Equity Policy
BRS Broadening Regional Sharing Policy
MPD Minimization of Pre-Transplant Death Policy
MTW Minimization of Total Wastage of Hearts Policy
MWT Mean Waiting Time Policy
VWT Variance of Waiting Time Policy
STD Standard Deviation
B.2 Theorem 2.1
Theorem 2.1. A feasible triple of state and control variables (x, z, u) is an optimal solution for
(P1) if and only if there exist shadow prices k(t) and y(t) with one sided limits everywhere, a non-
decreasing I-dimensional vector function w(t), and a non-negative K- dimensional adjoint vector γ
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such that
k̇(t) ≤ (k(t)− w(t))(d+ ρ̂− ρT )− β, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], k(T ) = η, (15)
if xi(t) > 0 , k̇i(t) = [(k(t)− w(t))(d+ ρ̂− ρT )]i − βi, (16)
ẏ(t) = 0, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], y(T ) = γA, (17)
γ · (Az(T )) = 0, γ ≥ 0 (18)
uh(t) ∈ argmax
v
{((
αh − k(t)
)
qh + yh(t)
)
v : v ∈ R|I|+ , e · v ≤ µh(t), vhi = 0; (i, h) ∈ INF
}
∀h ∈ H.
(19)
Proof. Formulation (P1) is an optimal control problem with state variable x(t) and control variable
u(t), which involves integral constraints. First, we transform integral constraints (7) by introducing
a new state variable z(t) =
(
zhi (t)
)
i∈I,h∈H, and by setting z
h
i (t) =
∫ t
0
uhi (τ)dτ with z
h
i (0) = 0 as
follows:
∑
i∈Fk
∑
h∈Gk
zhi (T ) ≥ ak
∑
i∈I
∑
h∈Gk
zhi (T ), ∀k = 1, . . . ,K,
yielding the equivalent constraints of the following form,
(1− ak)
∑
i∈Fk
∑
h∈Gk
zhi (T )− ak
∑
i∈I\Fk
∑
h∈Gk
zhi (T ) ≥ 0, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K, (20)
with the additional constraints
żhi (t) = u
h
i (t), ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ H, t ∈ [0, T ], (21)
zhi (0) = 0, ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ H, (22)
which is due to the fact that zhi (t) is non-decreasing and therefore of bounded variation and (21)
holds for almost all t ∈ [0, T ]. We assume that (21) serves as a true reformulation, and analyze this
surrogate reformulation.
Constraints in (20) are a set of linear final time constraints on the state variable z(t), which can be
written as Az(T ) ≥ 0 where A is a K by I ×H matrix whose element on kth row and ihth column,
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ak,ih, for each h ∈ Gk is defined by,
ak,ih =

1− ak, if i ∈ Fk,
−ak, if i ∈ I \ Fk.
Also, the constraints in (21) are evolution, and the constraints in (22) are the initial value constraints
of the state variable z(t). Then, the optimal control problem (P1) with integral constraints can be
written equivalently as the following linear optimal control problem with finial time constraints:

VF (x0) = max
∫ T
0
(∑H
h=1 α
hqhuh(t) + βx(t)
)
dt+ ηx(T )
subject to ,
ẋ(t) = λ(t)−
∑H
h=1 q
huh(t)− (d+ ρ̂− ρT )x(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
ż(t) = u(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
u(t) ∈ Ω(t) := {u(t) : e.uh(t) ≤ µh(t); uh(t) ≥ 0, ∀h;
uhi (t) = 0, ∀(i, h) ∈ INF},
x(t) ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
x(0) = x0
z(0) = 0,
Az(T ) ≥ 0.
Let the functions F (·, ·, ·), f1(·, ·, ·), and f2(·, ·, ·) denote the total QALYs and system state evolution
at time t, respectively, that is,
F (x(t), u(t), t) =
H∑
h=1
αhqhuh(t) + βx(t),
f1(x(t), u(t), t) = λ(t)−
H∑
h=1
qhuh(t)− (d+ ρ̂− ρT )x(t),
f2(x(t), u(t), t) = u(t).
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Also, let the function S denote the final reward at time T , i.e., S(x(T ), T ) = ηx(T ). Define the
functions g and a as follows:
g(x(t), t) = x(t),
a(z(T ), T ) = Az(T ),
where A is a K by IH matrix of fairness constraints (assume we consider K fairness constraints).
Functions F (·, ·, ·), f1(·, ·, ·), f2(·, ·, ·), and g(·, ·) are continuously differentiable with respect to all
their arguments. In fact, they are linear. Hence, the differentiability requirements are satisfied. We
first prove that non-negativity of state constraint is of order one, in the sense that g(x(t), t) ≥ 0
does not explicitly depend on u, but its first derivative with respect to t depends on u. The order
of a state constraint is defined as the number of times that we differentiate g(·, ·) with respect to t
until control variable u appears (Hartl et al., 1995). Define g0(·, ·, ·) and g1(·, ·, ·) as the following:
g0(x(t), u(t), t) = g = g(x(t), u(t), t),
g1(x(t), u(t), t) = ġ = gx(x(t), t)f(x(t), u(t), t) + gt(x(t), t),
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives. We have gx(x(t), t) = e and gt(x(t), t) = 0. There-
fore, g1(x(t), u(t), t) = e.f1(x(t), u(t), t), and since f1 explicitly depends on u, consequently, g
1 also
depends on u, showing that the state constraint g(x(t), t) ≥ 0 is of order one.
Hence, by applying Theorem 2 (Necessary conditions) in Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1986, chap. 5),
and Theorem 7.1 in Hartl et al. (1995) we can characterize the optimal policy as follows:
Let (x∗(t), z∗(t), u∗(t)) be a feasible solution solving problem (P1) with g(x, t) a C
2−function
of (x, t). Then, there exist a scalar k0, vector functions k(t) = (k1(t), . . . , kI(t)) and y(t) =
(y11(t), . . . , y
1
I (t), . . . , y
H
1 (t), . . . , y
H
I (t)) with one sided limits everywhere, a non-decreasing vector
function w(t) = (w1(t), ..., wI(t)), and a non-negative adjoint vector γ, such that,
(I). k0 = 0 or k0 = 1.
(II). (k0, k(t), y(t), w(T )− w(0), γ) 6= 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(III). u∗(t) maximizes H(x∗(t), z∗(t), u, k(t), y(t), t) for u ∈ Ω(t) and for all t ∈ (0, T ),
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where
H(x∗(t), z∗(t), u, k(t), y(t), t) =
H∑
h=1
[k0α
h − k(t)].qhuh + k(t).λ(t)
+[k0β − k(t)(d+ ρ̂− ρT )].x∗(t) + y(t)u(t).
(IV). wi(t) is constant on any interval where x
∗
i (t) > 0, and wi(t) is continuous at all
t ∈ (0, T ) where x∗i (t) = 0 and ẋ∗i (t) is discontinuous.
(V). (a) If we define k∗(t) = k(t) + w(t), then k∗(t) is continuous, and has a continuous
derivative, k̇∗(t), at all points of continuity of u∗(t) and w(t), and we have:
k̇∗(t) = −∂L̄
∗
∂x
(
∂L̄
∂x
evaluated at (x∗(t), u∗(t), k∗(t), w(t), t)),
where L̄ = H − w(t).(gx(x, t).f(x, u, t) + gt(x, t)). Therefore, we have
k̇∗(t) = −k0β + [k(t)− w(t)](d+ ρ̂− ρT ). (23)
(b) y(t) is continuous, and has a continuous derivative, ẏ(t), at all points of continuity of u∗(t) and
we have:
ẏ(t) = −∂L̄
∗
∂z
(
∂L̄
∂z
evaluated at (z∗(t), u∗(t), y∗(t), t)),
Therefore, we have
ẏ(t) = 0, (24)
meaning that y(t) is constant for t ∈ [0, T ], i.e., y(t) = c.
(VI). The following transversality conditions hold at the final time T :
(a) k(T ) = k0
(
∂S
∂x(T )
)
= k0η.
(b) y(T ) = k0
(
∂S
∂z(T )
)
+ γ
(
∂a
∂z(T )
)
= γA where γ is the K-dimensional adjoint variable vector asso-
ciated to the fairness constraints a(z∗(T ), T ) = Az(T ) ≥ 0.
(c) γa(z∗(T ), T ) = 0, γ ≥ 0.
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Without loss of generality, we normalize w(t) by setting w(T ) = 0. This follows from Note 3.a in
Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1986, chap. 5). Now, by condition (III), u∗(t) maximizes

∑H
h=1[k0α
hqh − k(t)qh + yh(t)].uh + k(t).λ(t) + [k0β − k(t)(d+ ρ̂− ρT )].x∗(t),
subject to u ∈ Ω(t),
(PH)
where yh(t) = (yh1 (t), . . . , y
h
I (t)). Since the maximization is with respect to the control variable u,
by ignoring those terms in objective function of (PH) that are independent of u, we can write (PH)
equivalently as the following: u∗(t) maximizes

∑H
h=1[k0α
hqh − k(t)qh + yh(t)].uh,
subject to, u ∈ Ω(t).
(P̄H)
Optimality condition (I)-(VI) is called normal when k0 = 1 and abnormal when k0 = 0. Fontes
and Frankowska (2015) showed that under certain constraint qualifications on state constraints,
optimality condition requires k0 = 1. First, by considering the following lemma we show that
necessary conditions for (P1) cannot be satisfied with k0 = 0. Note that the problem-specific
argument in Akan et al. (2012) to prove this step is not applicable to our setting where fairness
constraints are involved.
Lemma B.1. (Fontes and Frankowska, 2015). Let (x∗(t), z∗(t), u∗(t)) be the optimal solution of
(P1). Under certain regularity conditions, if the following constraint qualification holds, then the
necessary conditions (I)-(VI) will be satisfied with k0 = 1.
CQn (Constraint Qualification for Normality) Assume that for every τ > 0 such that x∗(τ) = 0,
function g(x, t) is continuously differentiable on a neighborhood of x∗(τ), and there exist ε > 0 and
δ > 0 satisfying
inf
u∈Ω(t)
−∇g(x∗(τ), τ).f1(x∗(τ), u, t) < −δ
for a.e. t ∈ {r ∈ [τ − ε, τ ] ∩ [0, T ] : maxξ∈∂∗(−g(x∗(r),r)[ξ.f1(x∗(r), u∗(r), r)] ≥ 0},
where for a function h(·), ∂∗h(x) is the reachable Jacobian at x, and is defined as:
∂∗h(x) = lim sup
y→x
{h′(y)},
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where h′(y) denotes the Jacobian of h(·) at y.
Now, we apply Lemma B.1 to the optimal control problem (P1) to show that the necessary
optimality condition is satisfied with k0 = 1. First, note that the function g(·, ·) in the state
constraint g(x, t) ≥ 0 is continuously differentiable everywhere and we have ∇g(x∗(τ), τ) = e, where
e is the row vector of ones. Also, due to differentiability of g(·, ·) and consequently −g(·, ·), the
reachable Jacobian set of −g(·, ·) at any point (x(t), t) is a singleton consists of its Jacobian at
(x(t), t), i.e., ∂∗(−g(x∗(t), t) = {∇ − g(x∗(t), t)} = {−e}.
Now, suppose that for some τ ∈ (0, T ] we have x∗(τ) = 0 and suppose there exist ε > 0 such that
t ∈ {r ∈ [τ − ε, τ ] ∩ [0, T ] : [−e.f1(x∗(r), u∗(r), r)] ≥ 0}, meaning that t belongs to an interval right
before the time τ where the sum of components of the state evolution constraint is non-positive.
Then, for such a t we have f1(x
∗(τ), u(t), t) = λ(t) −
∑H
h=1 q
huh(t). Since (uh(t) = 0,∀h ∈ H) is a
feasible control that belongs to Ω(t), we plug it into f and we have f1(x
∗(τ), 0, t) = λ(t). Therefore,
inf
u∈Ω(t)
−∇g(x∗(τ), τ).f1(x∗(τ), u, t) ≤ −e.f1(x∗(τ), 0, t) ≤ −e.λ(t) = −
∑
i∈I
λi(t).
By setting δ =
∑
i∈I λi(t)−δ1 for some small δ1 > 0, we conclude that for all t ∈ {r ∈ [τ−ε, τ ]∩[0, T ] :
[−e.f1(x∗(r), u∗(r), r)] ≥ 0}, we have:
inf
u∈Ω(t)
−∇g(x∗(τ), τ).f1(x∗(τ), u, t) ≤ −e.f1(x∗(τ), 0, t) ≤ −e.λ(t) = −
∑
i∈I
λi(t) < −δ.
Therefore, the constraint qualification for normality holds for the optimal control problem (P1) and
the optimality conditions (I)-(VI) are satisfied with k0 = 1. Note that Akan et al. (2012) used a
proof of contradiction approach to show normality of the optimal control without constraints, which
is a special case of our setting. However, that approach is not applicable in our problem.
Hence, if we plug k0 = 1 in the objective function of (P̄H), we have: u
∗(t) solves
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
max
∑H
h=1[α
hqh − k(t)qh + yh(t)].uh(t),
subject to,
e.uh(t) ≤ µh(t),∀h ∈ H,
uhi (t) = 0,∀(i, h) ∈ INF,
uh(t) ≥ 0,∀h ∈ H, .
(P̃H)
Note that problem (P̃H) is a separable linear program with respect to its decision variables u
h(t),
i.e., solving (P̃H) is equivalent to solving H linear programs for h = 1, . . . ,H separately as follows:

max[αhqh − k(t)qh + yh(t)].uh(t),
subject to,
e.uh(t) ≤ µh(t),
uhi (t) = 0,∀(i, h) ∈ INF,
uh(t) ≥ 0.
This shows that the optimal solution is a priority index policy with respect to coefficient αhqh −
k(t)qh + yh(t) proving (19).
In order to prove (15) and (16), we claim that [k̇(t) + β − (k(t) − w(t))(d + ρ̂ − ρT )].x∗(t) = 0.
To see this, suppose that xi(t) 6= 0 or equivalently xi(t) > 0 for some i ∈ I and h ∈ H. Then, by
condition (IV) we conclude that wi(t) is constant, which implies that ẇi(t) = 0. Now, by condition
(V), we have: k̇∗i (t) = k̇i(t) = −βi + [(k(t)−w(t))(d+ ρ̂−ρT )]i, and this implies k̇i(t) +βi− [(k(t)−
w(t))(d + ρ̂ − ρT )]i = 0. Conversely, suppose that k̇i(t) + βi − [(k(t) − w(t)(d + ρ̂ − ρT ))]i 6= 0 or
equivalently k̇i(t) < −βi + [(k(t)− w(t))(d+ ρ̂− ρT )]i=k̇∗i (t). Hence, by condition (V) we see that
ẇi(t) > 0 and this implies xi(t) = 0 (since otherwise, if xi(t) > 0, by condition (IV), wi(t) has to be
constant, which contradicts the fact that ẇi(t) > 0). Therefore, we conclude the following results
k̇(t) ≤ (k(t)− w(t))(d+ ρ̂− ρT )− β, for t ∈ [0, T ], k(T ) = η,
if xi(t) > 0 , k̇i(t) = [(k(t)− w(t))(d+ ρ̂− ρT )]i − βi.
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Furthermore, (17) follows from optimality conditions (V-b) and (VI-b). Finally, (18) is immediate
by condition (VI-c).
(ii) Conversely, suppose that a feasible control ū ∈ Ω(t) and its associated state trajectory (x̄, z̄)
satisfy the necessary conditions (I)-(VI). Since f1(x, u, t) and f2(x, u, t) are linear on (x, z, u), g(x, t)
is linear on x, and Hamiltonian H(x, z, u, k, y, t) is concave on (x, z, u), by Theorem 1 in Seierstad
and Sydsaeter (1986, chap. 5) (Sufficient conditions) we conclude that (x̄, z̄, ū) is the optimal solution
of (P1), which completes the proof of Theorem 2.1.
B.3 An Upper Bound in a Markovian Setting
It is shown in several studies that the fluid approximation provides a lower bound (in
minimization case) to the optimal solution of the corresponding stochastic system. For example,
Gurvich et al. (2014) studied a matching queue, in which items of different classes arrive to the
system and wait on multiple queues to be matched with items of other classes. They approximated
the matching system by a fluid model and used it to generate lower bounds on the objective function
of the original system and characterize the asymptotic optimal solutions for both balanced and
imbalanced matching networks. Jiménez and Koole (2004) studied a time-varying queuing model
for a call center and showed that a fluid approximation generates a lower bound on the performance
of the system in several overloaded situations. Altman et al. (2001) showed that for a certain class
of queuing systems the fluid approximation provides a lower bound on the workload of the queuing
system. Bäuerle (2000, 2002) considered the class of control problems for networks with linear
dynamics. They showed that the fluid approximation of the network provides a lower bound on the
objective function of the stochastic problem. They also studied how to construct asymptotically
optimal decision rules. We generate upper bounds on the performance of the original system based
on work presented in Bäuerle (2000, 2002). However, the methods developed do not directly apply
as the expected drift of the Markov process in our formulation is a function of both state and action
variables. Therefore, we adopted the methodology to address such technicalities.
In order to assess the quality of solutions produced by the fluid approximation, we provide an
upper bound in a Markovian setting and the absence of fairness constraints. Bäuerle (2000, 2002)
provided an upper bound on the optimal value function for a class of stochastic networks. Specifically,
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Bäuerle (2002) developed an upper bound for a class of Markovian stochastic networks in finite and
infinite horizon, where the expected drift of the process is linear on control and the reward rate
is linear on state variables. Also, Bäuerle (2000) studied an infinite-horizon Markovian stochastic
network where the drift of the process is linear on control and the cost rate is lower-semicontinuous
in state and convex in control and derived an upper bound. The Markovian stochastic network
of the heart transplantation queue considered in this study differs from the ones considered in
Bäuerle (2000, 2002) as the expected drift in our network is a function of both state and action.
However, we adopt and apply the methods discussed in Bäuerle (2002) to derive the upper bound.
Nonetheless, the application of Markovian queuing networks to measure suboptimality of allocation
rules in transplantation queuing networks is novel.
This section formulates the heart transplantation system studied in Section 2.3 as a Markovian
stochastic queuing network. To that end, we assume that the interarrival times of all stochastic
processes involved are independent, stationary, and exponentially distributed. In fact, the statistical
tests on the UNOS heart transplantation data confirms the validity of these assumptions; see EC.4.2.
for validation results. However, the probability of death on the waiting list depends on many other
factors in the Cox proportional hazard model and our analysis shows that the dependency to waiting-
time is “weak,” i.e., the probability of death for a patient waiting 9 months (average waiting time
in heart transplantation queue is 7 months) is only increased by 2%, on average, compared to no
waiting if everything else is fixed. Furthermore, recall from the stochastic formulation in Section 3
that we keep track of a total of N patients. This assumption is not restrictive as one may assume a
large N .
For i ∈ I, define Xi(t) as the number of type i patients on the transplant waiting list, Yi(t) as
the number of type i patients on the post-transplant phase at time t, and let the state process of
the system be {(X(t), Y (t)) : t ≥ 0} where X(t) = (X1(t), . . . , XI(t)) and Y (t) = (Y1(t), . . . , YI(t)).
Hence, there are 2I number of queues including patients on both pre- and post-transplant lists and
the state space of the model is S = {(x, y) ∈ N2I0 : (x, y) · e ≤ N} where N0 denotes the set of non-
negative integers, and e is a 2I dimensional vector of ones. The state process {(X(t), Y (t)) : t ≥ 0}
is a continuous time Markov process and note that in this formulation we keep track of patients in
the post-transplant phase such that the reward rates become a linear function of the state. The
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controller can take action continuously over time, and without loss of generality one may restrict
the control (action) of the system to discrete sequence of points in time where the state process of
the system has a jump. Therefore, let the sequence {Tn : n ≥ 0} with T0 := 0 be the sequence of
jump times of the Markov process {(X(t), Y (t)) : t ≥ 0}, which corresponds to the decision epochs
of the model. Let the control variable ahi (t) be the probability of assigning an available heart type
h to a patient in class i, and a(t) = (ahi (t) : i ∈ I, h ∈ H). The action space can be written as
A := {(ahi : i ∈ I, h ∈ H) :
∑
i
∑
h a
h
i = 1, 0 ≤ ahi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I, h ∈ H; ahi (t) = 0, ∀(i, h) ∈ INF},
which is a compact and convex set. Let Q = (q((x, y), a, (x′, y′))) be the generator of the stochastic
process {(X(t), Y (t)) : t ≥ 0}, where q((x, y), a, (x′, y′)) is the transition rate from state (x, y) to
state (x′, y′) given that (x, y) · e 6= N when action a is taken, given by
q((x, y), a, (x′, y′)) =

λi x
′ = x+ ei, y
′ = y,
ρijxi x
′ = x− ei + ej , y′ = y,
dixi x
′ = x− ei, y′ = y,∑
h µ
hahi (1− (1− phi )N ) x′ = x− ei, y′ = y + ei,
d′iyi x
′ = x, y′ = y − ei,
where d′i denotes the death rate for patients in class i after transplantation, d
′ is a diagonal matrix
representing post-transplant death rates with d′i on its diagonal, ei is the I-dimensional unit vector
whose ith element is 1, and e is a 2I dimensional vector of ones. In the case where (x, y) · e = N ,
the transition rate from state (x, y) to (x′, y′) is similar to the case where (x, y) · e 6= N , except
q((x, y), a, (x + ei, y)) = 0. Note that the other transition rates are equal to zero and that q(·) is
uniformly bounded as both state variable (x, y) and action a are bounded.
Define A(x, y) := {a ∈ A : xi = 0 =⇒
∑
h a
h
i = 0} as the set of all admissible actions in state
(x, y) and note that A(x, y) 6= ∅ for all (x, y) ∈ S, meaning that there is at least one admissi-
ble action in every state. For all (x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ S and a ∈ A(x, y) let b : S × A → R2I with
b((x, y), a) =
∑
(x′,y′)∈S((x
′, y′) − (x, y))q((x, y), a, (x′, y′)) be the expected drift of the network,
which can be written as
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b((x, y), a) =

(
λ−
∑H
h=1 q
hµhah − (d+ ρ̂− ρT )x,
∑H
h=1 q
hµhah − d′y
)
(x, y) · e < N,
(
−
∑H
h=1 q
hµhah − (d+ ρ̂− ρT )x,
∑H
h=1 q
hµhah − d′y
)
(x, y) · e = N.
The reward rate function r : S → R+ with r(x(t), y(t)) = βx(t) + γy(t) is linear on state vari-
able which accounts for the pre- and post-transplant QALYs, where γ = (γ1, . . . , γI) is the QALYs
coefficient vector for the patients in the post-transplant phase. Similarly, the final reward function
g : S → R+ at the end of the planning horizon T is given by g(x(T ), y(T )) = ηx(T ) + δy(T ) where
δ = (δ1, . . . , δI) is the future QALYs coefficient vector for the patients who are still alive in the
post-transplant phase at the end of the planning horizon. For an initial state (x, y) ∈ S and a fixed
decision rule π, let the expected total QALYs be
Jπ(x, y) = Eπ
{∫ T
0
r(x(τ), y(τ))dτ + g(x(T ), y(T ))|(x(0), y(0)) = (x, y)
}
.
The decision maker solves for
V (x, y) = sup
π∈Π
{
Jπ(x, y)
}
,
where Π is the set of all admissible policies.
A fluid approximation to the stochastic network is given by

VF̂ (x0, y0) = max
∫ T
0
r(x(t), y(t))dt+ g(x(T ), y(T ))
subject to
(ẋ(t), ẏ(t)) = b((x(t), y(t)), a(t)),
(x(0), y(0)) = (x0, y0),
x(t) ≥ 0, y(t) ≥ 0,
N − e2I · (x, y) ≥ 0,
a(t) ∈ A,
(PU )
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The following theorem, shows that the value function of problem (PU ) provides an upper bound to
the optimal value function of the stochastic Markovian network, V (x, y).
Theorem B.1. For all initial states (x, y) ∈ S, V (x, y) ≤ VF̂ (x, y).
In order to solve the optimal control problem (PU ), the planning horizon is discretized. Let
V
(m)
F̂
(x, y) be the optimal value function of the discretized version of the optimal control problem
(PU ) where m denotes the number of discretization steps. Because the optimal control problem
is linear, its discretized version is an LP which can be solved efficiently. Also, since problem (PU )
satisfies conditions in a corollary for Theorem 3 in Budak et al. (1969), as the number of discretization
steps increases, the optimal value of the discretized version of the optimal control problem converges
to VF̂ , i.e., V
(m)
F̂
(x, y)→ VF̂ (x, y) as m→∞, for all x.
Remark B.1. Although in the original system in Section 2.3 some probability distributions are not
memoryless based on statistical tests on real data, we “heuristically” use the bound presented in this
section, i.e., V
(m)
F̂
(·), to assess the quality of feasible allocation policies. Furthermore, we show in
Section B.3.2 that the optimal solution of problem (PU ) is also a priority index policy depending on
shadow prices associated to x and y evolution constraints. In Section B.3.2, we test the quality of
solutions produced by such priority rules.
B.3.1 Proof of Theorem B.1
Theorem B.1. For all initial states (x, y) ∈ S, V (x, y) ≤ VF̂ (x, y).
Proof. Proof. Suppose that π ∈ Π is an arbitrary decision rule for the Markovian stochastic queuing
network. As stated in the main text of Chapter 2, the state process {(X(t), Y (t)) : t ≥ 0} is a
Markov process whose generator is Q = (q((x, y), π(x, y), (x′, y′))). Using the Dynkin’s formula for
this Markov process, we obtain
M(t) = (X(t), Y (t))− (x, y)−
∫ t
0
b((X(s), Y (s)), π(X(s), Y (s)))ds, (25)
where M(t) is a martingale with the initial condition M(0) = 0 and b(·, ·) is the expected drift of
the network (Athreya and Kurtz, 1973, Display 5). Note that in transforming the Markov process
via Dynkin’s formula we used the fact that the expected drift is uniformly bounded (condition (1)
in Athreya and Kurtz (1973)) and its derivative exists (condition (2) in Athreya and Kurtz (1973)).
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These conditions hold because the expected drift is a linear function of state and action, where both
of them are bounded (defined on bounded state and action sets). First, note that:
(a) For our stochastic queuing network, the expected drift
b((x, y), a) =

(
λ−
∑H
h=1 q
hµhah − (d+ ρ̂− ρT )x,
∑H
h=1 q
hµhah − d′y
)
(x, y) · e < N,
(
−
∑H
h=1 q
hµhah − (d+ ρ̂− ρT )x,
∑H
h=1 q
hµhah − d′y
)
(x, y) · e = N,
is bounded as both state and action variables belong to bounded spaces, which yields the following:
Eπ
{∫ t
0
b
((
X(s), Y (s)
)
, π
(
X(s), Y (s)
))
ds
}
=
∫ t
0
Eπ
{
b
((
X(s), Y (s)
)
, π
(
X(s), Y (s)
))}
ds.
(b) The expected drift is linear on its arguments. Therefore, we have:
Eπ
{
b
((
X(s), Y (s)
)
, π
(
X(s), Y (s)
))}
= b
(
Eπ
{(
X(s), Y (s)
)}
,Eπ
{
π
(
X(s), Y (s)
)})
.
Then, we take the expectation of (25) considering (a) and (b) and noting by the optional sampling
theorem that the expectation of the martingale M(t) is equal to zero (the expectation of M(0)),
which yields:
0 = Eπ
{(
X(t), Y (t)
)}
− (x, y)
−
∫ t
0
(
λ(s)−
H∑
h=1
qhµhEπ
{
πh
(
X(s), Y (s)
)}
− (d+ ρ̂− ρT )Eπ{X(s)},
H∑
h=1
qhµhEπ
{
πh
(
X(s), Y (s)
)}
− d′Eπ{Y (s)}
)
ds,
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which yields the following for the case where (X(t), Y (t)) · e < N ,
Eπ
{(
X(t), Y (t)
)}
= (x, y)
+
∫ t
0
(
λ(s)−
H∑
h=1
qhµhEπ
{
πh
(
X(s), Y (s)
)}
− (d+ ρ̂− ρT )Eπ{X(s)},
H∑
h=1
qhµhEπ
{
πh
(
X(s), Y (s)
)}
− d′Eπ{Y (s)}
)
ds, (26)
and, for the case where (X(t), Y (t)) · e = N , we have
Eπ
{(
X(t), Y (t)
)}
= (x, y)
+
∫ t
0
(
−
H∑
h=1
qhµhEπ
{
πh
(
X(s), Y (s)
)}
− (d+ ρ̂− ρT )Eπ{X(s)},
H∑
h=1
qhµhEπ
{
πh
(
X(s), Y (s)
)}
− d′Eπ{Y (s)}
)
ds (27)
Define
(
x̂(t), ŷ(t)
)
:= Eπ
{(
X(t), Y (t)
)}
, and â(t) := Eπ
{
π
(
X(t), Y (t)
)}
. We have
(
X(t), Y (t)
)
≥ 0,
(X(t), Y (t)) · e ≤ N , and π
(
X(t), Y (t)
)
∈ A, almost surely. Hence, we have
(
x̂(t), ŷ(t)
)
≥ 0 and(
x̂(t), ŷ(t)
)
· e ≤ N , and â(t) ∈ A as the action space A is convex. So, by rewriting (26) and (27) we
get
(
x̂(t), ŷ(t)
)
= (x, y) +
∫ t
0
b
(
(x̂(s), ŷ(s)), â(s)
)
ds.
This can be written by plugging the expected drift function as follows

(x, y) +
∫ t
0
(
λ(s)−
∑H
h=1 q
hµhâh(s)− (d+ ρ̂− ρT )x̂(s),
∑H
h=1 q
hµhâh(s)− d′ŷ(s)
)
ds, (x̂, ŷ) · e < N,
(x, y) +
∫ t
0
(
−
∑H
h=1 q
hµhâh(s)− (d+ ρ̂− ρT )x̂(s),
∑H
h=1 q
hµhâh(s)− d′ŷ(s)
)
ds, (x̂, ŷ) · e = N.
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This is equivalent to (x̂0, ŷ0) = (x, y) with
(
˙̂x(t), ˙̂y(t)
)
= b
(
(x̂(t), ŷ(t)), â(t)
)
=

(λ(t)−
∑H
h=1 q
hµhâh(t)− (d+ ρ̂− ρT )x̂(t),
∑H
h=1 q
hµhâh(t)− d′ŷ(t)), (x̂, ŷ) · e < N,
(−
∑H
h=1 q
hµhâh(t)− (d+ ρ̂− ρT )x̂(t),
∑H
h=1 q
hµhâh(t)− d′ŷ(t)), (x̂, ŷ) · e = N.
Therefore, the pair
(
(x̂(t), ŷ(t)), â(t)
)
is feasible for the fluid model (PU ) for every decision rule π.
Note that the expected total QALYs for the stochastic queuing network for an arbitrary policy π is
given by
Jπ(x, y) =Eπ
{∫ T
0
[
βX(t) + γY (t)
]
dt+ ηX(T ) + δY (T )
∣∣∣(X(0), Y (0)) = (x, y)}
=
∫ T
0
[
βEπ
{
X(t) |
(
X(0), Y (0)
)
= (x, y)
}
+ γEπ
{
Y (t) |
(
X(0), Y (0)
)
= (x, y)
}]
dt
+ ηEπ{X(T )|
(
X(0), Y (0)
)
= (x, y)}+ δEπ{Y (T )|
(
X(0), Y (0)
)
= (x, y)}
=
∫ T
0
[
βx̂(t) + γŷ(t)
]
dt+ ηx̂(T ) + δŷ(T )
=
∫ T
0
r(x̂(t), ŷ(t))dt+ g(x̂(T ), ŷ(T )).
This implies that for every decision rule π ∈ Π, and initial state (x, y) ∈ S, because the triple of
state-action
(
(x̂, ŷ), â
)
is feasible for the fluid problem (PU ), we have
Jπ(x, y) =
∫ T
0
r(x̂(t), ŷ(t))dt+ g(x̂(T ), ŷ(T )) ≤ VF̂ (x, y),
meaning that the value function of the stochastic queuing network for every decision rule π ∈ Π,
Jπ(x, y), is bounded above by the optimal value function of the fluid model (PU ), VF̂ (x, y). Taking
supremum over all feasible decision rules yields
sup
π
Jπ(x, y) ≤ VF̂ (x, y) =⇒ V (x, y) ≤ VF̂ (x, y),
which shows that the optimal value function of the fluid model (PU ) provides an upper bound to
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the optimal value function of the stochastic queuing network.
B.3.2 Policy Derivation for Problem (PU )
Fluid approximation (PU ) of the Markovian stochastic queuing network of the heart trans-
plantation allocation problem introduced in Section B.3 is a linear optimal control problem with
state variable (x, y) and action a as shown below:

VF̂ (x0, y0) = max
∫ T
0
r(x(t), y(t))dt+ g(x(T ), y(T ))
subject to
(ẋ(t), ẏ(t)) = b((x(t), y(t)), a(t)),
(x(0), y(0)) = (x0, y0),
x(t) ≥ 0, y(t) ≥ 0,
N − e2I · (x, y) ≥ 0,
a(t) ∈ A,
(PU )
where r(x(t), y(t)) = βx(t) + γy(t) is the cost rate function, g(x(T ), y(T )) = ηx(T ) + δy(T ) is
the final cost function, b((x(t), y(t)), a(t)) is the expected drift, and e2I is a 2I-dimensional vector
of ones. The necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the linear optimal control problem
provides the following LP for each heart type h at each time t, whose solution provide the optimal
control 
max
(
k2(t)− k1(t)
)
qhuh(t),
subject to,
e.uh(t) ≤ µh(t),
uhi (t) = 0,∀(i, h) ∈ INF,
uh(t) ≥ 0,
(28)
where k1(t) and k2(t) are the shadow prices associated to ẋ(t) and ẏ(t) constraints, respectively.
Similar arguments as in proof of Theorem 2.1 provides the following condition that can be used to
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Table 37: Each Objective Function Component for OPLS Policy
Objective Function (Life-Days ×106)
Policy Pre-TX Post-TX Final Total
OPLS 7.43 160.21 0.024 167.66
Table 38: Mean and Standard Deviation of Waiting Time for OPLS Policy
Waiting Time (Days)
Policy Mean STD
OPLS 96 72
calculate these shadow prices
k̇1(t) = −β + (d+ ρ̂− ρT )(k1(t)− w1(t)) + w̄3(t), (29)
k̇2(t) = −γ + d′(k2(t)− w2(t)) + w̄3(t), (30)
with final condition k1(T ) = η and k2(T ) = δ. In addition, vectors w1(t) and w2(t) and scalar
w3(t) are the shadow prices associated to constraints x(t) ≥ 0, y(t) ≥ 0, and N − e2I · (x, y) ≥ 0,
respectively. Note that w̄3(t) is a I-dimensional vector whose elements are all w3(t).
As can be seen from the derived LP in (28), given the shadow price vectors k1(t) and k2(t), the
optimal solution of problem (PU ) at each time t is a priority index policy with priority coefficient(
(k2i (t)−k1i (t)
)
qhi , which prioritizes patients with higher coefficients. This provides a patient priority
list that can be used to simulate the optimal solution of the optimal control problem (PU ). We denote
this policy by OPLS. Tables 37 and 38 report the results of simulating the OPLS policy in terms of
life years and mean and standard deviation of waiting time. Results in the tables indicate that the
OPLS policy performs very similarly to the OPL policy in terms of these measures.
In addition, this section presents the results of solving the discretized fluid problem (PU ), which
yields an upper bound on the value function of the stochastic formulation in Section 2.3 in the absence
of fairness constraints, and the results of simulating the OPL policy that yields a lower bound. In
particular, Table 39 assesses the upper and lower bounds on the total LYs of the patient population
for each region in the U.S., and reports the optimality gap calculated by UB(r)−LB(r)UB(r) × 100%, where
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Table 39: Optimality Gap in a Markovian Setting
Region R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 Total
Optimality Gap (%) 7.7 7.0 3.2 2.8 4.5 1.4 4.3 6.5 2.2 2.8 3.9 4.3
UB(r) and LB(r) stand for the upper and lower bound in region r, respectively. The optimality
gap ranges from 1.4% to 7.7% across regions and it is 4.3% in the country, which suggests that the
proposed OPL policy is near optimal.
B.4 Simulation and Assumption Validation
This section provides details about the simulation model, the allocation policies studied and
simulated in Chapter 2, as well as the results of statistical tests performed for validation purposes.
A simulation model of the stochastic heart transplantation system on a daily basis, calibrated and
validated by data from UNOS/SRTR, is used for numerical studies (Hasankhani and Khademi, 2017).
This simulation model is different from the TSAM provided by SRTR. In particular, TSAM makes
the following assumptions: (1) arrivals of patients and donors are input to the model with a data
file, (2) the initial waiting list is input to the model with a data file, (3) an entire history of waiting
list health status changes must be input to the model for each patient. The simulation model relaxes
those assumptions by creating models for arrivals of patients and hearts, as well as models for change
of health status in the waiting list. It consists of six main modules: (1) patient arrival module, (2)
heart arrival module, (3) patient health status change module, (4) pre-transplant survival module,
(5) allocation module, and (6) post-transplant survival module. Figure 17 in Section B.4 illustrates
the flow of the simulation model. In addition, Table 40 in Section B.4 provides a mapping of heart
transplantation system elements from practical aspects to the simulation and mathematical models.
The patient arrival module generates patient arrivals to the waiting list and assigns various clinical
and demographic attributes according to conditional distributions. The patient arrival is modeled
as a non-stationary Poisson process with the arrival rate depending on year. Similar to the patient
arrival module, heart arrival module generates a newly donated heart and assigns its attributes that
will be used in the allocation process. In the simulation model, the daily health status progression
of patients on the waiting list is modeled as a Markov chain and data from UNOS/SRTR is used
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to estimate its transition probability matrix using maximum likelihood estimator. By using a Cox
survival model, at each day of the simulation, the pre-transplant survival module generates the
probability of death for patients on the waiting list. The post-transplant survival module uses
another Cox model to generate death probabilities for patients on the post-transplant phase. Note
that the simulation model considers all the characteristics of patients and donated hearts reported in
UNOS/SRTR data sets such as ethnicity, gender, number of transplants before listing, and disease.
The allocation module is responsible for matching the available hearts with patients. In particular,
once a heart is procured, this module seeks to match the available heart with a patient on the waiting
list by using certain priority rules, which is called the allocation policy. The UNOS allocation policy
is used as a baseline policy for the simulation model for validation purposes.
The simulation model is validated by using the UNOS allocation policy in the allocation module
and comparing the outputs for several measures such as yearly patient arrivals, yearly heart arrivals,
waiting list size at the end of each year, yearly transplants performed, yearly deaths on the waiting
list, and 1- and 5-year post-transplant survivals with those reported by UNOS/SRTR. Also, the
Markov chain model used in health status change module is validated by comparing the percentage
of patients in each health status in our simulation model with the historical data reported by
UNOS. The statistical tests for comparing the outcomes of the simulation model and real data
and associated p-values confirm the validity of the simulation model. For details regarding model
creation, calibration, and validation see Hasankhani and Khademi (2017). The simulation model is
used to compare the performance of the several allocation policies under different measures, which
are discussed in Sections 2.6 and B.5. The modules of the simulation model are validated and the
results are reported in Hasankhani and Khademi (2017). We provide the results of the validation of
the assumptions made throughout the Chapter 2. The health status change module is validated and
the results are reported in Table 48. The pre-transplant survival module is responsible for generating
patient deaths while waiting on transplantation waiting list, which makes use of a Cox proportional
hazard model. Furthermore, patients delisting due to reasons other than death is also considered
in the simulation model. The heart allocation module, is a set of user defined rules which finds a
patient match for an available donor heart. Finally, patients receiving a donor heart move to the
post-transplant phase, and the post-transplant survival module is responsible for generating survival
of transplanted patients. Another Cox model is used in the post-transplant survival module to
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determine survival times of different types of patients after transplantation. Figure 17 represents the
overview of the simulation model, as well as the interaction between different modules. Furthermore,
Table 40 illustrates a mapping from the practical aspects of the heart transplantation to simulation
and mathematical models. UNOS policy was used as a baseline policy in the simulation model to
validate different modules of the simulation model, as well as the whole model. The validation results
of all modules and the corresponding statistical tests with their p-values are reported in Hasankhani
and Khademi (2017) and we do not duplicate them in this work and refer the interested reader
to that study. However, we report the results of the statistical tests for the components that are
necessary for the assumptions made in Section B.3 where we present an upper bound in a Markovian
setting.
In order to simulate the OPL policy, we create a patient priority list for each donor heart type in
each day of simulation according to the descending order of coefficient
(
αhi − ki(t)
)
qhi + y
h
i (t) in the
presence, and
(
αhi −ki(t)
)
qhi in the absence of the fairness constraints. Upon arrival of a donor heart,
the simulation model preserves the same geographical (regional sharing) and blood type matching
rules but instead of prioritizing patients by their health status, prioritizes based on the priority list
corresponding to the available heart type and simulation day. Furthermore, similar to UNOS policy,
first-come first-served waiting time priority rule is used within each class of eligible patients. The
benchmark policies and the ones derived by considering alternative objectives, explained in Section
B.5, are also simulated in a similar fashion.
B.4.1 UNOS Policies
UNOS Policy (2006-2018): UNOS policy prioritizes patients according to their health status
(1A>1B>2) while it considers certain blood type matching, and regional sharing rules. Tables 41
and 42 indicate the primary and secondary blood type matching rules, respectively. Also, Table 43
provides the definition of the priority Zones in the UNOS allocation. Furthermore, patients within a
same priority class are prioritized based on their waiting time. This policy offers an available heart
to patients on the waiting list according to Table 44, which summarizes the UNOS allocation policy
for the hearts from adult deceased donors (at least 18 years old). Note that in the simulation model,
due to the limited cold ischemia time of heart (4-6 hours), we assume that a donor heart is offered
to at most N = 4 patients and is wasted if no match is found. Next, we describe the new 7-tiered
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Table 40: Practical Aspects of Allocation in Simulation and Mathematical Modeling
Practical Aspect Simulation Model Mathematical Modeling
Patient Arrival
Patient Arrival Module:
Poisson arrivals
λi(t):
Patient type i arrival rate
Heart Arrival
Heart Arrival Module:
Poisson Arrivals
µh(t):
Heart type h arrival rate
Patients Death
Pre-transplant Survival Module:
A Cox proportional hazard model
di:
Patient type i pre-transplant
death rate
Patients Delisting
Patients Delisting Module:
Delisting based on fitted
historical distributions
Delisting rate is included
in the patients’ death rate.
Patients Class
Change
Patients Class Change Module:
A Markov chain based on historical
frequency of class changes
ρij :
Rate at which patients
of class i move to j.
ρ̂ii =
∑
j ρij
Heart Acceptance
(Wastage)
Allocation Module:
Due to limited cold ischemic time
for heart, a donor heart is offered
to at most four patients and if no match
found the heart will be wasted.
qh:
Heart type h acceptance probability.
A diagonal matrix.
qhi : Diagonal element i,
denoting heart type h acceptance
probability for patient class i
Proximity
Constraints
Allocation Module:
UNOS proximity zones
(DSA, Zones A-E)
Not explicitly modeled.
Blood Type
Compatibility
Allocation Module:
UNOS primary and secondary
ABO matching.
INF: Set of infeasible pairs of
patients and hearts.
Including primary and
secondary ABO matching.
uhi (t) = 0, ∀(i, h) ∈ INF
Avoiding
Transplant of
Inactive Patients
Allocation Module:
Does not consider inactive patients
in the allocation procedure.
INF: Set of infeasible pairs of
patients and hearts.
Including inactive patients
transplant avoid.
uhi (t) = 0, ∀(i, h) ∈ INF
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Figure 17: Heart Allocation Simulation Model
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policy and its implementation.
Table 41: Primary Blood Type Matching Requirements
Hearts from donors with: Are allocated to the candidates with:
Blood Type O Blood type O or blood type B
Blood Type A Blood type A or blood type AB
Blood Type B Blood type B or blood type AB
Blood Type AB Blood type AB
Table 42: Secondary Blood Type Matching Requirements
Hearts from donors with: Are allocated to the candidates with:
Blood Type O Blood type A or blood type AB
Blood Type A Not applicable
Blood Type B Not applicable
Blood Type AB Not applicable
Table 43: Priority Zone Definition
Zone Includes transplant hospitals:
A Within 500 nautical miles from the donor hospital but outside of the donor’s hospital DSA.
B Within 1000 nautical miles from the donor hospital but outside of the zone A and donor’s hospital DSA.
C Within 1500 nautical miles from the donor hospital but outside of the zone B and donor’s hospital DSA.
D Within 2500 nautical miles from the donor hospital but outside of the zone C and donor’s hospital DSA.
E More than 2500 nautical miles from the donor hospital.
UNOS 7-Tiered Policy: The newly proposed 7-tiered policy, which is in effect since January
2018, categorizes patients into seven health status groups, and broadens the regional sharing of the
hearts. The new definition of each health status provided by UNOS is used in the simulation model
to categorize the patients on the waiting list. Note that since the simulation model is keeping track of
all patient characteristics that UNOS data reports, this categorization is straightforward. Table 45
summarizes a mapping from previous 3-tiered to newly proposed 7-tiered health status classification
by UNOS to provide a big picture of the new classification. The UNOS 7-tiered policy considered as
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Table 44: Allocation of Hearts from Adult Deceased Donors in the UNOS Policy
Classification Candidates that are within the: And are:
1 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
2 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
3 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
4 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
5 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
6 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
7 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
8 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
9 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
10 OPO’s DSA Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
11 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
12 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
13 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
14 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
15 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
16 Zone A Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
17 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
18 Zone B Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
19 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
20 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
21 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
22 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
23 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
24 Zone C Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
25 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
26 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
27 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
28 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
29 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
30 Zone D Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
31 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
32 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
33 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
34 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
35 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
36 Zone E Adult or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
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Table 45: Mapping from 3-tiered to 7-tiered Health Status Classification
Three-tiered status Seven-tiered status
1A 1
2
3
1B 4
2 5
6
Inactive 7
a benchmark policy in this study is similar in implementation to the UNOS policy, which makes use
of similar blood type matching rules and Zone definitions as in Tables 41, 42, and 43. Furthermore,
patients within a same priority class are prioritized according to their waiting time in the“first-in
first-served” fashion. However, a donor heart under the 7-tiered policy is offered to a wider area
around the DSA of the available heart’s OPO compared to the UNOS policy as shown in Table
46, which provides the details of the proposed 7-tiered allocation policy, which is implemented in
simulation.
B.4.2 Validation of Assumptions in Section B.3
Assumptions considered to obtain the upper bound in Section B.3 state that the interarrival
and interdeparture times in the heart transplantation waiting system are exponentially distributed
and stationary. Note that Hasankhani and Khademi (2017) report the results for non-stationary
Poisson processes and we refer the reader to that study for the validation results. Such assump-
tions help us treat the problem in Section B.3 as a Markovian queuing network, and are validated
by conducting statistical tests on patient and heart arrivals, as well as death and delisting rates.
Furthermore, patient class change due to health improvement/deterioration is modeled by a Markov
chain which is also validated by using the real data. In particular, the chi-squared goodness of fit
test with a significant level of α = 0.05 is used to test the validity of the null hypotheses (whether the
patient/heart arrivals and patient death/delisting follow Poisson distributions). Table 47 reports the
p-values associated to these statistical tests, where a p-value larger than the considered significance
level (α = 0.05) suggests that the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. In addition, the Markov chain
that is developed to model the health status change of patients on the waiting list is validated by
comparing the proportion of patients in each health status produced by the simulation model with
the historical data reported by UNOS/SRTR. In particular, we used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
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Table 46: Allocation of Hearts from Adult Deceased Donors in the UNOS 7-Tiered Policy
Classification Candidates that are within the: And are:
1 OPO’s DSA+Zone A Adult Status 1 or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
2 OPO’s DSA+Zone A Adult Status 1 or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
3 Zone B Adult Status 1 or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
4 Zone B Adult Status 1 or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
5 OPO’s DSA+Zone A Adult Status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
6 OPO’s DSA+Zone A Adult Status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
7 Zone B Adult Status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
8 Zone B Adult Status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
9 OPO’s DSA Adult Status 3 or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
10 OPO’s DSA Adult Status 3 or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
11 OPO’s DSA Adult Status 4 and primary blood type match with the donor
12 OPO’s DSA Adult Status 4 and secondary blood type match with the donor
13 Zone A Adult Status 3 or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
14 Zone A Adult Status 3 or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
15 OPO’s DSA Adult Status 5 and primary blood type match with the donor
16 OPO’s DSA Adult Status 5 and secondary blood type match with the donor
17 Zone B Adult Status 3 or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
18 Zone B Adult Status 3 or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
19 OPO’s DSA Adult Status 6 or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
20 OPO’s DSA Adult Status 6 or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
21 Zone C Adult Status 1 or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
22 Zone C Adult Status 1 or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
23 Zone C Adult Status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
24 Zone C Adult Status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
25 Zone C Adult Status 3 or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
26 Zone C Adult Status 3 or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
27 Zone A Adult Status 4 and primary blood type match with the donor
28 Zone A Adult Status 4 and secondary blood type match with the donor
29 Zone A Adult Status 5 and primary blood type match with the donor
30 Zone A Adult Status 5 and secondary blood type match with the donor
31 Zone A Adult Status 6 or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
32 Zone A Adult Status 6 or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
33 Zone D Adult Status 1 or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
34 Zone D Adult Status 1 or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
35 Zone D Adult Status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
36 Zone D Adult Status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
37 Zone D Adult Status 3 or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
38 Zone D Adult Status 3 or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
39 Zone B Adult Status 4 and primary blood type match with the donor
40 Zone B Adult Status 4 and secondary blood type match with the donor
41 Zone B Adult Status 5 and primary blood type match with the donor
42 Zone B Adult Status 5 and secondary blood type match with the donor
43 Zone B Adult Status 6 or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
44 Zone B Adult Status 6 or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
45 Zone E Adult Status 1 or pediatric status 1A and primary blood type match with the donor
46 Zone E Adult Status 1 or pediatric status 1A and secondary blood type match with the donor
47 Zone E Adult Status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
48 Zone E Adult Status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
49 Zone E Adult Status 3 or pediatric status 1B and primary blood type match with the donor
50 Zone E Adult Status 3 or pediatric status 1B and secondary blood type match with the donor
51 Zone C Adult Status 4 and primary blood type match with the donor
52 Zone C Adult Status 4 and secondary blood type match with the donor
53 Zone C Adult Status 5 and primary blood type match with the donor
54 Zone C Adult Status 5 and secondary blood type match with the donor
55 Zone C Adult Status 6 or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
56 Zone C Adult Status 6 or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
57 Zone D Adult Status 4 and primary blood type match with the donor
58 Zone D Adult Status 4 and secondary blood type match with the donor
59 Zone D Adult Status 5 and primary blood type match with the donor
60 Zone D Adult Status 5 and secondary blood type match with the donor
61 Zone D Adult Status 6 or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
62 Zone D Adult Status 6 or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
63 Zone E Adult Status 4 and primary blood type match with the donor
64 Zone E Adult Status 4 and secondary blood type match with the donor
65 Zone E Adult Status 5 and primary blood type match with the donor
66 Zone E Adult Status 5 and secondary blood type match with the donor
67 Zone E Adult Status 6 or pediatric status 2 and primary blood type match with the donor
68 Zone E Adult Status 6 or pediatric status 2 and secondary blood type match with the donor
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Table 47: P-values for the Chi-Squared Goodness of Fit Test
Process P-Value
Patient Arrival 0.058
Heart Arrival 0.051
Patient Death and Delisting 0.051
Table 48: P-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
P-value 0.7714 0.2286 1 0.7718 0.7700 1 1 1 1
to check whether the health status distributions produced by the model are statistically identical to
the real health status distributions at the end of each calendar year during the period 2006-2014. P-
values for such statistical tests are reported in Table 48, which suggest that at a α = 0.05 significance
level the Markovian assumptions cannot be rejected.
B.5 Benchmark Policies and Alternative Objective Funnctions
This section provides details of the benchmark policies introduced in Section 2.6.1, and an-
alyzes the policy derivation for heart allocation problem with alternative objective functions studied
in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2.
B.5.1 Benchmark Policies
UNOS Policy (2006-2018). The UNOS allocation policy prioritizes patients on the waiting list in
three different levels, i.e., geographical (proximity to the donor hospital), health status, and waiting
time level. In particular, once a heart becomes available in an OPO, the policy first categorizes
patients on the waiting list based on their distance from the heart procurement OPO into six zones,
each including all transplant centers within some distance of the donor hospital. The policy first
offers the procured heart to the patients in the DSA of the same OPO as the heart is (Zone DSA);
if no one is matched, the heart will be offered in hierarchy to patients in Zones A, B, C, D, and
E. At each zone it prioritizes patients by their health status (1A > 1B > 2) and then primary and
secondary blood type match with the donor heart. Within each class, patients are ranked by their
waiting time (see B.4.1 for more details).
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UNOS 7-Tiered Policy. UNOS has revised the previous 3-tiered health status policy and pro-
posed a new policy which categorizes patients into seven groups based on their health status and
considers a broader regional sharing of donor hearts. Specifically, there is a correspondence between
the health statuses of the 3-tiered and 7-tiered grouping systems, i.e., roughly speaking, status 1A
is divided into three new statuses 1-3; status 1B is new status 4, status 2 is divided into two new
statuses 5-6; and inactive status is new status 7. The mechanism of the 7-tiered policy is similar
to that of UNOS policy, i.e., there is still three levels of prioritization, geographical, health status,
and waiting time. Prioritization based on health status and the regional sharing of donor hearts are
changed accordingly but the blood type matching eligibility is preserved under this policy. Eligible
patients in the same class are prioritized according to their waiting time (see B.4.1).
Su and Zenios Efficiency (SZE) Policy. Su and Zenios (2006) studied the problem of efficient
allocation of donor kidneys, and developed a mathematical programming model to find the optimal
kidney allocation in the case of full and hidden information. The problem setup is similar to ours,
where there are classes of patients and donor kidneys arriving to the system, and the patients
may depart due to transplant or death. However, they do not consider patients’ class change, i.e.,
health improvement/deterioration. Utility for a patient is defined by a combination of pre- and
post-transplant quality-adjusted life expectancy and the objective is to maximize the utilitarian
efficiency, i.e., the sum of utilities of all patient classes, subject to organ availability and truth-
telling constraints. The focus is on post-transplant heterogeneity as the pre-transplant death rates
are assumed to be constant across all patient classes. They showed that the optimal policy is an
assortative partition policy, whose solution provides a priority list of patients, which depend on the
type of available organ. We adopt and apply their method to the heart transplantation case study
and simulate it in the case of full patient information. Parameters and data required in this model
are estimated from the UNOS/SRTR real data.
Su and Zenios Equity (SZQ) Policy. Su and Zenios (2006) also studied an objective of equity
among patient classes by maximizing the minimum utility over patient classes. They showed that
the optimal solution of the equity problem is also an assortative partition policy, which provides a
patient priority for allocation. We adopt their techniques into heart transplantation and simulate
the SZQ policy in the case of full patient information, similar to the SZE policy.
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Broadened Regional Sharing (BRS) Policy. The geographic disparity is an important prob-
lem in organ allocation and sharing organs can address it; see Ata et al. (2016) and references
therein. Hasankhani and Khademi (2017) proposed a policy similar to UNOS that broadens the
regional sharing of the donor hearts. Specifically, when a donor heart becomes available, it is first
offered to the patients in the DSA of the available heart, and if no one is matched, it is offered to
the patients in Zone 1 (union of Zones A, B, and C of UNOS allocation rule), Zone 2 (Zone D in
UNOS allocation rule), and Zone 3 (Zone E in UNOS allocation policy) in hierarchy. Note that in
each prioritization zone, the same health status, blood type match, and waiting time prioritization
rules are considered as UNOS. The rationale for combining the UNOS priority Zones A, B, and C
is that the 4- to 6-hour cold ischemic time for heart is equivalent to 1500 airline miles similar to the
definition of Zone 1.
UNOS Health Reversed (UNOS-HR) Policy. As mentioned earlier in this section, in terms of
health status of the patients, UNOS allocation policy prioritizes sicker patients over healthier ones,
i.e., prioritization order in terms of health status of patients is as follows: 1A>1B>2. We consider
a simple benchmark policy which is similar to the UNOS policy in terms of geographic and waiting
time priorities but reverses the health priority order in which donor hearts are allocated to the
patients. In particular, this policy prioritizes healthier patients in the following order: 2>1B>1A.
Heart Allocation Scoring System (HAS) Policy. Designing a heart allocation system is a
top priority in heart transplantation and UNOS Heart Subcommittee plans to design such a scoring
system similar to kidney and lung. There are two main challenges for such a design: (1) identifying
appropriate score components, and (2) estimating the coefficients of each score component in the
formula. There is not any available scoring system for heart and, thus, no scoring components
are available. Therefore, we design many score components, estimate their coefficients (which is
discussed later), and measure the resulting score-based allocation policy via our validated simulation
model. Then, we choose the scoring system with the highest performance as the heart allocation
scoring system. Note that considering a combination of some common sense score components
and optimally estimating their coefficients does not necessarily produce good policies as many of
candidates that were tested produced significantly poor policies. Therefore, introducing such a
combination of score components is novel and a contribution by itself. In order to address the
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second challenge, we use the approximate dynamic programming approach proposed by Bertsimas
et al. (2013) to estimate the coefficients of a given set of score components based on real data
from heart transplantation. Recall that score components are functions of certain patient/heart
characteristics with specific weights corresponding to each patient/heart pair. For a pair of patient
i and heart h, we finalize four pre-selected score components including: f1(i, h) =
(
1-DPI(h)
)
×
POST(i), f2(i, h) =DPI(h)×WT(i), f3(i, h) = |AGE(i)-AGE(h)|, and f4(i, h) =PRE(i), where
DPI(h) denotes the donor profile index of the donor heart taking values in interval [0, 1] (higher
quality hearts have lower DPI), POST(i) denotes the expected post-transplant survival of a patient
type i averaged over heart types, WT(i) denotes the waiting time of a patient type i, Age(i) and
Age(h) denote the age of patient type i and age of donor h, and PRE(i) denotes the expected pre-
transplant survival of a patient type i. Then, for a pair (i, h) of patient and heart type, the heart
allocation score (HAS) function can be written as
HAS(i, h) =w0 + w1 ·
(
1−DPI(h)
)
· POST(i) + w2 ·DPI(h) ·WT(i)+
w3 · |AGE(i)−AGE(h)|+ w4 · PRE(i),
with wj for j = 1, 2, 3, 4 being the weight associated to the j
th score component fj .
After selecting the score components, the score weights are calculated by fitting a regression model on
the heart transplantation historical data such that the efficiency of the allocation policy is maximized
in the absence and presence of fairness constraints. For the HAS policy, optimal values of score
components are estimated as follows: w1 = 1.466, w2 = 1.079, w3 = 0.006, w4 = 0.007 with a
regression intercept of w0 = 806. These optimal values are used to simulate the policies. Once the
weights are estimated, for a given pair of patient-heart, the HAS is calculated and the patients will
be offered with donor hearts based on their score. We calculate the HAS for patient-heart pairs in
two cases and simulate the allocation policies in each case, i.e., absence of fairness constraints (HAS
policy) and presence of 50+ age fairness constraints (HAS-F policy). This method is flexible to
incorporate other fairness constraints. Results of simulating HAS is reported in Table 2 in Chapter
2. Here, we report the results of simulating the HAS-F policy. For the HAS-F policy, the estimated
values of the weights are as follow: w1 = 1.69, w2 = 0.031, w3 = 0.01, w4 = 0.005 with a regression
intercept of w0 = 750.
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Table 49: Each Objective Function Component for HAS-F Policy
Objective Function (Life-Days ×106)
Policy Pre-TX Post-TX Final Total
HAS-F 7.11 161.13 0.024 168.26
Table 50: Mean and Standard Deviation of Waiting Time for HAS-F Policy
Waiting Time (Days)
Policy Mean STD
HAS-F 109 92
B.5.2 Alternative Objective Functions
Section 2.5 analyzes the heart transplantation system with alternative objective functions
including (1) minimizing pre-transplant mortality, (2) minimizing total wastage of donor organs, (3)
minimizing the mean of waiting times for patient classes, and (4) minimizing the variance of waiting
times across patient classes and develops optimal allocation policies under these objectives. This
section provides details of deriving optimal policies for (1) and (2). Analysis of (3) is presented here
and (4) is analyzed in Zenios (1999).
Minimization of Pre-Transplant Death: We reformulate the optimal control problem (P1) by
replacing its objective function with a function indicating the total mortality on the waiting list
during the planning horizon where fairness constraints are present. Note that the analysis in this
section is different from that presented in Akan et al. (2012) because we consider fairness constraints
in the set of constraints. Therefore, the objective function can be written as
min
∫ T
0
e.d x(t)dt,
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where d is the pre-transplant death rate matrix. Then, an optimal control problem of the following
form has to be solved in order to find the optimal allocation rule:

min
∫ T
0
e.d x(t)dt
subject to (2.4)− (2.7).
(P2)
Problem (P2) is an optimal control problem with integral constraints on the control variables, which
can be transformed to a linear optimal control problem with boundary state constraints. An anal-
ogous arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.1 and writing necessary and sufficient optimality
conditions for the linear optimal control problem yields the following LP for each heart type h,
whose solution provides the optimal control of the problem (the optimal allocation rule when a
heart of type h is available) at time t

min
(
k̂(t)qh − ŷh(t)
)
uh(t)
subject to
e.uh(t) ≤ µh(t),
uhi (t) = 0,∀(i, h) ∈ INF,
uh(t) ≥ 0,
where k̂(t) is the shadow price associated to the state evolution constraints in (2.5), and can be
calculated by solving the following linear system of ODEs (in an overloaded system),
˙̂
k(t) = d+ k̂(t)(d+ ρ̂− ρT ),
with final condition k̂(T ) = 0. Furthermore, ŷh(t) is the shadow price vector associated to the
evolution of auxiliary state variables (introduced to transform the integral constraints into linear
ones). The necessary and sufficient optimality condition suggests that ŷhi (t) is constant in [0, T ] and
this constant value is the ihth element of the vector γA, and γk is the shadow price associated to the
kth fairness constraint (fairness constraints after transforming integral constraints to linear ones),
i.e., ŷhi (t) =
(
γA
)
ih
=
∑K
k=1 γkak,ih.
As can be seen from the derived LP, given the shadow price vector k̂(t), ŷh(t), the optimal solution
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of problem (P2) at each time t is a priority index policy with priority coefficient q
h
i k̂i(t) − ŷhi (t),
which prioritizes patients with lower coefficients. This provides a patient priority list that can be
used to simulate the policy that minimizes pre-transplant mortality. In particular, once we have the
priority list, the policy can be simulated in the same fashion as the OPL policy.
Minimization of Heart Wastage: Another objective function considered in this section is to
minimize total wastage of donor organs which is equivalent to maximizing total number of transplants
during the planning horizon where the fairness constraints are incorporated. The objective function
can be written as
max
H∑
h=1
∫ T
0
e · qhuh(t)dt,
and the optimal control problem associated to this objective is as follows

max
∑H
h=1
∫ T
0
e · qhuh(t)dt
subject to (2.4)− (2.7).
(P3)
Note that formulation (P3) is different from that presented in Akan et al. (2012) for the minimization
of heart wastage due to the presence of fairness constraints, thus a distinct analysis. Similar to
the proof of Theorem 2.1, transforming the optimal control problem (P3) with integral constraints
(2.7) to a linear problem with boundary state constraints, and following the necessary and sufficient
optimality conditions provide the following LP whose solution can be used to find the optimal policy,
which is also a priority index type. Hence, when a heart type h is available at time t, the LP

max
((
e− k̃(t)
)
· qh + ỹh(t)
)
uh
subject to
e.uh(t) ≤ µh(t),
uhi (t) = 0,∀(i, h) ∈ INF,
uh(t) ≥ 0,
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is solved and the optimal solution of the problem (P3) is found, where k̃(t) is the shadow price vector
associated to the state evolution constraints in (2.5), and can be calculated by solving the following
linear system of ODEs (in an overloaded system),
˙̃
k(t) = k̃(t)(d+ ρ̂− ρT ),
with final condition k̃(T ) = 0, whose solution implies k̃(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0, T ]. In addition, ỹh(t) is
the shadow price vector associated to the evolution of auxiliary state variables introduced to apply
the integral fairness constraints transformation. Similarly, by letting γ be the shadow price vector
associated to the transformed fairness constraints, we have ỹhi (t) =
(
γA
)
ih
=
∑K
k=1 γkak,ih.
Hence, the optimal solution of problem (P3) at each time t is a priority index policy with priority
coefficient qhi + ỹ
h
i (t), which prioritizes patients with higher coefficients. In fact, when a heart type
h is available, this policy prioritizes patients with higher acceptance probability of the donor heart
while it considers the impact of the fairness constraints in prioritizing patients. The priority list is
used to simulate the policy that minimizes total wastage of donor hearts, in a similar fashion as the
OPL policy is simulated.
Minimization of Mean and STD of Waiting Times: In the rest of this section, we provide
details of the MWT and VWT policies. As described in the main text of Chapter 2, in Zenios (1999)
the expected waiting time for patient class i is derived to be Wi =
1
di
(
1 −
∑
h µ
hahi
λi
)
, where di is
the pre-transplant death rate for patient class i, λi is the arrival rate of patient class i, and a
h
i is
the percentage of heart type h allocated to patient class i. By using this expression and letting
ai =
∑H
h=1 µ
hahi denote the total allocation rates to a patient in class i, we formulate the following
problem that minimizes the average expected waiting time among patient groups in long run

minai
[
1
I
∑I
i=1
1
di
(
1− aiλi
)]
subject to∑I
i=1 ai = µ,
ai ≥ 0,∀i = 1, . . . , I.
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The problem is a Knapsack problem whose solution is a priority index policy with respect to the
coefficient − 1diλi that prioritizes the patients with lower coefficient. Specifically, when a heart is
available for transplantation, the policy offers the available heart to the patient classes with lower
− 1diλi or equivalently lower diλi, which is denoted by MWT.
UNOS considers disparities in the expected time to transplant for different patient groups as a
measure of equity in organ allocation: reducing the variability in expected waiting times improves the
equity (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 2016b). In fact, during the last decades,
UNOS revisited allocation policies to improve equity. For example, after the implementation of
the kidney allocation system the variability in the expected time to transplant among patients has
been significantly reduced (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 2016b). Reducing the
variability in the expected waiting time of different customer types is also proposed in the queuing
literature as a measure of equity. For example, Avi-Itzhak and Levy (2004) used an axiomatic
approach for a G/D/1 queuing system and showed that the variance of the waiting time can be
used as a yardstick for comparing the equity of proposed designs and extended it to more general
queuing systems. As mentioned earlier, Zenios (1999) studied the organ transplantation waiting list
as a queuing model with reneging, and analyzed the system analytically to find allocation policies
considering equity by equalizing the expected waiting time of patient classes. In particular, by letting
λ =
∑I
i=1 λi, µ =
∑H
h=1 µ
h, ρ = λµ , and d̄ =
∑I
i=1
λidi
λ and assuming that (1) the demand exceeds
the supply (i.e., λ > µ), (2) the organ arrival rate is much larger than the individual patient death
rates (i.e., µ >> di, i = 1, . . . , I), and (3) maxi di <
ρd̄
ρ−1 , a policy that equalizes the expected waiting
time over patient classes (VWT Policy) randomizes patient groups proportional to λiρ
(
(1−ρ)di+ρd̄
d̄
)
.
Note that assumptions (1), (2), and (3) made in Zenios (1999) hold for heart transplantation set of
parameters.
B.6 Fluid Model with Geographical Considerations
The fluid model (P1) does not consider the location of patients and donor hearts as one
of the factors defining patient and heart types. Therefore, the OPL policy is found for each trans-
plantation region separately. However, regional sharing of donor hearts may improve efficiency and
fairness by providing more transplant opportunities. In this section, we reformulate the fluid model
(P1) to incorporate locations of patients and hearts into our formulation. The problem setup, vari-
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ables, and parameters are the same as the fluid model (P1) in Section 2.4, except that in order
to apply geographical considerations in allocation rules we add OPO as one of the factors defining
patient/heart types to represent their location. Thus, the model variables are modified as follows.
Let xio(t) be the number of patients in class i listed on the waiting list of OPO o, and u
ho′
io (t) be the
allocation rate of heart type h procured in OPO o′ to the patients in class i listed on the waiting
list of OPO o. Note that there are 59 OPOs in the U.S. and we let O = {1, . . . , 59} denote the set
of all OPOs. All the parameters α, β, η, λ, q, d, ρ̂, ρT , and µ are modified accordingly to depend on
OPOs. Objective function which is the total QALYs of the patient population and the state evolu-
tion constraints, state variable non-negativity constraints, and fairness constraints are also modified
to include the patient/heart OPOs. The proximity constraints are included in the set of admissible
actions Ω(t) in the following way: Based on the limited cold ischemic time for heart (4 hours),
the air distance corresponding to this time period, and the distances between the 59 OPOs in the
U.S. heart transplantation system, we choose 500 miles threshold as allowable distance for regional
sharing of donor hearts, i.e., a heart procured in an specific OPO can be shared among patients of
the OPOs that are included in a circle with radius 500 miles around the procured OPO. Therefore,
the following set of constraints are added to the set of admissible actions Ω(t):
∑
i∈I
∑
h∈H
uho
′
io = 0, for o /∈ CIR(o′), o′ ∈ O,
where for each o′ ∈ O, CIR(o′) is the set of all OPOs within the 500 miles (air distance) from the
OPO o′ and are found by using the UNOS regional data and Google maps. Then, the reformulated
fluid model can be written as follows:
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VF (x0) = max
∫ T
0
( ∑
h∈H
∑
o′∈O
αho
′
qho
′
uho
′
(t) +
∑
o∈O
βoxo(t)
)
dt+
∑
o∈O
ηoxo(T ) (Po)
subject to
ẋo(t) = λo(t)−
∑
h∈H
∑
o′∈O
qho
′
uho
′
(t)− (do + ρ̂o − ρTo )xo(t), xo(0) = x0o, o ∈ O
xo(t) ≥ 0, t ≥ 0, o ∈ O∫ T
0
( ∑
i∈Fk
∑
h∈Gk
∑
o′∈O
uho
′
io (t)
)
dt ≥ ak
∫ T
0
(∑
i∈I
∑
h∈Gk
∑
o′∈O
uho
′
io (t)
)
dt, k = 1, . . . ,K, and o ∈ O,
u(t) ∈ Ω(t) :=
{
u(t) : e.uho
′
(t) ≤ µho
′
(t); uho
′
(t) ≥ 0, ∀h, o′ ∈ O;∑
o∈O
∑
o′∈O
uho
′
io = 0, ∀(i, h) ∈ INF;
∑
i∈I
∑
h∈H
uho
′
io = 0, ∀o /∈ CIR(o′), o′ ∈ O
}
.
where xo(t) =
(
x1,o(t), . . . , xI,o(t)
)
is the state variable vector for patients in OPO o, x0o =(
x01,o, . . . , x
0
I,o
)
is the initial population vector in OPO o, and λo(t) =
(
λ1,o(t), . . . , λI,o(t)
)
is the
arrival rate vector of patients in OPO o. Furthermore, uho
′
(t) =
(
uho
′
io (t) : i ∈ I, o ∈ O
)
is the
allocation rate vector of a heart available in OPO o′ with type h and µho
′
(t) is the heart type h
arrival rate in OPO o′.
Note that in the reformulated model, we model the fairness considerations in such a way that they
hold for patients in every OPO, e.g., during the planning horizon [0, T ]: at least ak percent of total
donor hearts of specific type belonging to set Gk must be allocated to the patients belonging to the
set Fk in each OPO o ∈ O. Similar arguments as in proof of Theorem 2.1 characterizes the structure
of the optimal solution of problem (Po) and shows that the solution is a priority index policy with
respect to coefficients depending on the shadow prices of the fairness constraints. We call this policy
OPL-RS and simulate this policy along with other benchmarks via the validated simulation model.
The results are reported in Table 2.2 of Chapter 2 where the simulation performance of different
allocation policies are reported.
Also, note that for computational purposes we assume pre-transplant death rate (d) and life quality
coefficients (β) and (η) be the same across all OPOs. Furthermore, we used the same acceptance
probability matrix (qh) and class change matrices (ρ̂ and ρ) for different OPOs. The reason is that
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these quantities are independent of the proximity considerations. However, for the post-transplant
life expectancy coefficients (αh,o
′
), we adjusted the life expectancies as when a donor heart in an
OPO allocated to a patient in another OPO with higher distance, its quality is affected and most
likely is going to be deteriorated compared to the case where it is allocated to a patient in the same
OPO (this reduction in life expectancy is reflected in the organ failure Cox model presented for heart
in the SRTR risk adjustment models): see Colvin et al. (2017). Nonetheless, the formulation (Po)
is flexible enough to incorporate any dependency of parameters to OPO location upon availability
of data.
B.7 Fairness Analysis of OPL
Section 2.6.4 in Chapter 2 studies the OPL policy in the presence of several age, health,
and combination of age-health constraints. Table 51 below shows the details of the constraints that
imposed in each grouping, where for each one, K denotes the number of fairness constraints imposed,
and for each k = 1, · · · ,K, Gk denotes the set of heart types under consideration in constraint k
(i.e., H is the set of all heart types), Fk the set of patient classes under consideration in fairness
constraint k (e.g., {I ∈ I : HS(i) = 1A} is the set of patient classes whose health status is 1A and
{I ∈ I : age(i) ≥ 35} is the set of patient classes older than 35 years), and ak the lower bound
associated to constraint k. Recall that Theorem 2.1 provides the optimal solution of problem (P1)
in the presence of each set of constraints, which is a priority index policy. We analyze OPL in the
presence of fairness constraints via simulation and compare their improvement over UNOS with the
OPL policy in the absence of fairness constraints. Numerical results are reported in Section 2.6.4.
Age Fairness Constraints. This set of constraints consists of one or more constraints ensuring
the percentage of total hearts allocated to patients in a specific range of age group during the
planning horizon is at least that under the UNOS policy. Such constraints can be seen as fairness
constraints assuring that the OPL policy is as fair as the UNOS policy in allocating donated hearts
in terms of age. We consider five age groupings including (i) [35+], (ii) [50+], (iii) [65+], (iv) [50-65]
and [65+], and (v) [35-50] and [50-65] and [65+]. For example, for [50+], UNOS allocates 65% of
the total donated hearts to the patients older than 50 years (Figure 18b). Hence, a constraint of
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Table 51: Details for Fairness Constraints
Fairness
constraints
Heart Types
Involved (Gk)
Patient Classes
Involved (Fk)
Lower Bound
(ak)
Number of
Constraints (K)
Age [35+] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : age(i) ≥ 35} 0.88 K=1
Age [50+] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : age(i) ≥ 50} 0.65 K=1
Age [65+] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : age(i) ≥ 65} 0.13 K= 1
Health [1A] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : HS(i) = 1A} 0.49 K=1
Health [1B] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : HS(i) = 1B} 0.47 K= 1
Health [2] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : HS(i) = 2} 0.04 K= 1
Age [50-65] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : 50 ≤ age(i) ≤ 65} 0.52
K=2
Age [65+] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : age(i) ≥ 65} 0.13
Age [35-50] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : 35 ≤ age(i) ≤ 50} 0.23
K=3
Age [50-65] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : 50 ≤ age(i) ≤ 65} 0.52
Age [65+] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : age(i) ≥ 65} 0.13
Health [1A] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : HS(i) = 1A} 0.49
K=2
Health [1B] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : HS(i) = 1B} 0.47
Health [1A] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : HS(i) = 1A} 0.49
K=2
Age [65+] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : age(i) ≥ 65} 0.13
Health [1A] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : HS(i) = 1A} 0.49
K=3
Health [1B] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : HS(i) = 1B} 0.47
Age [65+] All heart types (H) {I ∈ I : age(i) ≥ 65} 0.13
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type
∫ T
0
( ∑
{i:age(i)≥50}
∑
h
uhi (t)
)
dt ≥ 0.65
∫ T
0
(∑
i
∑
h
uhi (t)
)
dt
is considered as a fairness constraint in problem (P1), where {i : age(i) ≥ 50} denotes the set of
patient indices whose age are greater than 50 years, ensuring an allocation of at least 65% of donor
hearts to such patients. Similar constraints are added and analyzed for each group separately.
Health Fairness Constraints. Fairness constraints on health are also imposed in the optimal
control problem (P1), ensuring that the OPL policy allocates at least the same percentage of hearts
as the UNOS policy does to patients with certain health statuses. In particular, we consider four
health status groupings, i.e., (i) [1A], (ii) [1B], (iii) [2], and (iv) [1A] and [1B]. We analyze the
optimal solution of problem (P1) under each group of fairness constraints separately. For example,
by Figure 18b, UNOS allocates 49% of total hearts to 1A patients, thus the following health fairness
constraint
∫ T
0
( ∑
{i:Health(i)=1A}
∑
h
uhi (t)
)
dt ≥ 0.49
∫ T
0
(∑
i
∑
h
uhi (t)
)
dt
is imposed, where {i : health(i) = 1A} denotes the set of patient indices with health status 1A.
Similar constraints are considered for other health groupings.
Age-Health Fairness Constraints. We also analyze two combinations of age-health fairness
groups, i.e., (i) [65+] and [1A], and (ii) [50-65] and [65+] and [1A]. For example, the latter involves
three fairness constraints in the optimal control problem (P1), i.e., two constraints on age and one
on health. By Figure 18b, UNOS allocates 52% of total hearts to patients in age group [50-65],
13% to patients in [65+] age group, and 49% to patients with health status 1A. Hence, the imposed
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fairness constraints are as follows:
∫ T
0
( ∑
{i:50≤age(i)≤65}
∑
h
uhi (t)
)
dt ≥ 0.52
∫ T
0
(∑
i
∑
h
uhi (t)
)
dt
∫ T
0
( ∑
{i:age(i)≥65}
∑
h
uhi (t)
)
dt ≥ 0.13
∫ T
0
(∑
i
∑
h
uhi (t)
)
dt
∫ T
0
( ∑
{i:Health(i)=1A}
∑
h
uhi (t)
)
dt ≥ 0.49
∫ T
0
(∑
i
∑
h
uhi (t)
)
dt,
B.8 Further Analysis of OPL Policy
This section provides the priority coefficients of the OPL policy (in the absence and presence
of different fairness constraints) in color coded tables for the allocation of each heart type h, which
helps us understand how the policy performs in terms of prioritization based on age and health
status of patients.
In the Absence of Fairness Constraints. Table 2.3 in Section 2.6.3 illustrates the OPL policy
priority coefficients which are averaged over heart type, time, and patients characteristics except for
age and health status. This section provides similar tables for each of sixteen heart types for OPL
policy (heart type 16 is excluded due to insufficiency of data). In particular, the numbers in Tables
53-67 are for the case where fairness constraints are absent and numbers are average of quantities(
αhi − ki(t)
)
qhi over time, and over the other characteristics of patients (except for age and health
status). Table 52 shows the mapping between heart types considered in this study and the age and
blood type of the donor heart. Note that for infeasible pairs of patients and hearts in allocation we
put NA as coefficient in the tables.
In the Presence of Fairness Constraints. In order to understand the patient prioritization in
the presence of fairness constraints, we conduct an analysis similar to that in Section 2.6.3 of Chapter
2 and present color-coded tables for the OPL policy patient prioritization coefficients in the presence
of each age, health, and combination of age-health fairness constraints. In particular, Tables 68-78
provide the average over time, heart type, and other patient characteristics of the priority coefficient
of OPL policy in the presence of several fairness constraints. Comparing the priority coefficients
in Table 2.3 with those in Tables 68-78 reveals that: (1) the [35+] fairness grouping containing a
single constraint on the patients older than 35 years shifts the allocation priority from the youngest
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Table 52: Mapping between Heart Types and Age and Blood type of Donor Hearts
Heart Type Age Group Blood Type
1 [18-35] O
2 [18-35] A
3 [18-35] B
4 [18-35] AB
5 [35-50] O
6 [35-50] A
7 [35-50] B
8 [35-50] AB
9 [50-65] O
10 [50-65] A
11 [50-65] B
12 [50-65] AB
13 [65+] O
14 [65+] A
15 [65+] B
16 [65+] AB
Table 53: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 1)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 9451.75 6830.38 3858.69 2452.14
1B 10330.62 7316.52 4137.73 2060.95
2 9987.37 5842.15 5514.90 6403.52
Table 54: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 2)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 9159.13 6528.95 3713.90 2141.06
1B 9910.72 7352.75 4151.35 2851.39
2 9809.52 8770.95 4414.51 2409.12
Table 55: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 3)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 9942.47 6562.14 3473.14 1909.45
1B 9828.78 6776.78 4193.68 2065.05
2 10103.98 8866.96 3325.18 1720.39
Table 56: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 4)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 8669.89 6201.93 4486.51 1577.37
1B 9223.56 6924.85 4255.33 3020.79
2 9633.63 6948.99 4111.03 2292.62
Table 57: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 5)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 9449.36 6811.87 2988.58 863.33
1B 8750.33 6700.207 3577.13 1374.24
2 10469.72 8157.46 5040.80 5411.05
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Table 58: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 6)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 9400.38 6145.19 3470.40 1197.09
1B 10126.54 7087.75 3391.25 1704.89
2 10285.47 6432.37 5896.87 2205.885
Table 59: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 7)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 8325.94 6162.03 3310.36 1353.77
1B 9883.22 6340.02 3442.12 977.46
2 11074.06 5850.47 3456.26 1324.29
Table 60: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 8)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 6850.35 6640.65 2536.18 1087.57
1B 9693.64 6958.98 3657.99 2879.19
2 9920.64 5986.23 2937.81 3469.26
Table 61: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 9)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 9120.64 5880.84 2900.51 1735.72
1B 10213.11 6040.29 4225.98 1882.94
2 10633.56 7468.03 2472.72 2149.85
Table 62: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 10)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 9111.76 6318.25 2834.75 585.62
1B 9814.92 7602.79 4059.18 2003.57
2 11400.31 5122.83 2670.71 2354.74
Table 63: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 11)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 9354.25 5967.19 3006.06 733.24
1B 8681.42 5745.42 3530.73 1408.26
2 10433.26 5484.21 2767.69 2683.11
Table 64: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 12)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 13036.77 4317.99 2148.74 NA
1B 10786.75 5671.73 3680.07 2042.61
2 9709.12 8953.25 2129.88 1890.90
Table 65: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 13)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 9788.129 6092.61 3153.92 2387.92
1B NA 7484.04 6548.36 1437.16
2 NA 1790.06 5520.97 NA
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Table 66: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 14)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A NA NA 4013.75 NA
1B 8313.78 6157.08 5237.22 NA
2 NA NA 5369.02 12604.04
Table 67: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy without Fairness Constraints (Heart type 15)
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A NA NA NA NA
1B 10001.36 NA 4900.78 1084.407
2 NA NA NA NA
patient group (age group [18-35]) to the ones older than 35 years, (2) the [50+] fairness grouping
containing a single constraint on the patients older than 50 years shifts the allocation priority from
the younger patient groups (age groups [18-35] and [35-50]) to the ones older than 50 years, (3) the
[65+] fairness grouping containing a single constraint on the patients older than 65 years shifts the
allocation priority from the patients younger than 65 years to the ones in age group [65+] (note
that although the priority order in the color-coded tables does not change in this case, the priority
coefficients for patients older than 65 years increases while it decreases for the younger ones), (4)
the [50-65] and [65+] fairness grouping containing two constraints one on the patients in age group
[50-65] and one on the patients older than 65 years, shifts the allocation priority towards these
patients (as can be seen from Tables 69 and 71, the priority order in this grouping is similar to
that in [50+] but the former has higher priority coefficients for patients older than 65 years because
it considers two separate constraints on patients in age groups [50-65] and [65+] while the [50+]
grouping combines the two older age groups which emphasizes on prioritizing [50-65] patients more
than the [65+] ones since they have a better post-transplant outcomes), (5) the [35-50] and [50-65]
and [65+] fairness grouping containing three constraints one on the patients in age group [35-50], one
on the patients in age group [50-65], and one on the patients older than 65 years, shifts the allocation
priority towards these patients compared to the absence of fairness constraints, i.e., Table 2.3. As
can be seen from Tables 68 and 72, the priority order in this grouping is similar to that in [35+].
Table 68: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy with Age Fairness Constraints ( [35+])
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 4311.10 6877.52 3966.54 1836.84
1B 4635.35 7413.94 4887.55 2602.07
2 5240.97 7278.59 4661.74 3970.79
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Table 69: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy with Age Fairness Constraints ([50+])
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 6876.80 3707.52 4614.56 2484.87
1B 7201.05 4243.94 5535.57 3250.09
2 7806.67 4108.59 5309.76 4618.82
Table 70: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy with Age Fairness Constraints ([65+])
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 9139.80 5970.51 3059.53 2612.32
1B 9464.05 6506.93 3980.54 3377.55
2 10069.66 6371.58 3754.73 4746.27
Furthermore, comparing the coefficients in Tables 71 and 72 illustrates an increase in coefficients for
age groups [35-50] and a decrease in coefficients for age group [65+] in this grouping, (6) the [1A]
fairness grouping containing a single constraint on the patients with health status 1A, increases the
priority coefficient for 1A patients and consequently decreases the coefficients for 1B and 2 patients
shifting the priority from healthier patients (with health status 1B and mostly 2) towards sicker
patients (1A patients) compared to the case where no fairness constraint is present in the model,
(7) the [1B] fairness grouping containing a single constraint on the patients with health status 1B,
increases the priority coefficient for 1B patients and decreases the coefficients for 1A and 2 patients
shifting the priority from healthier and sicker patients, with health status 2 and 1A respectively,
towards patients with medium health status (1B patients) compared to the case where fairness
constraints are not present in the model, (8) the [2] fairness grouping containing a single constraint
on the patients with health status 2, does not change the priority coefficient of patients since in the
optimal control problem (P1), such a constraint is redundant and its corresponding shadow price is
zero, which suggests that the fairness grouping [2] has no impact on the optimal allocation policy
(the reason is that the OPL policy in the absence of fairness constraints is fairer than UNOS in
allocating hearts to healthier patients with health status 2), (9) the [1A] and [1B] fairness grouping
containing two constraints, one on the patients with health status 1A and one on the 1B patients,
increases the priority coefficients for these patients compared to the case where fairness constraints
Table 71: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy with Age Fairness Constraints ( [50-65] and [65+])
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 6949.29 3780.00 4454.08 2931.64
1B 7273.54 4316.43 5375.09 3696.86
2 7879.16 4181.07 5149.28 5065.59
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Table 72: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy with Age Fairness Constraints ( [35-50] and [50-65]
and [65+])
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 4098.32 7071.02 4711.46 -1288.7
1B 4422.57 7607.45 5632.47 -523.57
2 5028.19 7472.09 5406.66 845.16
Table 73: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy with Health Fairness Constraints ([1A])
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 10698.5 7529.2 4618.2 2488.6
1B 8395.3 5438.2 2911.8 626.3
2 9000.9 5302.9 2686.0 1995.1
Table 74: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy with Health Fairness Constraints ( [1B])
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 9091.61 5922.32 3011.34 881.64
1B 9983.76 7026.65 4500.25 2214.77
2 10021.47 6323.39 3706.54 3015.59
Table 75: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy with Health Fairness Constraints ( [2])
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 9358.52 6189.24 3278.25 1148.56
1B 9682.77 6725.66 4199.26 1913.78
2 10288.39 6590.31 3973.45 3282.51
Table 76: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy with Health Fairness Constraints ([1A] and [1B])
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 11772.47 8603.18 5692.20 3562.50
1B 8039.91 5082.80 2556.41 270.93
2 21.13 -3676.9 -6293.8 -6984.7
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Table 77: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy with Age-Health Combination of Fairness Constraints
( [65+] and [1A])
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 10140.07 6970.78 4059.80 4813.58
1B 8196.87 5239.75 2713.36 3311.35
2 8802.49 5104.40 2487.55 4680.08
Table 78: Color-Coded Graph for OPL Policy with Age-Health Combination of Fairness Constraints
( [50-65] and [65+] and [1A])
Health GroupAge Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+]
1A 7881.10 4711.81 5368.04 4253.28
1B 6297.10 3339.99 4380.81 3110.26
2 6902.72 3204.64 4155.00 4478.99
are absent (note that the priority coefficients for health status 2 patients significantly reduces in this
grouping as the optimal policy puts its priority on 1A and 1B patients together), (10) the [65+] and
[1A] fairness grouping containing one age constraint on the patients older than 65 years and one
health constraint on the 1A patients, increases the priority coefficients for these patients compared
to the case where fairness constraints are absent (comparing the coefficients reveals that in Table 77
priority coefficients are higher for 1A patients (and all the age groups in 1A row) and those older than
65 years while coefficients for 1B and 2 patients in the column of [65+] age group decreases compared
to 70 since the [1A] fairness constraint has more impact on the optimal solution of the problem (P1)
than the [65+] constraint), (11) the [50-65] and [65+] and [1A] fairness grouping containing two age
constraints and one health constraint, increases the priority coefficients for these patients compared
to the case where fairness constraints are absent (comparing the coefficients reveals that in Table
78 priority coefficients are higher for patients in age group [50-65] compared to 70). Furthermore,
by Table 2.8 the OPL policy in the presence of this threshold performs similar to the UNOS policy
as these constraints restrict percentage allocation of hearts to age groups [50-65], [65+] and health
group [1A] to be at least as low as UNOS (recall that we showed earlier that the improvement of
OPL over UNOS is due to prioritizing healthier and younger patients in OPL policy and by imposing
such constraints improvement vanishes, which results in a policy similar to UNOS).
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 2.6.3, the OPL policy is further analyzed via the simulation
model to provide insights about its prioritization criteria in practice. In fact, we compare the
percentage of hearts allocated to different patient classes in simulating OPL and UNOS and the
results are summarized in Figure 18. Our results show that the OPL policy is significantly different
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than UNOS policy in prioritizing patients on the waiting list. In particular, the results indicate that
the OPL policy allocates more donor hearts to healthier patients (with health status 2) and less to
the sickest patients (with health status 1A) compared to the UNOS policy. While the UNOS policy
tends to allocate 49% of the total available hearts to patients with health status 1A, the proposed
OPL policy prefers to assign only 18% to this health group and allocates 45% of the donated hearts
to patients with health status 2, compared to 4% for the UNOS policy. Also, the percentage of
hearts assigned to younger age groups (age groups [18-35] and [35,50]) is greater for the OPL policy
than the UNOS allocation. In fact, the UNOS policy assigns 65% of donor hearts to patients older
than 50 years old, where the OPL policy assigns 51% to such patients. However, as shown in Figure
18c, the percentage of transplants performed on the patients with different VAD statuses is not
significantly different for the two policies. This observation holds true because the post-transplant
survival for patients with VAD is similar to those without VAD (Colvin-Adams et al., 2015). Also,
the proportion of donor hearts transplanted in each of the allocation zones (i.e., DSA, Zone A, B,
C, D, and E) are reported for the two policies in Figure 18d. In the simulation of the UNOS policy
around 77% of all transplants are performed in the DSA of the donor heart and 23% in the proximity
Zones A-E, whereas, the OPL policy assigns 96% of the hearts in the DSA of the available hearts and
only 4% of the transplants are done in Zones A-E. These numbers indicate that finding a match for
an available heart within closer distances of the procured OPO is easier in the OPL policy than that
of UNOS practice. Note that the OPL policy does not directly take proximity zones into account but
changing patient prioritization can indirectly change the proportion of organs assigned to each zone.
In this case, because the OPL policy prioritizes healthier patients and the proportion of healthier
patients is higher on the waiting list (Stevenson, 2015), there is more opportunity to assign patients
in the DSA of the donor heart. Note that in B.6 the regional aspect of allocation is taken into
account and the OPL policy is analyzed in the presence of certain geographical considerations in the
fluid model.
Finally, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, we conduct similar analysis on OPL-F policy (the OPL
policy with fairness constraints over age group [65+] and health group 1A) as we did on OPL in
Section 2.6.3. Specifically, Tables 79 and 80 report the difference between the performance of OPL-F
and UNOS policies in terms of LYs gain and number of death increments broken down to patient’s
health and age groups. Results indicate that OPL-F policy performs similar to the UNOS policy
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Figure 18: Health, Age, VAD, and Zone Priorities for UNOS and OPL
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Table 79: LYs/Death Trade-off for Patient Health Groups (OPL-F minus UNOS
Health Group 1A 1B 2 Inactive Total
Death 7 34 -38 52 55
Total Life-Days (×107) -0.043 0.013 0.044 -0.0009 0.141
Table 80: LYs/Death Trade-off for Patient Age Groups (OPL-F minus UNOS)
Age Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+] Total
Death -5 -17 79 -2 55
Total Life-Days (×107) 0.009 0.133 -0.005 0.003 0.141
in terms of both pre-transplant deaths and total LYs. In addition, similar analysis is conducted
for comparing OPL with the newly proposed UNOS 7-tiered policy and the results are reported in
Tables 81 and 82. Note that since UNOS 7-tiered policy considers new 7-tiered health classes, we
simulate the 7-tiered policy but in order to have a meaningful comparison between OPL and UNOS
7-tiered, in breaking down the reported LYs and death differences into each patient health group,
we report them for a three-tiered system. Results of comparing UNOS 7-Tiered with OPL is very
similar to that of UNOS as the 7-tiered policy produces 625 more pre-transplant deaths but gains
1.49× 107 more total life days compared to OPL. This analysis together with the analysis presented
in Section 2.6.3 provide decision makers with a tool to quantify the cost that policy makers have to
trade off in order to gain an increase in total LYs by switching to a policy based on the utilitarian
approach.
Table 81: LYs/Death Trade-off for Patient Health Groups (OPL minus UNOS-7-tiered)
Health Group 1A 1B 2 Inactive Total
Death 221 30 -116 490 625
Total Life-Days (×107) -4.82 1.63 4.7 -0.015 1.49
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Table 82: LYs/Death Trade-off for Patient Age Groups (OPL minus UNOS-7-tiered)
Age Group [18-35] [35-50] [50-65] [65+] Total
Death -52 -286 510 453 625
Total Life-Days (×107) 1.08 0.62 -0.13 -0.075 1.49
172
Bibliography
Jae-Hyeon Ahn and John C Hornberger. Involving patients in the cadaveric kidney transplant
allocation process: A decision-theoretic perspective. Management Science, 42(5):629–641, 1996.
Mustafa Akan, Oguzhan Alagoz, Baris Ata, Fatih Safa Erenay, and Adnan Said. A broader view of
designing the liver allocation system. Operations Research, 60(4):757–770, 2012.
Oguzhan Alagoz, Lisa M Maillart, Andrew J Schaefer, and Mark S Roberts. The optimal timing of
living-donor liver transplantation. Management Science, 50(10):1420–1430, 2004.
Oguzhan Alagoz, Lisa M Maillart, Andrew J Schaefer, and Mark S Roberts. Determining the
acceptance of cadaveric livers using an implicit model of the waiting list. Operations Research, 55
(1):24–36, 2007.
Eitan Altman. Constrained Markov decision processes, volume 7. CRC Press, 1999.
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Nicole Bäuerle. Optimal control of queueing networks: an approach via fluid models. Advances in
Applied Probability, 34(02):313–328, 2002.
173
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